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«Библиотека слушателей Европейского учебного института при МГИМО (У) МИД России КАКИМИ СТАНУТ ВНУТРЕННИЕ И ВНЕШНИЕ ПОЛИТИКИ ЕС В РЕЗУЛЬТАТЕ ВСТУПЛЕНИЯ В СИЛУ ...»

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Меры для достижения указанных целей подлежат, в  соответствии с  Кон ституцией, установлению в европейских законах и рамочных законах (аналоги настоящих регламентов и  директив соответственно). Таким образом, Кон ституцией Европейского союза предусматривалась возможность применения в энергетике как метода гармонизации, так и метода унификации. Исходя из этого, можно говорить, что создатели Конституции предусмотрели возмож ность выбора разных степеней сближения законодательств государств-членов в данной области.

Вместе с тем указанные законодательные меры Союза не должны были затра гивать выбор государств-членов между различными источниками энергии и об щую структуру их энергоснабжения. Данная оговорка имела достаточно общий и неопределенный характер. Это позволяло говорить об установлении некоего баланса между полномочиями Союза и  государств-членов в  данной области смешанной компетенции. Представляется, что конкретное содержание данной нормы должно было проявиться в процессе ее непосредственного применения.

Раздел Конституции ЕС, посвященный политике в  области трансъевро пейских сетей, не содержал существенных новаций по отношению к  тексту Бирюков М. М. Европейская интеграция: международно-правовой подход. — М.: Научная книга, 2004. С. 146.

Какими станут внутренние и внешние политики ЕС Договора о Сообществе. Статья III-145 содержала специальное указание на то, что основные ориентиры и иные меры в этой области подлежат установлению европейскими законами или рамочными законами. Кроме того, была предусмот рена возможность непосредственного сотрудничества государств-членов для координации национальных мер по развитию сетей при содействии Комиссии.

Лиссабонский договор Подписанный 13 декабря 2007 г. Лиссабонский договор, безусловно, явил ся компромиссом, направленным на примирение радикальных и  умеренных центростремительных (а отчасти и центробежных) тенденций в Европейском союзе. Тем не менее в области энергетики Лиссабонский договор представляет собой значительный шаг вперед по сравнению с действующими на настоящий момент предписаниями. Кроме того, необходимо сразу отметить значительную международную составляющую в изменениях, касающихся энергетики.

Компетенция Союза по Лиссабонскому договору, применимые к энергетике положения, общие положения Определенные Лиссабонским договором виды компетенций Союза в целом аналогичны рассмотренным выше категориям компетенций, предусмотренным Конституцией. К исключительной компетенции Союза отнесены в частности таможенный союз, правила конкуренции, необходимые для функционирования внутреннего рынка, общая торговая политика. Энергетика и трансъевропейские сети входят в совместную компетенцию Союза и государств-членов наряду с ре гулированием внутреннего рынка как такового и вопросов окружающей среды.

Использование совместных компетенций регулируется принципами субси диарности и пропорциональности. Содержание данных принципов уточняется в специальном протоколе к Лиссабонскому договору, который, безусловно, имеет много общего с  действующим в  настоящее время протоколом относительно указанных принципов.

Пределы совместных компетенций Союза регулируются принципом пе редачи полномочий (principle of conferral). Согласно данному принципу Союз действует лишь в  рамках компетенций, переданных ему по договорам госу дарствами-членами, для достижения указанных в  них целей. Компетенции, не переданные Союзу по договорам, сохраняются за государствами-членами.

Интересно отметить, что указанные выше принципы установлены в Дого воре о Европейском союзе, а различные категории компетенций — в Договоре о функционировании Европейского союза (далее по тексту — «Договор о функ ционировании»), который представляет собой видоизмененный Договор об учреждении Европейского сообщества.

Положения последнего из договоров, касающиеся четырех свобод общего рынка и правил конкуренции, не претерпели существенных изменений. Тем не Какими станут внутренние и внешние политики ЕС менее введен ряд дополнений, которые предоставляют возможность институтам Союза принимать ограничительные меры в отношении третьих стран.

Так, согласно части 3 ст. 57 Договора о функционировании Совет, действуя на основе специальной законодательной процедуры, может единогласно, и после консультации с Европарламентом, принять меры, представляющие собой шаг назад в праве Союза в отношении либерализации движения капитала в или из третьих стран. Потенциально применение данного положения может служить не только для целей борьбы с терроризмом, но и для проведения ограничительной энергетической политики Союза по отношению к компаниям из третьих стран.

Одной из форм международного движения капитала является учреждение за границей дочерних или зависимых предприятий. Таким образом, и ограничения на движение капитала из третьих стран могут быть применимы к дочерним и/ или зависимым обществам государств — экспортеров энергоносителей, пред отвращая или препятствуя их интервенции в  форме прямых инвестиций на единый европейский энергетический рынок. Подобные меры по ограничению движения капитала (или по крайней мере возможность их осуществления) могут представлять собой весомый инструмент в  достижении целей Союза в энергетической отрасли.

Кроме того, Лиссабонским договором также закреплена возможность приме нения ограничительных налоговых мер в отношении третьих стран. К данному положению mutatis mutandis также применимы вышеобозначенные коммен тарии. Кроме того, не совсем очевидно, в полной ли мере данное предписание соответствует правилам ВТО.

Безусловно, важное дополнение внесено в ст. 100 Договора о Сообществе.

В первоначальном тексте данной статьи предусматривалось, что Совет ЕС по предложению Комиссии может, исходя из духа солидарности между государ ствами-членами, решить о  принятии мер, соответствующих экономической ситуации, в частности, если возникают серьезные затруднения в поставке опре деленных продуктов. В редакции Лиссабонского договора данное положение дополнено указанием на то, что подобные меры могут быть приняты в случае возникновения сложности в поставке продуктов «прежде всего в области энер гетики» (products in the area of energy).

Очевидно, что к «продуктам … в области энергетики» относятся прежде всего энергетические ресурсы;

хотя можно предположить и принадлежность к этой категории оборудования в области энергетики. Специальное выделение трудностей в поставках энергоресурсов в учредительном договоре, безусловно, свидетельствует о  том внимании, которое придается проблеме обеспечения энергетической безопасности. Кроме того, это может быть истолковано и как сигнал, адресованный государствам-экспортерам и транзитным государствам, о том, что Союз готов выступать «единым фронтом» в случае возникновения угроз надежности поставок энергоресурсов.

Какими станут внутренние и внешние политики ЕС В качестве одной из целей экологической политики Союза указана борьба с климатическими изменениями. Это также может оказать влияние на энерге тическую политику всего ЕС и отдельных государств-членов, на которые эко логические ориентиры — и конкретно ориентиры по борьбе с климатическими изменениями — будут оказывать все большее влияние. Тем более что, как уже указывалось выше, вопросы охраны окружающей среды отнесены к  сфере совместной компетенции Союза и государств-членов. Это означает, что в слу чае принятия институтами ЕС нормативного акта в  этой сфере государства должны будут привести национальные правовые предписания в соответствие с этим актом.

Изменение специальных положений, касающихся энергетики Влияние экологической политики ЕС на энергетику непосредственно про является и в специальных положениях учредительного договора. Аналогично Конституции ЕС в  Лиссабонском договоре энергетике посвящена отдельная глава, также состоящая из одной статьи.

Направления энергетической политики ЕС по сравнению с  положениями Конституции (обеспечение функционирования единого рынка, обеспечение на дежности поставок энергоресурсов в Союз, продвижение энергоэффективности и энергосбережения и развитие новых и возобновляемых источников энергии) дополнены развитием соединений между энергетическими сетями. Таким образом, по тексту Лиссабонского договора, в рамках единой энергетической политики ЕС консолидируются и те направления данной политики, что были обозначены в Конституции ЕС, и деятельность по развитию трансъевропейских энергетиче ских сетей. В этой связи применимые к энергетическим сетям положения раздела о трансъевропейских сетях могут рассматриваться как логическая составляющая общей энергетической политики ЕС. К слову сказать, положения упомянутого раздела не претерпели каких-либо изменений в Лиссабонском договоре.

Новеллой Лиссабонского договора, даже по отношению к Конституции ЕС, является требование солидарности при проведении энергетической политики интеграционного объединения. На наш взгляд, оно может иметь прямое след ствие и для международных аспектов сотрудничества ЕС в данной отрасли, тем более с учетом тех изменений, которые затронули правовые рамки междуна родной деятельности ЕС.

Для достижения указанных выше целей Европарламент и Совет ЕС, действуя в соответствии с обычной законодательной процедурой (аналогична действующей процедуре совместного принятия решений), должны установить необходимые меры. Такие меры должны быть приняты после консультации с Экономическим и социальным советом и Комитетом регионов. Лиссабонский договор, в отличие от Конституции ЕС, не устанавливает конкретные виды правовых актов, которы ми должны быть оформлены данные меры. Отсутствие подобной детализации Какими станут внутренние и внешние политики ЕС связано прежде всего с тем, что в Лиссабонском договоре не нашла отражения установленная в Конституции номенклатура нормативно-правовых и индивиду альных актов (европейские законы, европейские рамочные законы и т.д.).

Выше уже было указано, что Лиссабонский договор представляет собой ком промисс между интеграционными тенденциями с одной стороны и стремлением государств-членов оградить свой суверенитет — с другой. В этой связи в от ношении энергетической политики Союза предусмотрен более существенный перечень ограничений. Так, меры, принимаемые интеграционным объединением в  энергетической отрасли, «не должны затрагивать право государства-члена на определение условий разработки его природных ресурсов, его выбор между различными источниками энергии и общую структуру его энергоснабжения»94.

Следует отметить, что две последние формулировки имеют в достаточной степени оценочный характер. Так или иначе, выбор государства между разными источниками энергии и общая структура энергоснабжения могут быть, безуслов но, затронуты мерами в области конкуренции (которые, необходимо напомнить, находятся в исключительной компетенции Союза), в области охраны окружаю щей среды, общей торговой политики Союза. Исходя из этого, возникает вопрос, насколько допустимы будут подобные меры интеграционного объединения по отношению к национальным энергетическим политикам государств-членов.

В отступление от приведенных выше ограничительных положений Совет ЕС, действуя в  соответствии со специальной законодательной процедурой (аналог действующей в настоящее время консультативной процедуры), должен единогласно устанавливать меры общей энергетической политики, если они носят фискальный характер. Данным положением установлены рамки принятия решений в отношении гармонизации налоговых режимов государств-членов в энергетической отрасли. Первоначальные предложения в данной связи вы сказывались еще в начале 90-х гг. XX века.

Вопросы внешней энергетической политики в Договоре о Союзе В Договор о Союзе добавлен целый ряд положений, касающихся развития отношений с соседними государствами, в число которых входит и Россия, об щей политики в сфере международных отношений, а также индивидуальных действий государств- членов на международной арене.

Согласно общим положениям Союз будет развивать специальные от ношения с  соседними государствами, направленные на установление про странства процветания и  добрососедства, основанного на ценностях Союза и характеризующегося тесными и мирными взаимоотношениями, базирующи мися на сотрудничестве. Интересно отметить, что в качестве основ установления Часть 2 ст. 176А Договора о функционировании Европейского союза (в редакции Лиссабонского договора).

Какими станут внутренние и внешние политики ЕС пространства добрососедства и  процветания указаны ценности Союза и  не упоминаются ценности государств-соседей или хотя бы общие для подобных пассажей «общие ценности, разделяемые обеими сторонами».

В качестве базовых ориентиров в Договоре предусмотрено, что Союз уста навливает и осуществляет общие политики и действия и осуществляет деятель ность, направленную на достижение высокой степени сотрудничества во всех сферах международных отношений, в частности в целях содействия принятию международных мер по сохранению и улучшению качества окружающей среды и устойчивого управления глобальными природными ресурсами для обеспе чения устойчивого развития и в целях продвижения международной системы, основанной на более интенсивном многостороннем сотрудничестве и  надле жащем глобальном управлении.

Включение данных целевых установок в учредительный договор позволяет, в первую очередь, ожидать, что Европейский союз будет выступать «единым фронтом» («to speak with one voice» в английской интерпретации) в отношении значительно большего количества вопросов в  международных отношениях.

Этому будет способствовать и новый статус Высокого представителя Союза по международным делам и политике безопасности, институционализированный Лиссабонским договором. Кроме того, включение в полномочия Союза проблем «управления глобальными природными ресурсами» может непосредственно вовлечь все интеграционное объединение в дискуссии по ряду ключевых во просов, таких, например, как статус природных ресурсов Арктики.

Прежде чем предпринять какое-либо действие на международной арене или вступить в какое-либо соглашение, которое может затронуть интересы Союза, каждое государство-член согласно положениям Лиссабонского договора должно проконсультироваться с другими государствами-членами в рамках Европейского совета или Совета ЕС. Государства-члены должны обеспечить путем сближения своих действий, чтобы Союз мог отстаивать и продвигать свои интересы на меж дународной арене, а также должны демонстрировать взаимную солидарность95.

Подобное требование солидарности представляет собой существенное огра ничение односторонних действий государств- членов на международной арене.

Односторонние действия теперь могут быть охарактеризованы как самовольные и нарушающие требования солидарности. Тем не менее в Договоре не установле ны обязательные критерии, которые бы помогали определить, во-первых, в каких случаях предполагаемое действие или соглашение может «затронуть интересы Союза», то есть в каких случаях государству необходимо прибегать к процедуре консультации в рамках Совета. Во-вторых, не понятно, в каких пределах госу дарства-члены должны обеспечить сближение действий и каким должен быть результат консультаций в рамках Совета, будет ли он оформлен в виде одобрения Ст. 16 Договора о Европейском союзе (в редакции Лиссабонского договора).

Какими станут внутренние и внешние политики ЕС или запрета действия или некоего общего направления политики. И, в-третьих, в связи с неясностью предыдущего вопроса до конца не очевидно, какими будут последствия несоблюдения государством-членом рекомендаций Совета.

В свете отношений в области энергетики подобное требование ставит под вопрос реализацию проектов двухстороннего и многостороннего сотрудниче ства между Россией и отдельными государствами-членами. Уже сейчас можно сказать, что подобные проекты, и уж тем более межгосударственные соглашения, подписываемые в рамках таких проектов, будут находиться под более присталь ным вниманием, если не сказать контролем, институтов Союза.

Вывод В целом, рассматривая нововведения в регулирование энергетической поли тики ЕС, установленные Лиссабонским договором, можно отметить, пожалуй, два ключевых момента. Во-первых, вслед за Конституцией ЕС институциона лизированы основные направления политики интеграционного образования в этой отрасли. Во-вторых, обозначено усиление роли ЕС на международной арене, в том числе и путем консолидации политик государств-членов. При этом предусмотрена возможность осуществления ограничительных мер в отношении третьих стран, а также антикризисных мероприятий в случае возникновения сложностей в поставках энергоресурсов в ЕС.

Трыканова Светлана Анатольевна Доцент Кафедры государственно-правовых дисциплин и менеджмента РГУ имени С. А. Есенина Актуальные тенденции в организационно-правовом регулировании миграционной политики ЕС и Лиссабонский договор Лиссабонский договор является новой вехой в развитии европейской интег рации. Данный документ дает новый импульс для решения актуальных проблем, стоящих перед Европейским союзом.

Анализ событий во Франции и  других странах Европейского союза пока зывает, что совершенствование правовой базы миграционной политики стало первостепенной задачей обеспечения европейской безопасности. На современ ном этапе в Европейском союзе отсутствует единая политика в области регу лирования миграционных процессов. В последние годы вопрос гармонизации миграционной политики все чаще поднимается на форумах ЕС. Так, на саммитах Какими станут внутренние и внешние политики ЕС в Тампере (Финляндия) в 1999 г. и в Брюсселе (Бельгия) в 2004 г.отмечалось, что вопросы предоставления убежища и регулирования миграции требуют развития единой политики ЕС.

Миграционная политика ЕС в настоящее время остается в компетенции на циональных правительств, которые в большинстве случаев начинают усиленно разрабатывать программы привлечения иммигрантов, а также всеобъемлющие программы сотрудничества со странами — традиционными экспортерами тру довых ресурсов в Европу. Примером этого может послужить программа Green Card в Германии, процедура ускоренного приема на работу определенных кате горий трудовых ресурсов из третьих стран в Великобритании или соглашение о приеме рабочей силы, подписанное в апреле 2001 г. между Испанией и Марокко.

Каждая страна устанавливает свои собственные критерии приема. Зачастую государства с  обширным колониальным опытом выдвигают более мягкие условия для граждан своих бывших колоний (Франция, Испания, Великобри тания), чем для граждан других развивающихся государств. Напротив, страны, в  наибольшей степени подвергающиеся наплыву иммигрантов, принимают новые более жесткие иммиграционные законы, учитывающие в основном их национальные, а не коммунитарные интересы.

Правовое регулирование миграционной политики в ЕС осуществляется на двух уровнях: законодательства стран, входящих в состав ЕС, и нормативных документов ЕС.

Правовое и  политическое регулирование вопросов миграции в  ЕС под чиняется принципу субсидиарности. Правовое обеспечение миграционной политики ЕС — международные договоры, директивы и рамочные соглашения («модельные» и обязательно имплементативные нормы права для гармонизации законодательства в странах ЕС), законодательство национальных государств.

Следует выделять два вида миграционных потоков в ЕС: миграция граждан ЕС и миграция граждан третьих стран по территории Сообщества.

Законодательный статус миграционная политика ЕС по отношению к граж данам третьих стран получила после вступления в силу Амстердамского дого вора 1997 г., в который был включен раздел IV «Визы, убежище, иммиграция и другие направления политики, связанные со свободным перемещением лиц».

Данная сфера также регулируется Шенгенским соглашением, принятым в 1990 г., вступившим в силу в 1995 г.

Следует отметить, что правовое регулирование миграции граждан третьих стран на территории ЕС долгое время отсутствовало. Объем прав и обязанно стей граждан конкретной третьей страны регулировался но основе междуна родных соглашений между ЕС и этой страной.

В последние годы Союзом были предприняты усилия по гармонизации режима свободного передвижения и  проживания граждан третьих стран на территории государств-членов.

Какими станут внутренние и внешние политики ЕС Результатом проведенной работы стали Директива Совета 2003/109/ЕС от 25  ноября 2003  г. о  статусе граждан третьих стран, проживающих на долго срочной основе, и Директива Совета 2003/86/ЕС от 22 сентября 2003 г. о праве на семейное воссоединение. Вместе с тем статус члена семьи гражданина Сою за, которые являются гражданами третьих стран, определяется Директивой 2004/38/ЕС.

Однако в настоящее время государственные органы и население стран ЕС столкнулись с целым рядом очень серьезных проблем, от решения кото рых в определенной степени зависит будущее Европейского союза, которые требуют правового регулирования. К  таким проблемам нужно отнести следующие:

— отсутствие единого определения понятия «мигрант». Так, в одних странах (Германия и  страны Южной Европы) в  первую очередь при определении гражданства мигранта принимают во внимание его национальность, и глав ную роль при этом играют доказательства его происхождения от той или иной этнической группы (принцип jus sanguinis). В то же время, например, Франция и Великобритания при определении гражданства лица первооче редное значение придают месту его рождения (принцип jus solis);

— отсутствие унифицированной правовой базы по обеспечению статуса ино странцев, приезжающих в шенгенские государства на долгосрочный период (более трех месяцев) или постоянно в них проживающих;

— недостаточные полномочия Европейского союза в  сфере контроля за пе редвижением людей по территории Союза, отсутствие единого механизма реагирования на угрозы иммиграции, так как до сих пор существовали лишь системы договоров между странами внутри и вне ЕС;

— плохое функционирование системы регулирования иммиграционных пото ков, которые из эпизодического явления превращаются в ЕС в постоянный фактор;

— недостаточная степень адаптированности к современным условиям правовой базы, касающейся нелегальных иммигрантов и беженцев;

— несовершенство законодательства и мер по адаптации иммигрантов к усло виям труда, быта и культуры страны их пребывания.

Таким образом, можно сделать вывод, что в начале XXI века миграция ста новится главным аспектом европейской безопасности.

Лиссабонский договор дает больший объем наднационального организаци онно-правового ресурса в регулировании миграционной политики ЕС.

В заключение следует отметить, что, выстраивая эффективную миграци онную политику, надо прийти к осознанию того, что это задача комплексная, требующая взаимодействия всех уровней власти и стратегического мышления.

Тактическими задачами или недолговременными решениями здесь руковод ствоваться нельзя.

Письменные доклады на английском языке Rikard Barkeling Political Section, Delegation of the European Commission to Russia The EU as a Foreign Policy Actor after the Treaty of Lisbon Foreign policy implications of the Treaty of Lisbon The Treaty of Lisbon that will enter into force, as we hope, in 2009  has major implications for the capabilities of the European Union as a global actor. First of all, it will make the European Union more understandable for the outside world. The distinction so far between, on the one hand, the European Community denoting the traditional competencies of the European Commission [trade, competition and agriculture in particular] and, on the other hand, the European Union as an overarching political framework without legal personality as such has been a source of certain confusion ever since the Maastricht Treaty entered into force in 1993.

The Treaty of Lisbon brings clarity by giving the European Union a single legal personality in international legal terms. This will make the Union more comprehensible for the outside world. The change will also make the Union more visible and stronger as an international negotiator insofar as the European Union as such from now on — endowed with legal personality — will be able to conclude international agreements in it own capacity.

Another important feature of the Treaty of Lisbon from a foreign policy perspective is that it will bridge the foreign policy competencies of the Council and the foreign policy competencies of the Commission. This will be the direct consequence when the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy — appointed by the Council — simultaneously will serve as Vice-President of the Commission.

Thus, we will be close to having an EU ‘foreign minister’. We expect that this dual empowerment — or ‘double hat’ — of the High Representative will ensure that the European Union will be better ‘dressed’ in the international context.

A direct consequence of the Treaty of Lisbon is also that an EU diplomatic service will be created. This European External Action Service will be set up through a Council decision in 2008. The service will be put at the disposal of the High Representative and receive its funding from the EU budget.

The basis for this External Action Service will be the currently existing network of European Commission Delegations that exist in 132 countries worldwide with a total Какими станут внутренние и внешние политики ЕС staff of 6,000 people. In order to become a fully-fledged and genuine EU service, this structure will include civil servants — not only from the Commission — but also from the member states’ administrations, as well as personnel from the Council secretariat.

The EU as a Foreign Policy Actor One of the biggest mistakes that an analyst of international affairs can do is to assume that the basic rationale of international actors is shared by all international players and that their behaviour merely is a question of military and economic might.

This is the reason for why scholars of international relations in recent years have shown a strong interest for issues such as institutions, socialisation and identity. Given the institutional complexity of the European Union and the cultural heterogeneity of its members, any analysis of the EU as a foreign policy actor and of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) must start with a look at what makes the European Union completely unique in the context of foreign policy and inter-state relations.

To assume that the European Union merely is the latest incarnation of the traditional great power completely misses the point. The reason is that the European Union is a completely unique case of international actorness. Until the start of the modern European integration project soon after the Second World War, Europe had been the bloody battleground of competing ‘national ideas’ and truths for hundreds and hundreds of years. The integrationist processes that have taken us from there to where we are today in 2008 lack precedents in world history. No other country, or so called great power, has gone through something similar to what nations such as France and Germany have gone through since the Second World War.

The European Union as we know it today is the result of a process in which sovereign democratic states — some of them traditional so called great powers having waged wars with each other for centuries — gradually have handed over some of their sovereignty to supra-national bodies. Initially, they did so believing that interdependencies created in non-political areas such as coal and steel would reduce the likelihood for new military conflicts. Since then, many other motivations behind the European integration have emerged and, in turn, fuelled the process that we have called enlargement.

One of the most important motivations is the realisation among European democracies that the practice of ‘pooling sovereignty’ sometimes is a more effective way of addressing the challenges of the globalised world than to simply continue to exercise traditional national sovereignty. In other words, more and more sovereign democratic countries have realised that many of the challenges in an inter-connected world are best addressed by taking a crucial step beyond traditional inter-governmental cooperation.

The most obvious examples of those challenges include cross-border threats related to the environment, but the advantage of selling one’s goods and services at the world’s biggest integrated market and to move freely throughout the whole continent are also reasons for why countries chose to ‘pool sovereignty’ in the EU context. In this context, it should be stressed that even though the EU is a unique case, the EU member states Какими станут внутренние и внешние политики ЕС include many of the oldest nation states on earth. Thus, it is not the lack of strong national identities that have provided the basis for EU integration. On the contrary, EU integration has taken place against all odds — at least from a broader perspective taking into consideration the historic ‘track record’ of Europe.

After this brief outline of the rationales behind the decision of Europeans to choose the path of integration, it is important to stress what this integration has done with the minds and hearts of those participating in the integration. A useful word invented by the social sciences in this context is ‘socialisation’. This sounds theoretical, but is simply a way of speaking about the mindset through which EU looks upon the world.

Socialisation denotes the process in which an actor’s worldview is affected by his or her social interaction with others. The European Union is a project that has taken large parts of Europe from a permanent state of war to a permanent state of negotiations or — as someone put it — a ‘highly developed system for mutual interference in each other’s domestic affairs right down to beer and sausages’.

A permanent negotiation implies that a failed round of talks always harbours a successful round of negotiations. Another result of the permanent negotiation is that people from different contexts meet each other regularly. This has important consequences — apart from what actually is achieved at the negotiation table. Moreover, these frequent contacts between the civil servants of various member states affect the way national elites look upon each other and — not less important — at their sovereignty.

In fact, European integration is a process through which former enemies — step by step  — have started to identify common interests rather than narrow national ones. This process has implied a dramatic redefinition of ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ and ensured that the European continent has ceased to be the bloody battleground of competing truths or ‘national ideas’. In a sense, a post-modern order can be said to have been established among the members of the European Union. In this order, an armed conflict between the twenty-seven EU member states is inconceivable today. In a broad historic perspective, this is one of the most remarkable achievements ever. Unfortunately, this achievement is too often taken for granted.

With an absolute majority of European states now being members of the European Union, the enlargement — which in a sense has been a direct export of the post-modern order — has lost some of its previous relevance as the main foreign policy instrument of the Union. This makes it possible and necessary for the European Union to pay more attention to what happens beyond Europe. This exploratory look finds a world that definitely is not characterised by the post-modern order that is emerging between the EU member states with their total population of around 500 million people.

The world outside the European Union includes to a large extent countries where war — especially civil war — still is a constant and real threat. It is a world where states occasionally cease to function, where states fail to protect its citizens and Какими станут внутренние и внешние политики ЕС where borders collapse, which — in turn — creates a fertile ground for terrorists and criminal groups. This is important to stress insofar as the first line of defence for the EU often is abroad, as stipulated by the European Security Strategy from 2003. This leads us to the question whether post-modern Europe is prepared to assume a real international role at the first line of defence in the occasionally chaotic ‘pre-modern’ world. Some analysts have questioned this. One of them is Robert Kagan, who has argued that the European integration project always has been — and remains — a ‘post-modern paradise’ still depending on the United States when it comes to security in the ‘pre-modern world’.

When it comes to the discussion about security in the occasionally chaotic ‘pre modern’ world, it is crucial to define which kind of security we are speaking about. The case of Iraq today, on the one hand, and post-WWII Germany and Japan, on the other, are illustrative examples of how completely different types of security engagements by the outside world can have completely different consequences.

If we want to develop prosperous democracies in the world, it is — to use the words of Chris Patten — important to realise that democracy building is intrinsically different from making instant coffee. And as regards the transformative power necessary to achieve positive change and security from within, then the European Union is probably better equipped than any other international actor — both when it comes to the toolkit and means available, but also when it comes to its international goodwill. In this sense, it is not true that we are the ones who depend on others when it comes to safeguarding human security in the world. Sometimes, others are in fact dependent on the goodwill and holistic approach to human security that has become the competitive advantage of the EU when it comes to foreign policy.

Current Activities of the European Union in the World In order to avoid becoming too theoretical, I would like to give some examples of the holistic and transformative power [‘soft power’ sometimes has pejorative connotations in discussions about foreign policy;

I will therefore avoid the expression here] that is the hallmark and competitive advantage of the European Union when it comes to foreign policy.

One of the most important contributions of the EU for world security — both our own security and the security of others  — is development aid. In fact, the European Union is the biggest donor of development aid in the world. Aid from the European Union amounts to more than half of the money spent every year by the world community to help poor countries. In 2006, 47 billion Euros were spent by the Union and its member states for these purposes. This is the equivalent of 0,43% of the member states’ total GDP. The ambitious goal of the European Union is to increase this level to 0,7% by 2015. Development aid is only one aspect of what it takes to take people out of poverty, but it is clear that the security of the developed world ultimately depends on our ability to eradicate poverty. Everyone having spent some time in a Какими станут внутренние и внешние политики ЕС country or city with big income disparities knows perfectly well that these disparities can destabilise the situation in a way that ultimately threatens the security of those better off. In other words — to help others is to help ourselves.

The issue of poverty can not be successfully addressed in isolation from the issue of trade. This is one of the underlying reasons for the EU strategy of ‘making globalisation work for everyone’, as well as for our commitment to bring the Doha Round of world trade liberalisation to its successful conclusion. The EU has taken the lead in order to make a deal possible. It is crucial that the ultimate outcome of the Doha Round also covers agricultural market access.

Another important example of the EU as a global actor is the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which aims at avoiding the emergence of new dividing lines between the new enlarged European Union and our neighbours by promoting the development of prosperity and stability in our neighbourhood. The ENP reaches out to its neighbours in a tailor-made way. It should be seen in separation from the enlargement process, but does not prejudge for European neighbours their future relations with the EU.

The European Union attaches great importance to the promotion of intercultural dialogue, which explains the initiative to make 2008 the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue. This year-long event aims first and foremost at helping the citizens of the European Union to deal with the increasingly complex cultural environment, but is also of high relevance for countries outside the European Union insofar as it includes a component of dialogue between Islam and Christianity. Coupled with socio-economic prosperity, promotion of human security and support to moderate Islam, this dialogue can also help us to eliminate the economic despair and anger that underpins terrorist activities worldwide.

Let me also highlight some recent cases of how the European Union acts for the sake of human security in the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). In January 2008, the EU launched — in line with UN Security Council Resolution 1778 — the EUFOR TCHAD/RCA military operation in order to address the long-standing humanitarian crisis in Darfur by contributing to the protection of civilians in danger, facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid and protecting UN personnel.

Another example of how the European Union resolutely addresses urgent needs outside the Union is the EULEX rule of law mission to Kosovo announced in February 2008 with the aim to contribute to Kosovo’s and the region’s long term stability. Its staff consisting of more than 2,000 members will assist Kosovo — in a context of conditional independence — to secure minority rights, policing, customs and the establishment of an independent judicial system. The EU force will include police, judges and customs officers. With a number of Balkan countries already members of the European Union and several standing in line, the EU considers that it has a particular responsibility to safeguard stability in Kosovo.

Какими станут внутренние и внешние политики ЕС The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a conflict that has implications far beyond those directly concerned in the disputed territories. This conflict has huge implications for world security and is a good example of when the holistic approach of the EU is most relevant. Let me, in this context, recall the launch of the new EU mechanism — PEGASE — created for channelling assistance to facilitate the building of a Palestinian State. It will channel assistance, in particular, to the areas of governance, social development, economic and private sector development, as well as public infrastructure.

The instrument preceding PEGASE  — the Temporary International Mechanism (TIM)  — attracted contributions from 19  international donors (including 15 EU member states) amounting to 190 million Euros in 2006 and 2007.

Conclusions It is a common wisdom that a good understanding of foreign policy starts with an analysis of domestic factors. In this paper, I have tried to address some of the domestic factors that will continue to shape the EU as a foreign policy actor under the new Treaty of Lisbon. I have done this by describing the EU as a process in which a number of European nations ‘pool’ national sovereignty, engage in permanent negotiations and start defining common interests rather than strictly national. All these characteristics are important to take into consideration when looking at the EU as an actor on the international arena. They will continue to mark the EU and make the Union particularly predisposed for multi-lateral solutions and holistic approaches towards international security.

Cameron Fraser Director of the EU — Russia Centre, Brussels The Lisbon Treaty — a New Milestone for Europe?

Introduction The European Union has always known and survived crises. But between 2003 and 2005 the EU experienced three major shocks that could arguably have destroyed the EU. In 2003, the Union was in total disarray over the Iraq war, in 2004 it experienced its biggest ever enlargement from 15 to 25 Member States, and in 2005 French and Dutch voters rejected the Constitutional Treaty. For over two years the EU drifted in a state of limbo until the European Council agreed a modified treaty (the Treaty of Lisbon) in December 2007. This paper examines the main changes in the new treaty and assesses its likely impact over the next decade.

Какими станут внутренние и внешние политики ЕС From Laeken to the Convention The background to any debate on treaty reform covers familiar battle ground. On the one side are those arguing in favour of deepening the Union, i.e. strengthening the institutions. On the other side, are those arguing in favour of widening the Union, i.e.

bringing in new members as quickly as possible. Historically, the two processes have always gone hand in hand. Each previous enlargement has been accompanied by a strengthening of the institutions. The EU has also become accustomed to reforming its treaty base every few years. The first treaty reform, the Single European Act, took place thirty years after the Treaty of Rome. The pace then quickened with Maastricht in 1991, Amsterdam in 1997, Nice in 2001 and Lisbon in 2007.

One reason for the quickening pace of reform was the continuing struggle between the federalists and the confederalists. The federalists reached their high point between 1987–92. After Maastricht, with the formation of the highly complicated pillar structure for the new European Union, they fought to reverse the inter-governmental trend.

Their efforts were largely unsuccessful. In most key areas of policy the Union requires unanimity to proceed. The Union thus was, is and will remain a unique generic structure. At the same time there remains no consensus over its ultimate destination — or the finality politique as the French say.

The starting point for the latest debate on treaty reform was twofold. First, the prospect of the Union enlarging from 15  to 25/27 Member States. Second, the growing evidence of a gulf between EU elites and the citizens. Accordingly, the Laeken Declaration of December 2001 stated that: “The Union needs to become more democratic, more transparent and more efficient. It also has… to bring citizens, and primarily the young, closer to the European design and the European institutions”.

Measured against these lofty aims the Lisbon treaty can be considered a failure. The 250 pages of articles and the plethora of footnotes are quite unintelligible to the average citizen. It is also ironic that the French and Dutch voted against the Constitutional Treaty that had been agreed after the most transparent process in the history of EU treaty revision. The Convention on the Future of Europe, that brought together MPs, MEPs, Member States and EU institutions, was a marked contrast to the smoke-filled rooms of previous years. But, arguably, the single biggest mistake of the Convention, led by former French President Giscard d’Estaing, was to describe its finished product as a constitution. This was a red rag to the Eurosceptic bulls roaming around Europe, especially in the UK.

After two years of ‘reflection’  — when the EU was supposed to be listening to the wishes of its citizens — the Member States agreed to move ahead. The European Council of June 2007 decided to convene an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) to draw up a Lisbon Treaty “amending the existing Treaties with a view to enhancing the efficiency and democratic legitimacy of the enlarged Union, as well as the coherence of its external action”. The mandate gave the IGC little margin for manoeuvre, more or less Какими станут внутренние и внешние политики ЕС confining it “to a role of legal expert” in charge of implementing political compromises which had been previously decided by the Heads of State and Government.

The Lisbon Treaty agreed by EU leaders in October 2007 simply amends the existing Treaties. The idea of replacing all of them with a single text — called a Constitutional Treaty — was dropped. The treaty also dropped all reference to the symbols of the Union such as the flag and the anthem;

it did a U-turn on proposals to introduce the term “laws” or “framework laws”;

and the designation “Union Minister for Foreign Affairs”. But even the gravediggers of the Constitutional Treaty must acknowledge that many of the innovations resulting from the 2004 IGC have been integrated into the Lisbon Treaty, especially the institutional provisions — although there are noticeable differences between the Constitutional Treaty and its replacement.

The Lisbon Treaty: Institutional Changes What are the main institutional changes in the Lisbon Treaty? Will they significantly improve decision-making in an EU of 27 plus? Are there winners and losers from the reforms among the different EU institutions, or between the Union and Member States?

Of all the key institutional changes in the Lisbon Treaty, the extension of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) in the Council of Ministers to 50 new policy areas is probably the most important issue. In an EU of 27 plus these changes are highly valuable because they limit the possibility for any Member State to use its veto to block decision-making.

Although formal votes are rarely taken in the Council, the QMV rule implies that the Member States have to build coalitions in order to reach compromises. This is very different from the unanimity rule, which allows any Member State to block the decision-making process.

Parallel to the extension of QMV, the new system of Double Majority Voting (DMV) — with proposals requiring the support of at least 55% of the Member States (comprising at least 15 of them) representing at least 65% of the EU population to be passed — has been preserved in the Lisbon Treaty. However, because of opposition from Poland (supported by some other Member States, such as the Czech Republic), the new DMV system will only take effect on November 1, 2014, with the present weighting system continuing to apply until then.

From then, until 31 March 2017, two more restrictions will be in place. First, when a decision is to be adopted by qualified majority, any Member State may request that it be taken in accordance with the QMV rules as defined in the current Treaty. Second, if Member States representing at least 25% of the population or 25% of the Member States necessary to constitute a blocking minority, oppose the Council adopting an act by qualified majority, the Member States must search for a satisfactory solution to answer their preoccupations;

in other words, they should reach a consensus. It will be impossible for EU citizens to understand such a complicated mechanism and it does little to meet their demands for greater transparency in EU decision-making.

However, introducing this transitional period was the only way to persuade Poland Какими станут внутренние и внешние политики ЕС to sign up to the new Treaty. Polish President Lech Kaczynski wanted to stick with the voting system laid down in the Nice Treaty, regarding it as the best deal to satisfy Poland’s demand for ‘big’ Member State status. It is true that DMV, by formalising the population criterion, favours the EU’s more populated countries — Germany today and maybe Turkey tomorrow. However, no system can guarantee a perfect representation of all the Member States.

The delay in introducing the new and fairer voting system until 2014/2017 means that the Union will be forced to maintain the current unfair system for several years.

This is hardly likely to be conducive to greater efficiency or legitimacy.

The European Council President The Lisbon Treaty also transforms the European Council into a ‘full’ institution, distinct from the Council of Ministers. Born as an ad hoc institution in 1974, the European Council has been progressively institutionalised in EU treaties since the Single European Act (1987). This evolution makes sense, because it is within the European Council that the Heads of State and Government build the main political compromises on EU policies.

The European Council’s power will be enhanced by its new right to elect its own President (by QMV) for a two-and-a-half-year term, renewable once. The Presidency of the various Councils of Ministers (except that of Foreign Affairs) will continue to be held by each Member State for six months on the basis of equal rotation, but the Presidency of the European Council will be permanent.

The rationale for this change was that with 27 member-states, the current system of shifting the presidency from one country to the next every six months has simply become unworkable. Some smaller countries struggle with the huge task of running the EU’s complex agenda;

and bigger ones sometimes mix up national priorities with the European interest. Moreover, rotation results in too little follow-up on summit decisions. It will not be easy to find the right person for the job. He or she will need to be a consensual figure but also weighty enough to set the agenda and cajole EU governments into implementing their political promises. Already there is considerable jockeying for position with names such as Blair, Juncker and Rasmussen being mentioned as possible candidates. Inevitably, this appointment will be part of a wider package deal involving the President of the Commission and the first new-style High Representative. This deal will be dependent on the outcome of the 2009 elections to the European Parliament and will require considerations of party balance and geography.

One of the potential problem areas relates to external representation as the Lisbon Treaty (Art. 9 B.6) states that the Council President “at his or her level, and in that capacity, shall ensure the external representation of the Union on issues concerning CFSP without prejudice to the powers of the High Representative…” Given that, the President of the Commission also has powers in this field: it will be interesting to see Какими станут внутренние и внешние политики ЕС how the tasks are divided up. In a future crisis such as Iraq it is doubtful that the new structures would make much difference. Washington would still call London, Berlin and Paris for support before turning to Brussels.


The Commission The Lisbon Treaty also confirmed the new composition of the Commission enshrined in the Constitutional Treaty, but again only from 1 November 2014. Until then, the College of Commissioners will continue to have one national from each member state, including the Commission President and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who will be one of its Vice-Presidents. For this latter job, which will be created in 2009 (assuming the Treaty has been ratified), the EU will need an active politician who can navigate a course between the instructions he or she receives from the European Council President and those from the Commission President.

Regrettably, the EU is condemned to function with a large College of Commissioners for seven more years, with an inevitable sectorisation of tasks and a difficult question to answer when Croatia joins: what portfolio could its Commissioner be given, given that there are already not really enough ‘proper’ jobs to go round? The switch, from November 2014, to having Commissioners from just two-thirds of the Member States (selected on a rotating basis) will be an improvement. The Lisbon Treaty states that this rotation shall be organised in an equal manner, and it is indeed important for every Member State, whatever its population size, to have the same right to be represented in the Commission. However, some rationality should also be introduced in the order of rotation, as is currently the case for the Presidency of the Council of Ministers. Could one really imagine a College of Commissioners which includes Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian members but no British, German or French?

Reducing the size of the College will undoubtedly remain a sensitive issue in future, especially for the ‘small’ Member States which are now in the majority and will argue that they have already lost power in the Council with DMV. The Lisbon Treaty also reinforces the political legitimacy of the Commission President, stating that “the European Council acting by a qualified majority, shall propose to the European Parliament a candidate for President of the Commission. This candidate shall be elected by the European Parliament by a majority of its component members”.

If the European Parliament votes for a Commission President according to political criteria (right/left cleavage), this will move the EU closer to a majoritarian political system. But will this necessarily be the case? Nationality could also remain a criterion for choosing the holder of this post. Furthermore, the Commission President’s appointment will be part of the above-mentioned package deal. Considering that most competences are shared between the EU and the Member States, conflicts will be inevitable between the two personalities whose legitimacy flows from two different sources.

Какими станут внутренние и внешние политики ЕС Shifts in Parliamentary Power The Lisbon Treaty also introduces changes for the European Parliament. As has been the case in every institutional reform since the Single European Act, the Parliament’s legislative power will increase through an extension of the co-decision procedure, especially in matters relating to policing and the judiciary. However, these changes do not mean that the citizens will necessarily become more aware of the real role played by the Parliament in the EU legislative process.

The Lisbon Treaty stipulates that the number of MEPs should not exceed 750, plus the Parliament President. The representation of citizens will be degressively proportional, with a minimum threshold of six MEPs per Member State, and no Member State shall be allocated more than 96 seats. Again, this will only apply after the June 2009 European elections (i.e. in 2014). The Lamassoure-Severin Report, adopted by the Parliament’s Constitutional Committee in October 2007, set out proposals for distributing seats between the Member States to take account of the new 750-member ceiling. These envisaged a decrease in the number of seats for most of the Member States, with only Austria, Malta, Slovenia and Sweden getting a slight increase. In the final treaty negotiations at the October Informal Summit in Lisbon, Romano Prodi’s Italian government contested the proposed end to the parity between the number of seats devoted to Italy (72) and other ‘big’ countries like France and the UK. The compromise, as usual in the EU, was a ‘half-half ’ solution: in 2009, Italy will get the same number of seats as the UK (73) but one less than France.

Any analysis of the new institutional balance introduced by the Lisbon Treaty is not complete without examining the new role given to national institutions and to national parliaments in particular. In general, the Lisbon Treaty puts more emphasis than the Constitutional Treaty on avoiding any encroachment by the EU on national competences. The new Article 5 of the Treaty on the European Union states, for instance, that: “The Union shall act only within the limits of the competences conferred upon it by the Member States”. National parliaments will now be given eight weeks, instead of six, to examine draft legislative texts and give an opinion on whether the Treaty’s subsidiarity provisions have been respected. The subsidiarity control mechanism is also reinforced in the sense that if a draft EU legislative act is contested by a majority of national parliaments, the Commission must re-examine the proposal and decide whether to maintain, amend or withdraw it.

If it chooses the first option, it will have to justify why it considers that the draft complies with the principle of subsidiarity. The Commission’s opinion, and those of the national parliaments, will then be transmitted to the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament for consideration. If the Council and Parliament decide (by a majority of 55% of Council members or a majority of votes cast in the Parliament) that the proposal is not compatible with the subsidiarity principle, it will not be given any further consideration. It remains to be seen whether national parliaments will Какими станут внутренние и внешние политики ЕС invoke this right to give an opinion often or not. One first conclusion can already be drawn, however: namely, that they will become full players in the EU decision-making process, acting as the ‘watchdogs’ of national competences. Several other examples of how the role of national parliaments has been enhanced can be found in the Lisbon Treaty, such as the possibility to contest any EU proposal relating to family law.

Majority voting on Internal Security The new treaty scraps national vetoes in about 50 areas. Many of these are minor, and some are needed to allow the EU to implement its declared priorities, such as the swift disbursement of overseas aid. The most radical shift concerns decisions on EU co-operation for fighting terrorism, crime and illegal immigration, or what officials refer to as justice and home affairs (JHA). In most policy areas, such as the single market or transport, the Commission drafts laws, the Council of Ministers and European Parliament decide on them, and the European Court of Justice has the right to review whether the member-states comply with them. Decisions on JHA, on the other hand, require unanimity, and they are beyond ECJ jurisdiction. The need for painstaking consensus has resulted in frequent delays and watered-down compromises in this hugely important policy area. And the lack of ECJ involvement has raised concerns that EU legislation for, say, extraditing suspected criminals, could infringe human rights. Therefore, from 2009 most JHA issues will be dealt with like normal EU business. Since many of the issues at stake are sensitive, the EU has added an ‘emergency brake’ that allows each government to halt discussions on a JHA measure that could threaten its national legal system. If the country in question cannot reach a compromise with its EU partners, it is free to opt out of the measure.

Despite the availability of this safeguard, the British government has negotiated an opt-out from all JHA policies. Ireland, with which the UK has a common travel area, will also follow this arrangement.

Foreign and Security Policy One of the potentially biggest changes in the Lisbon treaty is the merging of the current position of High Representative for CFSP with that of the Commissioner for External Relations. The new beefed up High Representative will also be a Vice President of the Commission and chair the external affairs council. Perhaps even more important, he will have control of a new external action service that is de facto an EU diplomatic service.

The Council’s High Representative (currently Javier Solana) has the political clout that comes from speaking on the EU’s behalf — provided the 27 member-states agree on what he should say. But he has few resources. The commissioner for external action (currently Benita Ferrero-Waldner) has a Euro 10 billion annual budget and a huge staff of officials. But she has little diplomatic weight since foreign policy is decided by the Council, not the Commission. Co-operation between the two foreign policy Какими станут внутренние и внешние политики ЕС figureheads is often difficult, and sometimes entirely absent. The Reform Treaty therefore proposes the only sensible solution: a merger of the two posts. In response to UK pressure, the merged post will not be called the ‘EU foreign minister’ but the High Representative for Foreign Policy and Security. Though less catchy, the title is more accurate. The High Representative will chair the meetings of EU foreign ministers, which will allow him or her to steer the Union’s foreign policy agenda. Like Benito Ferrero-Waldner now, the High Representative will be in charge of the EU’s external relations budget. And he or she will preside over the EU’s new ‘external action service’ which is designed to provide administrative support and advice. Their service will consist of the foreign affairs departments (including the overseas missions) of the Council and the Commission, as well as officials seconded by the Member States. In key foreign policy areas, the new High Representative (like Solana now) will only be able to act if there is unanimous agreement among all Member States. But he will be in a strong position to put forward proposals and follow through when agreement has been reached. By steadily building up the new external action service the High Representative could have an extremely important instrument to help implement EU policies.


Winners and Losers?

Although most of the changes to the EU institutions contained in the Constitutional Treaty have been taken up again in the Lisbon Treaty  — the reform of QMV, the composition of the Commission and Parliament, the creation of a permanent President of the European Council — many of them appear to be commitments to act in several years’ time, rather than immediately. There will thus be no short-term improvements in decision-making. It is also difficult to say which Member States have won and which have lost out as a result of the institutional reforms contained in the new Treaty. As is usual in the EU, every Member State has had to give some powers up in order to gain others in a positive sum game.

If there are losers and winners in institutional terms, the most significant factor is the increase in the power of national institutions vis-a-vis the EU institutions — a trend exemplified by the new role given to national parliaments. Generally speaking, the Lisbon Treaty insists — throughout its 250 pages — on the protection of Member State competences. This is in line with current public opinion both in the ‘old’ and ‘new’ Member States.

The discussions which took place in Maastricht 15 years ago about whether to include a reference to the “federal vocation” of the EU in the Treaty seem very far away.

In 2007, no single government would dare to propose such a reference. The ‘obstinate’ sovereign state is now uppermost in most European minds, and it has won. But it is far from certain that this is the best way to cope with the challenges of a global world in which each EU Member State on its own (including Germany, France and the UK) looks rather small.

Какими станут внутренние и внешние политики ЕС Lessons The main lesson that many EU leaders will draw from this lengthy, and often frustrating, episode in treaty making is: never again. If and when the Lisbon treaty enters into force next January it will have taken seven years to achieve. With 27 members, and more likely to join in the future, reaching the kind of complex and fragile compromise that underlies EU treaties has become very difficult. The Union may still adopt treaties on specific issues, such as climate change. But most European leaders agree that the EU has more important things to do than to fiddle with its institutions and decision-making procedures. And since any substantive new treaty would probably be subject to a referendum in a number of EU countries, the risk of failure would be high.

So the member-states will want to avoid another round of treaty change for as long as possible. The EU can use the accession treaties it signs with newcomers to make minor changes to the way it is run. And it could launch new policies through other types of inter-governmental agreement. However, in the absence of treaty change, the need to bring everyone on board diminishes. So it is more likely that smaller groups of EU countries will go ahead with new projects and policies, perhaps outside the EU’s established legal and institutional framework. The Schengen area of passport-free travel started like this. So did the seven-country treaty on police co-operation (both have subsequently been incorporated into the EU treaties). Future areas for such ‘variable geometry’ could include harmonising tax bases, integrating defence forces and aligning criminal law. If the negotiations for the Reform Treaty are anything to go by, it is already becoming clear who will take part in future initiatives and who will not.

Conclusion Like other EU treaties, the Lisbon Treaty can be considered a milestone in the history of European integration. But treaties only tell one side of the story, and arguably not the most important side. It will have very little effect, for example, on EU-Russia relations. The High Representative will certainly take over as the responsible figure for the negotiations on a new PCA (as opposed to Commission and Council). The Treaty contains an energy solidarity clause but even this would not have prevented deals such as North Stream or South Stream. What is more important is the ability of the major office holders to seize the room for manoeuvre and build consensus. Even more important is the political will of Member States to act in particular circumstances, whether agreeing to use force, breaking up energy monopolies or speaking with one voice towards Russia, China, the US or whoever. The present set of European leaders are all pragmatists, and very much pre-occupied with domestic politics. In these circumstances, and given the failure of EU leaders to communicate with their citizens on Europe, one should not have too high expectations of change in the next few years. The EU will continue to be a haven of stability and prosperity in a turbulent world. But it is unlikely to close the capability-expectations gap that has been apparent for over a decade.

Какими станут внутренние и внешние политики ЕС Cameron Fraser Director of the EU — Russia Centre, Brussels Prospects for EU — Russia Relations Introduction EU-Russia relations are presently in a particularly difficult and complex phase.

These problems affect both the substance of the relationship and the perceptions of it. Within the EU there are several different views on Russia. Some view Russia as a threat while others view Russia as a strategic partner. The current Russian leadership has expressed its support for European values but done little to promote such values.

It has also stated its desire to negotiate with a united Europe but has secured numerous bilateral deals, especially in the energy field, with member states. The attitude of Russia’s new President towards the EU is largely unknown.

The EU and Russia are two of the most important, albeit very different, global actors, with many shared interests. Both sides, however, have found it difficult to understand each other’s interests and motives. Russia has regained power and influence thanks to rocketing energy prices. The EU seems finally to have emerged from its navel gazing and is contemplating a greater role in external affairs. Although Russia has been designated a ‘strategic partner’ of the EU, there are a growing number of problems, from foreign policy to internal developments which cause an increasing number of member states to doubt whether it is still worthwhile to attempt to negotiate a new strategic partnership agreement with Russia. This paper examines recent developments in EU-Russia relations and assesses the prospects for the future.

Recent History In the 1990-s there were high hopes on both sides that there would be some form of common European home. Both Presidents Gorbachev and Yeltsin sought to move Russia towards Western institutions but were disappointed at the reluctant response of the West. The West offered financial and technical assistance to Russia but was disappointed that Russia did not reform itself quickly in a recognisable Western model.

The result was Russian disillusionment about the market economy and Western-style democracy. The alleged chaos of the 1990-s was a theme pushed constantly by President Putin during his term in office. He boasted of having set Russia on the path of stability and prosperity. His critics acknowledged some progress but asked: at what price?

As EU borders in recent years have moved closer to the Russian heartland a number of paradoxes have become more pronounced. First, while trade and investment are booming, the EU has increasingly strong concerns with regard to respect for the standards of democracy and human rights in Russia. The EU argues that Russia should maintain the commitments it subscribed to under the UN Charter, the OSCE, Какими станут внутренние и внешние политики ЕС the Council of Europe and the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA).

Second, while the EU welcomes an active Russia as an important partner in solving international and global problems, it is concerned with the direction and increasingly harsh tone of Russian foreign policy. It would appear that there is also some concern in Russia about such an approach. Third, while Russia was initially lukewarm towards the EU enlargement, it now perceives it (not quite as harshly as NATO enlargement) in largely negative terms. Moreover, bilateral problems with certain EU member states have impacted negatively on EU-Russia relations. Most notably the impasse over the Russian bans of meat and plant imports from Poland has prevented the start of the negotiations on a new PCA. One could add recent issues as diverse as the Russian withdrawal from the CFE Treaty, NATO enlargement, missile defence, Kosovo, the conflict with Estonia, and growing concerns about the security of supply of energy resources from Russia.

EU — Russia Relations — state of play Both the EU and Russia are committed to a new strategic agreement that would replace the PCA which expired in 2007. It is automatically prolonged unless either side decides to withdraw from the PCA. Russia contends that the 1994 PCA was negotiated during a period of Russian weakness and expects that new negotiations will be carried out by two equals. The EU contends that the PCA needs to be replaced in order to provide a legal base for new policy areas that have been developed over the past decade. These include sensitive areas of legal and police cooperation, foreign and security policy as well as the energy sector. Meanwhile there is much on-going business between the EU and Russia with officials meeting regularly and progress being made in different areas across the four ‘common spaces.’ Work with Russia is progressing on many less visible areas, not least in the area of justice and home affairs. Meetings on trafficking of human beings, money laundering and terrorist financing are held on a regular basis between the Commission and the Russian authorities. Passenger data exchange also takes place in the framework of the agreement on Kaliningrad. An agreed priority area is improving the border crossing points between Russia and the EU. The networking between large numbers of Russian officials meeting with their EU counterparts should not be under-estimated. But while there is good cooperation in certain areas the increasingly negative perceptions — on both sides — are undermining moves towards the strategic partnership desired by the EU and Russia since the mid-1990s.

While the PCA arrangements provide for ‘business as usual’,the opening of negotiations on a new strategic partnership has been delayed due to a bilateral Polish Russian trade dispute. Russian pressure on Estonia and Lithuania, and recent trade disputes with other member states (plus the Litvinenko murder in London) has not helped create an atmosphere conducive for negotiations. Some of the newer member states have pressed the EU to adopt a tougher approach towards Russia, a stance not Какими станут внутренние и внешние политики ЕС necessarily accepted by other member states. The advent of Merkel, Sarkozy and Tusk has led to a change in rhetoric if not substance. If and when the negotiations start, they may last for at least two years with a further two years for ratification. The EU has a number of strong cards to play including the sheer size of its internal market, its consumption of Russian energy (in a global market), its technology and its know-how in finance, social, environmental and regional issues.

Despite the difficulties of achieving a common EU approach towards Russia, it is incontestable that all member states are likely to be more effective in securing their aims by speaking with one voice. This applies to the security of energy supplies, investment protection to tackling international issues such as climate change, Kosovo, Iran and terrorism among other topics. At present, however, Russia finds it relatively easy to divide member states by offering energy deals. These are partly a reflection of short-term political and economic interests, and partly due to the absence of any real EU competence in the energy field. If the EU was given the power to negotiate with Russia on energy it would greatly improve the situation.

At present the EU and Russia seem to be talking ‘past’ each other, with Russia playing the energy power card and (most of) the Europeans insisting on values as part of discussions. It is vital to explain to Russia that a rules-based system is very much in its own interest, not least in helping to provide a more stable environment for domestic and foreign investment. The EU might also emphasise more its willingness to help Russia diversify its economy, bringing know-how and technology that is absent in Russia today. The present lop-sided trading relationship is not healthy in the long run for either side. The EU should stress its desire to see a prosperous, democratic Russia, as a long-term political and economic partner across the board. Cooperating on energy efficiency is a good example of a win-win situation for the EU and Russia.

The Need for Mutual Trust To make a real partnership function the essential element is mutual trust.

Unfortunately, it seems that there is growing lack of confidence in what the EU and Russia can achieve together. Many in Russia attribute this to the effect of enlargement.

Many in Europe think this is due to new assertiveness of the Russian state, both at home and with regard to energy and foreign policy. It is useful to consider all these areas.

First, the enlargement of the EU. The EU and Russia have a shared neighbourhood and a shared history. And although we may interpret history quite differently, the EU and Russia are “doomed” to be partners due to our geographic proximity and huge economic interdependence. Ten former allies or republics of the former Soviet Union are now members of the EU. While these societies have undertaken or are still in the midst of a profound debate on their past, a similar process of objective reassessment of the past occurred only briefly during the Yeltsin years in Russia. Today’s Russia prefers to ignore the dark side of the Soviet legacy. For EU-Russia relations to function despite this legacy we should leave the interpretation of history to historians and not Какими станут внутренние и внешние политики ЕС allow it to poison current political and economic relations. Alternatively, there should be a new push for joint historical commissions to look at sensitive issues such as the Soviet presence in the Baltic States and Soviet-Polish relations.

The Union’s most effective foreign policy instrument for affecting political and economic change among its neighbours — the enlargement process — is obviously not a tool at its disposal towards Russia. While there were those in Moscow who during the 1990s spoke about Russia one day joining the EU, this is no longer seen as an option if it ever were one. Nor does Russia wish to participate in the Union’s “European Neighbourhood Policy”. Russia sees itself as too different to be bundled together with other EU neighbours. Yet, although it sees itself as different, President Putin maintains that Russia is first and foremost a European country: In a letter to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the European Union on 25 March 2007 he wrote:

“I strongly believe the full unity of our continent can never be achieved until Russia, as the largest European state, becomes an integral part of the European process.” He goes on to say that “Russia shares the values and principles of the vast majority of Europeans and the development of multifaceted ties with the EU is Russia’s principled choice”.

Shared Values — What Are They?

The debate over shared values has been one of great sensitivity in recent years. Some member states have downplayed the importance of values in dealing with Russia. But the pendulum is now swinging the other way, partly due to changes in the leadership of several member states, partly due to the urgings of some new member states and partly due to developments in Russia which have had a negative reaction in the EU.

If there is a further slide in popular attitudes towards Russia it may be impossible to get a new treaty ratified by all 27 member states. The EU should recognize the very difficult historical legacy facing Russia, but the bottom line for the EU must be to insist that Russia respects the commitments it entered into on democracy, human rights and the rule of law in the PCA as well as the Council of Europe which it joined in 1996. The EU should press Russia to ratify Protocol 14 that would greatly speed up court procedures in Strasbourg.

The EU’s six-monthly meetings for human rights consultations with Russia gives the Union the chance to raise a long list of problems such as restrictions on press freedom, attacks on journalists and the independence of the judiciary as well as the conditions for NGOs and civil society at large or the situation in the North Caucasus. The Russian side also raises a variety of issues, but the situation of the Russian-speaking minorities in the Baltic States is always on the top. It would be incorrect to claim that these consultations have achieved many concrete results. But they do provide the occasion to discuss everything without taboos while providing much-needed support for the constituency promoting European values inside Russia. They also have a long-term influence on official policy in view of Russia’s reputation in bodies like the Council of Europe and the OSCE. It is regrettable that as for the December Duma elections Какими станут внутренние и внешние политики ЕС there were no OSCE/ODIHR observers. This tells us something about the level of commitment to holding a free and fair electoral process.

Energy — the Defining Issue Turning to the mutual interests in the relationship, energy is high on the agenda.



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