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Were that to happen, the fault would be ours. We all experience moments of revelation when a book or painting, symphony suddenly lights up a sense of ourselves. The pheno menological intensity of such moments is unquestioned. But why do we not trust these revelations and insights? Why cannot we accord them the same degree of phenomenologi cal certainty that Descartes accorded his overwhelming sense of being? Is it because we have become so enamoured with that monopolistic view of philosophy as an 'objective' science, dealing only with that which can be rendered in propositions and statemental assertions, that we are no longer prepared to trust our inner intuitions of sense? Decon struction is a truly telling opponent, finding us out within our secret longings. If we trusted our intimations of meaningfulness and resided in them, deconstruction could not perturb us since we would accept that the meaningfulness of our revelations stands apart from the issue of the foundational. Deconstruction need only worry us if we have sought to dress up our insights as universal truths rather than the truths which appertain to a tradition but why should we have done that? Either because our faith in our insights is weak and we seek to bolster them by dressing them up as theoretical truths or because we have imperialist tendencies and wish to vaunt our insights over others by disguising them as universal truths. In either case, deconstruction would rightly undo us. Yet if we were prepared to 50 Nicholas DAVEY accept that philosophy is not reducible to a pseudo-science of statement and counter statement and that it can embrace revelatory experiences of meaningfulness which can have a claim upon us irrespective of the question of foundations, deconstruction would be disarmed but only if we are prepared to renounce the universalising if not imperialising tendencies of our philosophical heritage and learn to trust once more what deconstruction's rhetoric of stylistics so threatens in its insensitive blanket denial of all modes of meaning, namely, the regional spheres of meaningfulness upon which our awareness of sense and the sense of our being actual and potential rests. If we re-learn such trust and hermeneuti cally de-colonize ourselves from a singular reason the question of style might indeed be meaningfully resurrected. In listening our intuitive voices we will individualise, make "subjective", as Kierkegaard might have put it, the general truths of those regional spheres of meaning that have shaped us and in so doing will find our own "style" and in so doing climb over the stile of being merely mannered.

Conclusion or 'Revealing Style' Let us now clarify the specific claims and implications of this paper. Commenting on Richard Rorty's essay 'Philosophy as a Kind of Writing'39, Norris remarks that "the central issue... is that of philosophical style" for any choice of style will involve commitment "to certain operative metaphors and modes of representation"40. Conventional philosophy "proceed by subjugating language to thought, rhetoric to logic and style to the notion of plenitude of meaning" whilst "abnormal philosophy rejects the protocols of orthodox linguistic philosophy in favour of a conscious, even artful play with stylistic possibilities, "a constant dealing in paradox and a will to problematise the relation between language and thought"41. Deconstruction affirms stylistic pluralities and "rejects the appeal of abso lute knowledge" seeking to demonstrate by its analytics of style "the delusions of systemat ic method"42. Against the backdrop of Norris' remarks the following should become clear.

Firstly, the purpose of this paper has not been to defend 'normal' from 'abnormal' phi losophy. To the contrary, the argument presented accepts both the plausibility of decon struction's repudiation of meaning-in-itself an that no philosophical-cum-literary articula tion can be immune from further analysis and interpretation. It has indeed been contended that there is dual-aspect to any formulation of that which is revealed as meaningful. When and wherever I cease interpretation and take something to mean this rather than that, it remains the case that what I have 'closed off as determinate meaning necessarily remains open to other readings. Whereas deconstruction is correctly insistent on no logical or final hermeneutics terminus to the question of meaning, this paper nevertheless insists that revelatory experiences of meaning suggest what Wittgenstein terms a psychological termi nus" of interpretation43, a point where despite the logical openness of all interpretation we choose this rather than that option because it lights up and makes sense of the projects and concerns that define us both individually and culturally.

Secondly, in making a case for revelatory experiences of meaningfulness are not either implying that those experiences are immune to deconstruction or that they are in some way privileged. Not only will the content of experiences be endlessly interpretable but their form too. As Steiner bid remember, "Structure is itself interpretation"44. Nor is there any necessary fixity to the forms of life within which intuitions of meaning occur. In all these respects deconstruction represents a consistent and plausible extension of Nietzsche's repudiation of essentialist epistemologies.

Thirdly, the argument of this paper does take issue with deconstruction over the ques tions of (A) the actuality of meaningful experience, and (B) the supposition that the ab BEYOND THE MANNERED: THE QUESTION OF STYLE IN PHILOSOPHY _ sence of meaning-in-itself renders regional spheres of meaning meaningless. Regarding (A) we have argued that the meaningfulness of an insight depends upon the extent to which it illuminates the projects and commitments we are individually concerned with.

Arguing for this does not imply a wish to return to normal philosophy for, as suggested, deconstruction as well as conventional philosophy emphasises predicational meaning.

Conventional. 'analytic' and rationalistic philosophy all to a degree pursue precise relations between a subject and its predictional states. Because it seeks to show the unlimited pre dicative relations that can be attributed to a subject, deconstruction too exhibits a loyalty to predicational meaning. The 'meaningfulness' we allude to, however, is not predicational for that which illuminates such experiences lies outside them, i.e. those perspectival meanings which shape our experiences and yet can never be exhaustively given in them. Without such nonpredicational meaning, the sense of our being and its possibilities would be stif fled. It might further be suggested that deconstructive criticism is itself reliant upon such an experience of meaningfulness. The proposal that open pluralistic philosophy can only ever be inferred not only suggests meaningful insight which is not propositional (it could only ever be 'shown')45 but also that an understanding has been reached concerning the limitations of traditional categories of meaning. Concerning (B) the supposition that all local horizons of meaning are meaninglessness, we argued that the particular danger inhe rent within deconstruction is that it encourages us to stop listening to, to disengage from and to cease to believe in the culturally contingent frameworks of meaning upon which all past and future revelation of the potentialities for our being depend. As Nietzsche would have energetically insisted, the absence of meaning-in-itself is no cause for despair (pas sive nihilism) since it has no bearing upon, indeed, liberates us for confrontation with what is meaningful-for-us46.

Fourthly, in arguing for the experience of meaningfulness witch alludes propositional capture it must be stressed that neither are we advocating mystical position nor a devalua tion of theoretical reflection. Mysteriously spontaneous in their emergence though they may be, there is nothing mystical about these experiences. They are a phenomenological fact of our being. Although theoretical reflection entails a distanciation from the content of such experiences, reflection ensures that we do not remain sealed within the framework of our experience. The relationship between analytic reflection and intuitive insight is of such complexity that any discussion of it is here impossible. It suffices to say, however, that any reflective examination of the revealed can expose nuances and implications within the intuition which might not have been apparent in the thralls of the experience itself. Reflec tive analysis is thus capable of extending and substantiating what is revealed. What these comments imply is that reflective analysis do not commence its operations ex nihilo but is asked to examine or confirm that revealed as meaningful. In one of his earliest philosophi cal essays Nietzsche points out that reason only ever follows the "wingbeats" of the imagi nation47 or, in our terms, the experience of meaningfulness. Furthermore, analysis of reve latory experience encourages openness to yet further experience. Gadamer comments that the fulfilment of experience does not consist in comprehensive knowledge but "in the openness to new experience"48. It is precisely the openness to new experience which the nihilistic (universal) denial of the meaningfulness of local horizons threatens.

If the very experience of meaningfulness which gives direction to any analytical dee pening of experienced meaning is denied (why should one carry the analysis out?), the critical stimulus which pushes one towards the possibility of new insight, the patience with which one listens for yet further illumination is shunned and with it the possibility of any cultural or spiritual growth.

Fifthly, the threat of such a calamity exists only if deconstruction remains wedded to the fallacious conviction that the absence of meaning-in-itself nullifies the meaningfulness 52 Nicholas DAVEY of local regions of meaning. If deconstruction is constrained to operating only as an analyt ical or critical tool, it might positively extend the potentialities for alternative readings of a given experience of meaningfulness. As soon as it adopts a universalistic stance which declares all horizons of meaning meaningless, deconstruction threatens to destroy not only the possibility of further experience but also to wither all the roots of meaningfulness through which regional meaning and hence individual and cultural identities feed.

Sixthly, we come to the point where the aforementioned clarifications of our argument can transform our previous discussion of the question of style philosophy. It has been argued that the phenomenological immediacy of experience of meaningfulness renders the question of style secondary. In that experience apprehension is immediate and unequivoc al: the question "how" the "what" of that which we apprehend puts in its appearance do not arise. Only reflection upon that experience will lead us to consider such refinements for in the experience itself both the "how" and the "what" will be fused. Once distinguished, however, two possibilities arise. (A) If we can differentiate between the "how" and the "what" of an experience, we can distinguish between its meaning and its expression or, in Gadamer's terms, between the thing-itself (Sache selbst) and its particular modes of dis closure. (B) If we can make such distinctions we can recognise that we have experienced a subject-matter this way rather than that way. Reflection upon this will show the irreplacea ble singularity of our instanciations of a given field of meaning or concern. Our expe riences of meaning attest to an incorporation or reception of a general framework of mea ningfulness, which in the experience is concretised in a particular instanciation. The combination of placedness within a horizon of meaning and the latter's particularisation in individual exemplars of meaningfulness is worthy of deep reflection which sadly cannot be carried out here. What can be said, however, is that unwittingly and with a spontaneity that is without guile and manner, the highly personal process of translating generally appre hended concerns and pre-occupations of meaning into the revealed exemplars of particu lar experiential meaningfulness reveals the style which constitutes our individuality. Thus, in reply to Rorty and Norris, we maintain that soon as it does become a "matter of style" in philosophy — a question of what mode of writing to adopt — the fundamental question of style in the sense discussed above as to the disclosure of individuality50, has already been lost and will be unretrievable until we both perceive and register that an adherence to the absence of meaning-in-itself does not nullify the significance of local lifelines of meaning and learn to trust those experiences of meaningfulness which we all know and have been shaken by but can never (to art and philosophy's advantage) fully articulate.

Cardiff Institute 29 IV NOTES This paper was written for the University of Amsterdam's Philosophy Department Conference, "Style in Philosophy and the Arts", April 3rd-5th, 1991. It was first presented in the Philosophy Department seminar of the University of Cardiff (March 9th, 1991) and then subsequently in Holland during the aforementioned Conference.

"Nothing is so valuable for the hermeneutical inquirer into an exotic culture as the discovery of an epistemology written within that culture". Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, (Basil Blackwell), 1980, p. 346.

Willem De Kooning, "What Abstract Arts Means to me" (1951), edited abstracts of which appear in H.B. Chipp's, Theories of Modern Art (California University Press), 1968, p. 556.

George Steiner: Real Presences, (Faber), 1989, p. 53.

BEYOND THE MANNERED: THE QUESTION OF STYLE IN PHILOSOPHY _ George Steiner: "Viewpoint: A New Meaning of Meaning" in the Times Literary Supplement, November 8th, 1985, p. 1262. The full text of the article appears in Peter Abbs (ed.), The Symbolic Order (Falmer Press), 1990, p. 271-284.

Jacques Derrida: Spurs: Nietzsche Styles (trans.) B. Harlow, (University of Chicago Press), 1979, p. 131-132.

George Steiner: "Viewpoint: A New Meaning of Meaning", op.cit., p. 1275.

Jacques Derrida: op.cit., p. 73.

Christopher Norris: The Deconstructive Turn: Essays in the Rhetoric of Philosophy.

(Methuen), 1983, p. 102.

Jacques Derrida: op.cit., p. 139.

Christopher Norris: op.cit., p. 164.

Christopher Norris: op.cit., p. 172.

This point is argued by Alexander Nehemas: "Nietzsche's stylistic pluralism... is his solution to the problem involved in presenting positive views that do not, simply by virtue of being positive, fall back into dogmatism... They (the views) show his perspectivism without saying anything about it, and to that extent they prevent his view that there are only interpretations from undermining itself'. Se his Nietzsche: Life as Literature (Harvard University Press), 1985, p. 40.

Jacques Derrida: op.cit., p. 139.

See Alexander Nehemas: op.cit., p. 41.

Friedrich Nietzsche: Beyond Good and Evil (trans.) Kaufman (Vintage), 1966, sec.


Hans G. Gadamer: Truth and Method (Sheed and Ward), 1979, p. 354.

Hans G. Gadamer: op.cit., p. 355.

Berel Lang: The Anatomy of Philosophical Styles (Blackwell), 1990, p. 23.

Berel Lang: op.cit., p.13.

Ludwig Wittgenstein: Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (trans.) Pears and McGuin ness (Routledge & Kegan Paul), 1967, paragraph 7, p. 151.

Theodor Adorno: "Every art work vanishes qua artefact in its truth content. Espe cially the truly great works are rendered irrelevant qua works by their truth content... The mark of authenticity of works of art is the fact that their illusion shines forth in such a way that it cannot possibly be prevaricated, and yet discursive judgement is unable to spell out Its truth. Truth cancels the art work along with its illusion". Aesthetic Theory (trans.) Leuhardt (Routledge), 1984, p. 191.

H.G. Gadamer: op.cit., p. 451.

H.G. Gadamer: op.cit., p. 451.

H.G. Gadamer: op.cit., Introduction to First Edition.

F.Nietzsche: Ecce Homo (trans.) Kaufman, (Vintage), 1969, p. 300.

Andrew Louth: Discerning the Mystery (Clarendon), 1989, p.55/6. In this passage Louth acknowledges that he is citing F.J.A. Hort's The Way, The Truth, The Life (London), 1897.

Michael Polyani: Knowing and Being (London), 1969, p. 144-148.

H.G. Gadamer: op.cit., p. 102f.

F. Nietzsche: The Will to Power (trans.) Kaufman (Weidenfeld & Nicolson), 1968, sec. 1(5).

J. Habermas: The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (Polity), 1987, p. 208.

54 Nicholas DAVEY Von Neurath: "Wie Schiffer sind wir, die ihr Schiff auf offener See umbauen mssen ohne es jemals in einem Dock zerlegen und aus besten Bestandteilen neu errichten zu koennen", quoted by W. V.O. Quine, Word and Object, (Harvard). 1964: Flyleaf John Searle: "The world turned upside down", New York Review of Books, 30, p. 74 79 cited in Susan Hekman's Hermeneutics and the Sociology of Knowledge (Polity), 1986, p. 194.

Michel Foucault: The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception (trans.) A.M. Sheridan Smith (Vintage), 1975, pp. xvi-xvii.

L. Wittgenstein: Zettel (Blackwell), 1967, sec. 231.

L. Wittgenstein: op.cit., sec. 234.

H.G. Gadamer: The Relevance of the Beautiful (Cambridge University Press), 1986.

See the essay "On the contribution of poetry to the search for truth" for a discussion of Hegel's concept of Einhausung, p. 114-115.

H.G. Gadamer: Truth and Method (Sheed and Ward), 1979, p. 422.

Richard Rorty's 'Philosophy as a kind of writting appears in his collection of essays, Consequences of Pragmatism (Harvester Press), 1982, p. 90-109.

Christopher Norris: op.cit., p.17.



The invocation of Wittgenstein's term "psychological terminus" (Psychologische Ende) carries with it unfortunate overtones of the randomly subjective. For the purpose of this paper, however, although it is clearly acknowledged that a terminus to interpretation is achieved in the subject's mind, that terminus occurs, as we have tried to argue, to the sub ject as an event and is to a degree beyond the subject's 'willing and doing'.

G.Steiner: op.cit., p. 21.

See above, note 13.

Nietzsche describes "passive nihilism" as a "decline and recession of power" (WP 22). He also remarks that "the philosophical nihilist is convinced that all that happens is meaningless and in vain;

and that there ought not to be anything meaningless and in vain.

But whence this: there ought not to be?" (WP 36). "Active nihilism" (WP 22), however, is that which recognises that the question of meaninglessness is insoluble (WP 36) and that the question is "to what extent we can admit to ourselves, without perishing" that meaning has an "origin which lies in us". (WP 15) To that extent "nihilism as the denial of a truthful world...might be a divine way of thinking" (WP 15). Nietzsche: The Will to Power.

See Nietzsche: Kritische Gesammt Werke (De Gruyter). Vol. III, 4.3lf.

Gadamer cited in hans Waldenfels, Absolute Nothingness (Paulist Press), 1980 p.


See Gadamer, Truth and Method (Sheed and Ward), 1979, p. 405-407.

Manfred Frank develops a related inside in his reading of Sartre's approach to poetic meaning. See 'The Interpretation of a Text' in Transforming the Hermeneutic Context, From Nietzsche to Nancy ( ed.) Schrift and Ormisten (SUNY), 1990, p. 145-176.


SEARCH FOR NEOPRAGMATIC COSMOLOGY It is fair to say that in the past four decades, since the death of John Dewey in 1952, his ghost has hovered over America's curriculum thought and theory. This ghost has influenced, in one way or another, the mathematics and science curriculum reform move ments of the 1960s — responding to the U.S.S.R's launching of Sputnik;

the back-to basics movement of the 1970s, following the extremes of the 60s reform movement;

the competency and/or behavioral objectives movements which permeated school curricula in both of these decades;

and now the quality Goals for the Year 2000 movement present in the 1990s. All these movements have one feature in common: narrow vision. All have focused exclusively on one viewpoint, usually the opposite of the viewpoint dominant when they came into existence. As Dewey (1938/1963) says: "Humankind likes to think in terms of extreme opposites.... Formulating its beliefs in terms of Either/Ors" (p. 17;

em phasis in original). Certainly this is true of American education with its penchant for fads;

but it is even true of western thought during the past centuries, influenced as this thought has been by Renee Descartes' dualistic separation of mind from body in the seventeenth century (1649-1664/1985). Such separation has become part of the Anglo-European tradition of modernist thought. In America we have dichotomized psychology into beha viorism vs. mentalism, theology into liberal vs. traditional, cosmology into evolutionism vs. creationism, politics into liberal vs. conservative, education into progressive vs. tradi tional, curriculum (the choosing and sequencing of subjects taught) into structured vs.

laissez faire. Such dichotomies, Dewey argued — and now his ghost argues — hinder, even prevent, our ability to see that the issue is not the power or supremacy of one of the either-ors. Politically the choice is not communism vs. democracy. Rather the issue is to see how these varying beliefs can and do interact in such a manner that the dichotomy is transcended and the various competing parts are transformed into a unified whole. All growth depends on such a transformative interaction: an interaction Dewey believed was necessary if any real or meaningful growth was to take place. This interaction — dynamic, reflective, transactive — entwines each of the either-ors within the other in a manner that each of the two becomes transformed into a new transacted. No longer do the either-ors exist, for a new, higher level of consciousness, activity, and organization has emerged.

This process, Hegelian in tone but non-Hegelian in its openness and non-determinacy1, lies at the heart of Dewey's philosophy (pragmatism) and theory of education (growth of and in experience). It is a process he outlined early in his career in an essay, "The Child and the Curriculum" (1902/1990a), developed later in Experience and Education (1938/1963), and explored yet again in his Knowing and the Known (with Arthur Bentley, 1949). In all these works, he argues for a transformation occurring through the interaction (the gerun dive knowing ) of the knower with the known in such a manner that both knower and known (child and curriculum) are transformed.

Such an interactive, transactive, transformative process, though, was not part of Amer ica's thought pattern during Dewey's era — late nineteenth, early and midtwentieth centu ries. Then, we were very much caught up in the notion of supremacy, of choosing one of the either-ors. Democracy, capitalism, industrialism became our favorites. This legacy remains with us today, as part of our foreign policy, as part of our educational philosophy.

56 William DOLL, Jr.

The concepts underlying post-modernism, complexity theory, and theoretical biology — those revolving around a nonlinear dynamic (Doll, 1993) — were not present in any ma terial way (what a modernist phrase!) when Dewey lived. Like all of us, Dewey was a prisoner of his time;

but in many of his writings, particularly in The Quest for Certainty (1929/1960b) and in Reconstruction in Philosophy (1948/1957), he saw the need for a new epistemological and metaphysical paradigm and with it a new philosophy of educa tion and learning. Now Dewey's ghost haunts us, we who have been imbued with his pragmatic philosophy and are able to combine it with a post-modern cosmology, to devel op what Dewey could not. His ghost exhorts us to carry on the crusade Dewey began: a crusade which takes us beyond the dichotomies of either-ors into a new land of heightened consciousness. In this land — that "fascinating imaginative realm born of the echo of God's laughter where no one owns the truth and all have the right to be understood" 2 — we may well be able to integrate the rigors of science (a concept Dewey espoused strongly) with the imaginativeness of story (a neo-Deweyan concept3) with the awesomeness of spirituality (which Dewey believed in even as he eschewed any particular religion 4). Such a fascinating, integrative dynamic might well be called a neo-pragmatic cosmology, com bining the thoughts of William James and John Dewey with those of Alfred North White head and Richard Rorty — a most eclectic, American mix.

Ghosts have played a major role in Western literary thought since the time of Homer's use of a ghost to rouse Achilles from his depression over the death of Patrocles up to Derrida's multiple use of ghosts in his Specters of Marx (1994). One of the prime uses of ghosts, meaning of course "life-spirit or soul" (Oxford English Dictionary (Vol. IV, 1989, p. 492), has been to urge us to action — "Do not forget. This visitation is but to whet thy almost blunted purpose" (Ghost to Hamlet, Act 111, sc. 4, lines 111-112) — or to warn us of coming events with the intent of putting things right before death. We see this latter in Patrocles' admonition to Ulysses about a proper burial;

and in Marley's warning to Scrooge, that "squeezing, wrenching, grasping, clutching, covetous old sinner," about reforming himself (p. 15, in Dickens' Christmas Carol 1843/1913). This life-spirit, ghost (or gheest in the old Flemish) wants a "proper order" — be it a burial, retribution, or change of habit — established before the final curtain is brought down or the last chapter written (to continue the literary metaphor). This sense of proper order is needed before the ghost can "rest in peace" or cross the river Styx to reside peacefully in that "Land of No Return."

Proper order, of course, is key to the very concept of curriculum. In its contemporary form, curriculum refers to the sequencing and delivery of courses taught by an institution (Oxford English Dictionary Vol. III, 1989, p. 152). In America, a strong link has been made between curriculum and industrialism. The "method" of curriculum (and of instruc tion as an off-shoot of curriculum) has been that of proper order. It was proper order which transformed America from an agrarian and small workshop society into an industrial giant at the turn of the century. Proper order was that which Frederick Taylor (1911/1947) used when in 1896 at Bethlehem Steel plant in Baltimore, Maryland he took Schmidt, a man "so stupid... that he more nearly resembles an ox" (p. 59) and trained him via time and motion studies to be "a first class, high priced man," one who did exactly as he was told "from morning till, through the day" and without any "back talk" (p. 45). As a "first class" man following in exact and precise detail Taylor's every order, regarding how he was to walk, stoop, pick-up pig-iron, Schmidt increased his productivity almost 400% — moving not his usual 12 1/2 tons of pig-iron per day but moving 47 tons. As a "high priced" man Schmidt's wages increased 70 cents a day. All with no "back talk."

This sense of proper order, "scientific management" it was called, swept not only America's industrial companies but its whole society as well. Even clergymen estimated GHOSTS AND THE AMERICAN CURRICULUM _ how "efficient" they were in carrying out their daily duties. Dewey (1915/1990b) said that this industrial model, which did indeed catapult America into the lead of nations produc ing products, was the most "rapid, extensive, complete" revolution history had ever known. "It overshadows and even controls all others... [It is] writ so large that he who runs may read" (pp. 8-9).

Curricularists, following the lead of Frederick Taylor, reformed their concept of curri culum, making it more dogmatic, more scientific, more circumscribed. The industrial model became the (not so) hidden heart of curriculum in America while the heart of indu strialism was Taylorism — the scientific management of workers based on the research done on them with time and motion studies (Doll, 1993, Ch. 2;

Kliebard, 1986, 1992;

Pinar, 1995, Ch. 2). Franklin Bobbitt (1912), one of the leading curricularists of the time, called students the "raw material" which the school was to transform into a "finished prod uct" (p. 269). Elwood Cubberley (1916), another prominent curricularist, continued the factory/industrial metaphor saying:

Our schools are, in a sense, factories in which the rawproducts (children) are to be shaped and fashionedinto products to meet the various demands of life (p. 338).

As befits one brought up on German idealism and transcendentalism, John Dewey (1916/1966) objected strongly to the narrow and outmoded "practicality" of this model.

Education is all one with life and as such is subordinate to no end other than itself:

[I]n reality there is nothing to which growth is relativesave more growth;

[hence] there is nothing to which education is subordinate save more edu cation (p. 51).

The relationship, though, between proper order and the curriculum, really between control and the curriculum — for, to borrow a phrase from Gilbert Ryle (1949), control is the ghost-in-the-curriculum — is not limited to America's dawning industrial period. It goes back beyond such industrialism to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. David Hamilton, in a number of works (1989, 1990, 1992, n.p.), fias pointed out that with the rise of Protestantism, commercialism, and the forming of the middle class a new social, commercial, and intellectual order arose in these centuries. Method became the byword. A host of writers, many of them influenced by John Calvin (and his belief in a simple and orderly life, as an antidote to the elaborate intrigue of the bynow corrupt Catholic Church), took to method as a means of salvation. Education became "methodized," placing "first that which is first in the absolute order of knowledge, that next which is next, and so on" (Peter Ramus, 1569, in Hamilton, 1989, p. 46). Curriculum now became an educational word for the first time in its existence.

Prior to the sixteenth century, curriculum had meant a racetrack, probably like that at the Circus Maximus around which the chariots, horses, drivers raced. John Calvin, in his Commentaries (1540-1565) refers to life as a racecourse and used the phrase "vitae curri culum" in his 1559 edition of the Institutes. His followers at the Universities of Leiden (1588) and Glasgow (1633) used the word curriculum to refer to an organized course of study all students would take and were expected to complete — a radical idea at that time and a pristine example of methodization. Another Calvin disciple, Peter Ramus, published the word curriculum in a book, Professio Regia (1576) when he outlined a taxonomy of all knowledge. These seem to be the origins of the word curriculum as a prescribed course of study one takes in order to receive a degree or certificate. The concepts of proper order and control dwell in this use of curriculum as an embedded ghost. The twentieth century, industrial connection is but a "ramification" (after Peter Ramus) of the concept as first framed by the Calvinists in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. It is, I be lieve, appropriate to lay this ghost of times past to rest and allow other more lively spirits of curriculum come to life. John Dewey's ghost would like that, for then it could find its 58 William DOLL, Jr.

own sense of peace, knowing that we the neopragmatic heirs of Dewey were taking up the quest he began to define curriculum not in preset terms but as a recording, reflecting, and ultimately reordering of life's experiences. The heart of Dewey's pragmatism is this re flecting on and reordering of life's experiences. If Dewey has a metaphysics or cosmology, and I believe he does, it is this naturalistic one. His statement (1938) that "the central problem of an education based on experience is to select the kind of present experiences that live fruitfully and creatively in subsequent experiences" (p. 28) is one I would extend to his whole philosophy as a method of inquiry. The central intellectual, not just educa tional, problem is to develop experience in a practical and theoretical way such that future experiences flow from present ones. This is the challenge Dewey set for himself;

for myself and other curricularists it is the challenge Dewey's ghost wants us to accept.

Other Spirits of Curriculum Currere. Once we lay to rest the spirit of curriculum as external control — that curri culum must needs be a course laid out in advance for others to follow — then we can allow other, more lively, spirits to come forth. A place to begin might be with the concept of currere, the infinitive of the word curriculum. Since the mid-1970's, William Pinar (1975, with Grumet 1976, 1978) has been working on the concept of currere, that is dealing with the lived experience of the one "running the course." As curriculum in its original Latin means a course to be run so currere means the running of the course. This shift from noun to verb is also a shift from object to experience, a personal experience.

Curriculum as currere now becomes associated with the lived experiences of those af fected by the curriculum — students, teachers, peripheral others. All curriculum begins, I believe, in these lived experiences;

hence the need to analyze, reflect on, refine, project these experiences — a very Deweyan notion. In fact, it can be said that such transforma tion of lived experience is the heart of Dewey's educational methodology.

In his educational compendium, Understanding Curriculum (with Reynolds, Slattery, Taubman, 1995), Pinar has detailed (passim) the history, development, criticism of currere over the past two decades. As a method, currere is essentially selfreflexive, recursive is a word I'd use, wherein the individual looks back to analyze personal experiences and to frame those in a social and cultural setting. As Pinar (with Grumet, 1976) says: currere is the "self-consciousness conceptualization" of the Self (p. 51). Obviously if this is done exclusively in isolation, currere runs the risk of being "purely personal and solipsistic" (Gibson, 1991, p. 498). However, combined with community (which Pinar does well, 1995, passim) currere enters into an alpha-omega relationship with curriculum whereby the two, interacting together, define the educational process. Dewey sees this clearly when he states that "the child and the curriculum" actually "define a single process" (1902/1990, p. 189);

and when he emphasizes so many times that lived experience to be truly lived needs to be reflected upon. To borrow a phrase from Madeline Grumet (with Pinar, 1976) as she speaks of currere : "By bringing the structures of experience to awareness, one enhances the ability to direct the process of one's own development" (p. 115). Dewey would say that without bringing the structures of experience to awareness there is no way one can direct one's future experiences. If pragmatism is about anything it is about direct ing future experiences. Pragmatism's goal is to allow and encourage the mind "to project new and more complex ends — to free experience from routine and from caprice... [to develop] possibilities not yet given... [to determine] the qualities of future experience" (1917/1960, p. 65).

GHOSTS AND THE AMERICAN CURRICULUM _ It is most unfortunate that over the decades American curricularists have read the concept of curriculum in such a narrow and circumscribed (i.e. non-currere, non lived experience) manner.

Complexity. Complexity is complex! It is an emerging field, one not yet certain of itself. Still, I believe if a new (I'd say post-modern) perspective is to develop then such will occur out of complexity theory with its emphasis on self-organization. This theory is what Dewey did not have and provides, I believe, a frame for accomplishing what he wished — developing his concept of experience into a "pragmatic cosmology" (if I may use such a seemingly contradictory phrase) If we can connect Dewey's educational and curriculum thought to the concept of self-organization, then I believe Dewey's ghost will finally rest and we will enter a new era.

Self-organization is the most exciting (and complex) issue in the new paradigm. Self organization is really a metaphor for control that arises spontaneously and naturally within the interacting system. "It lies in the nature of things," says Alfred North Whitehead (1929/1978), "that the many enter into complex unity" (p. 21). Understanding this enter ing and this complex unity is the challenge complexity theorists face.

Newton and others who founded the modernist paradigm of classical science (Doll, 1993, Ch. 1) saw "the nature of things" as showing us a universe simple in its design, balanced in its order, and controlled from "the outside." The metaphor used was that of the universe as a great clock with God as its Clockmaker. He, and God was a he in this por trayal, wound up the clock and then let it run — having occasionally to intervene to adjust the mechanism. Today, contemporary scientists and cosmologists see the universe in different terms and metaphors — complex in design, turbulent (even fractal and chaotic) in its order, without any "outside." To quote Nicolis and Prigogine (1989):

In classical physics, the investigator is outside the system that he observes.

He [sic] is the one who can make independent decisions, while the system it self is subject to deterministic laws. In other terms, there is a 'decider' who is 'free,' and members of the system, be they individuals or organizations, who are not 'free' but must conform to some master plan. Today, we are getting farther and farther away from such a dichotomy. (p. 3) In the traditional, modernist, Newtonian frame, God would intervene as a deus ex machine, one who would — to draw on the ancient Greek metaphor — be "cranked down from the heavens" to settle the affairs of humankind and then be cranked up again. This worldview carried with it the concept of the teacher as a lesser god, one outside the fray of learning, dispensing information, and then going off into "another world." Contemporary cosmology sees the universe, God, reality, and the teacher's role in different terms.

In complexity theory with its resultant cosmology there is no dichotomy separating us from an outside reality;

there are merely varying perspectives on an amorphous whole. In this whole, control and order are not imposed from "the outside" but emerge from the interacting parts or perspectives inherent in the dynamic whole that is life itself. As Stuart Kauffman (1993) says in his The Origins of Order:

I want to suggest that we can think of the origin of life as an expected emer gent collective property of a modestly complex mixture of catalytic poly mers, such as proteins or catalytic RNA, which catalyze one another's forma tion. (p. xvi;

emphasis in original) And again:

I suggest that the formation of a connected web of metabolic transformations arises almost inevitably in a sufficiently complex system. (p. xvi) In both these quotations lies the concept of complex order (turbulent, fractal, chaotic) arising spontaneously from a modestly complex mixture of interactions where various 60 William DOLL, Jr.

elements within a system "catalyze" one another. To think of curriculum in these terms is to consider it as a living system, taking shape and forming itself from the interactions. In broad general terms, the teacher's role in this frame is not to impose (order, control, know ledge, learning) from the outside but to be a generative and catalytic agent inside. One could call this a radical shift as seen from modernism's perspective but it is a natural activi ty as seen from a post-modern perspective (Doll, 1993).

Cosmology. The remarks made in the previous section imply a new cosmology, one associated with Alfred North Whitehead (1929/1978) and more recently with Ilya Prigo gine (with Stengers, 1984;

with Nicolis, 1989) and with the emerging complexity move ment (Waldrop, 1992;

Kauffman, 1993;

Cohen and Stewart, 1994). What distinguishes this cosmology from previous cosmologies, say a Platonic (pre-modern) or a Newtonian (modern) one, is in this cosmology's embrace of change as both a natural occurrence and the basis on which the cosmology is built. The cosmos is seen, literally, in terms of expan sion and contraction. This is its natural state, one which forms the foundation of all study as to the origin, development, future of the cosmos and all in it. The metaphysical issue in this cosmology is not the one Darwin faced — how to explain change — but rather how to explain order in a cosmos which is fundamentally change-oriented. The idea of scaling or patterns across change (selfsimilarity) seems to be emerging as a way to do this. Disconti nuous continuity is, I believe, a phrase Whitehead would like, "discontinuous existence" is one he uses (1925/1967, p. 135). Here existences (events) come and go but always there is a pattern to the individual events, hence the continuity across discontinuities. Reality lies then not in individual events or existences (atoms for Newton) but in the patterns found across events. Fractal geometry and quantum physics are manifestations of this cosmolo gy.

A curriculum honoring the concept of cosmology or curriculum as cosmology is a dynamic curriculum — it emphasizes fluctuating yet self-similar relations, nonlinear forms of organization, emerging patterns, and a sense of control which arises from and resides in the dynamics of interactions. Operationalizing these concepts in a curricular manner is a challenge, especially when we as curricularists are so imbued with modernist thinking.

One teacher, on reflecting on this challenge and wishing to reposition herself regarding the students, the text, knowledge has said the following: "I am not the center;

I reside in the connections..."5 I believe this is a good attitude for all of us to adopt, be we teachers, stu dents, text. Obviously this thought can be extended to rethinking the modernist concept of "self" but I leave that to others and shall not pursue it here.

There is, though, another aspect of cosmology I would like to pursue, one that has interesting pedagogic implications. As the study "of the universe as an ordered whole" (Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. III, 1989, p. 985), cosmology has a history of bringing together diverse aspects of human experience. We have expressed our awe at this cosmo logical whole in diverse ways: in a scientific manner and in a spiritual. Following my penchant for alliteration (Doll, 1993, Ch. 7), it is possible to look at cosmology in terms of 3 S's — science, story, spirit. All cosmologies, in dealing with the origin, development, future of the universe in which we reside, have aspects of science, story, and spirit in them.

We could use these three as metaphors for curriculum, accepting the challenge to design curriculum which would integrate the rigors of science with the imaginativeness of the creation myth stories with the awe we feel spiritually when we look upon the act of crea tion (Doll, 1995). A curriculum designed to be rigorous, imaginative, spirited and spiri tual (full of spirit) is an intriguing notion of a curriculum not yet attempted.

GHOSTS AND THE AMERICAN CURRICULUM _ Conversation. Conversation with fellow human beings is all we have, says Richard Rorty (1982), as we "cling together against the dark" in existential uncertainty (p. 166). It is all we have when we give up the "metaphysical comfort" absolute certainty provides for us and accept the pragmatist's viewpoint that certainty (in philosophical or scientific me thod, in God's way, in rationalism) does not exist. Such conversation is not that of talking with, through, past another — it is conversation as dialogue, which goes to the very heart of our personal being, our social culture, our cosmological existence. This conversation accepts the contingency of all life and honors our participation in life, shapes life to our collective ends. In this shaping, though, we need always to recognize the infinite small ness of our own being. In cosmic terms, we exist only as a dot on the landscape of life.

Yet we alone of all the species are able to realize, through consciousness, the irony of this situation. We recognize our frailty (and our arrogance) as does no other species.

Accepting this reality, at least tacitly, Hans-Georg Gadamer (1960/1993) says that a true conversation (or dialogue) is one which captures us, which we "fall into" or become "involved in" in such a way that the "conversation has a spirit of its own," "taking its own twists" and turns so that we as "partners" are far less "the leaders" than "the led" (P. 383).

This existential entry into conversation or dialogue leads, Gadamer believes (far more so than does Rorty6), to "understanding":

Thus it belongs to every true conversation that each person opens him [or her] self unto the other to such an extent that [s/]he understands not the par ticular individual but what [and why the individual] says. (p. 385) This understanding, which goes beyond knowing an individual's way of thinking to grasp ing "the substantive rightness" of that thinking, is a "fusion of horizons" to such an extent that "we can be at one with each other on the subject" discussed (p. 385, emphasis added).

Such a dialectical fusion is indeed a process of transformation of and for each participant over time. No longer is the concern with rightness versus wrongness but with a new level of transformed understanding. Such a view is radical, indeed idiotic from a modernist perspective which sees relations in terms not of transformation but of either-ors with win ners and losers.

To see curriculum as conversation is to see curriculum in a new perspective, as fluid, dynamic, transformative. More, it is to see curriculum not as substance (not even as meta phorical substance like a "set of courses") but as a process, a process continually moving, dialoguing, evolving. In this process, the "things" (events or occasions for Whitehead) of curriculum — goals, plans, courses, methods, procedures — emerge from the interactions happening in the conversation itself. For these interactions to be meaningful, it is impor tant that each participant be open, flexible, and a good listener. Without this attitude, the conversation will be shallow and nontransformative.

Community. The attitude spoken of in the previous section is the attitude of commu nity — a group that shares, partakes together. Community is perhaps the most important of the 5 C's, the one which holds all the others together, the "organizing glue" for currere, complexity, cosmology, conversation. Without community these others become egocen tric, not well connected. Once we give up the metaphysical comfort of a deus ex machine — be it knowledge, conviction, God, tradition — which rests outside the existential situa tion, then all we have is communion with ourselves. This is why Rorty (1980) says we must "keep the conversation going" (p. 377). We converse not only to bolster our courage as we traverse the unknown but also as a vehicle for reaching out, sharing and partaking with others in a communal way.

If the child (learner) and the curriculum (codified knowledge) are two points on the same line (of lived life), then the beginning should be, as Dewey says, with the learner and the learner's interests. But just as truly, development should lie in the interaction of learn 62 William DOLL, Jr.

er and knowledge, child and curriculum, as these meet in a lived social situation. Com munity is, I believe, the best way to approach such a situation. For community — a demo cratic, Deweyan community7 — combines the right amount of tension between the indi vidual and the group so that each enhances the other. Such a community removes us from the solipsism of ourselves and provides comfort against the existential fear of living and dying. It also provides a frame for critiquing and challenging ideas in a caring manner.

Critiquing, challenging, caring seem essential functions of a democratic community and necessary activities for the (Deweyan) growth of ideas.

If we consider currere as the alpha of curriculum then we might well consider commu nity as the omega. Each is complemented by the other, each develops the other;

and all education is about development, intentional development.

Concluding. Comment. In the foregoing ruminations (not ramifications) on curricu lum, I have been encouraging us — Americans and Russians — to consider curriculum in a new way. For us in America, curriculum is currently considered as a planned course of studies, firmly set prior to our active engagement with these studies. This has done us much harm in the development of democratic citizens. It has turned the rigor of our stu dies into the rigor mortis of an obsolescent system. The ghost of control inherent in this system — an external, deus ex machina ghost — needs to be laid to rest forever. Requiat in Pacem!

In its place I am proposing we honor John Dewey's ghost, one I find very much alive in the curriculum of currere, complexity, cosmology, conversation, and community. Since education is all one with life, as Dewey said, I suggest we fill curriculum with the ebul lience of life and in so doing search for a cosmology based on the awe-full dynamics of life. I believe these dynamics — open, creative, interactive, transformative — can be found via the pragmatic process and so search for a neopragmatic cosmology. Dare we search — metaphysically, socially, educationally, actively — for that "fascinating imagina tive realm, born as the echo of God's laughter, where no one owns the truth and everyone has the right to be understood"? (Kundera, 1988, p. 164).

NOTES Dewey began his academic career as a Hegelian, having studied Kant and Hegel in his graduate school work. He became disenchanted, however, with Hegelianism as he moved more and more away from absolutism to experimentalism — the human being as an experimental and experiential creature. However, he never lost all residue of Hegel. As he said, colorfully, in 1945:

I jumped through Hegel, I should say, not just out of him. I took some of the hoop... with me, and also carried away considerable of the paper the hoop was filled with. (Letter of John Dewey to Arthur Bentley, 9 July 1945, in John Dewey and Arthur Bentley: A Philo sophical Correspondence, 1932-1951, p. 439.) This quote is from Milan Kundera (1986, p. 164) who uses it to describe the realm of the novel. I use it to describe my hopes for education based on a newly vitalized concept of curriculum (Doll, 1993, Part III).

The concept of story — one of my 3S's of cosmology: science, story, spirituality — is not a part of Dewey but can, I believe, be found in neodeweyans. An interesting reference here is Richard Hopkins' Narrative Schoan" (1994) which combines Dewey's pedagogical thought with the activity of narration.

GHOSTS AND THE AMERICAN CURRICULUM _ Dewey was born of a pietistic mother and early in his life maintained a re relationship to a sort of transcendental idealism. However, he left organized religion early in his life without necessarily giving up an interest in the spiritual or religious. As he said in his famous A Common Faith (1934/1968): "What I had in mind in speaking of the difference between the religious and a religion... [is] the emancipation of elements... that may be called religious" (p. 8).

Sheri Kinney, University of Victoria, summer 1995. Her actual statement is "I am not in the centre, I am in the connections."

Rorty's sense of keeping the conversation open is not for the purpose of reaching a conclusion which then limits conversation but for the sake of conversation itself which should have, he says, "no constraints except conversational ones" (1982, p. 165). Rorty wishes to reinstate the Socratic ideal of taking conversation seriously: talking, I listening, placing our ideas in the forum of public scrutiny. All the existence we have is ourselves.

It goes without saying that not all communities are open and democratic. Many church, governmental, institutional communities are closed, autocratic, dictatorial. But in an open, democratic form of governance it is community which keeps the excesses of individualism in check. Much has been written on Dewey's rather special sense of com munity, I like best Robert Westbrook's John Dewey and American Democracy (1991).

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DESCARTES, R. (1985). The Philosophical Writings of Descartes (Various Trans.), (Vol. I). London: Cambridge University Press. (Original works published 1649-1664) DEWEY, J. (1957). Reconstruction in Philosophy (enlarged ed.). Boston: Beacon Press. (Original work published 1948) DEWEY, J. (1960a). "The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy." In R. Bernstein (Ed.), Dewey: On Experience, Nature, and Freedom (pp. 19-69). Indianapolis: The Library of Liberal Arts. (Original work published 1917) DEWEY, J. (1960b). The Quest for Certainty. New York: G.P. Putnam. (Original work published 1929) DEWEY, J. (1963). Experience and Education. New York: Collier Books. (Original work published 1938) DEWEY, J. (1966). Democracy and Education. New York: Free Press. (Original work published 1916) DEWEY, J. (1968). A Common Faith New Haven: Yale University Press. (Original work published 1934) 64 William DOLL, Jr.

DEWEY, J. (1990a). The Child and the Curriculum. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Original work published 1902) DEWEY, J. (1990b). The School and Society (rev. ed.). Chicago: University of Chica go Press. (Original work published 1915) DEWEY, J. & BENTLEY. A. (1964). John Dewey & Arthur F. Bentley: A philosophi cal correspondence, 1932 - 1951. (S. Ratner, & J. Altman, Eds.). New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.

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Kittredge, Ed.). Waltham, MA: Blaisdell Publishing. (Original work published 1603) TAYLOR, F. (1947). Scientific Management. New York: Harper & Brothers. (Original work published 1911) WALDROP, M. (1992). Complexity: The Emerging Science at fhe Edge of Order and Chaos. New York: Simon & Schuster.

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WHITEHEAD, A. N. (1978). Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology (Corrected Edition) (D. Griffin & D. Sherburne, Eds.). New York: Free Press. (Original work pub lished 1929) НЕСКОЛЬКО СЛОВ О CURRICULUM'E Русскому слуху или, как выразился профессор В.Л.Рабинович на конференции "Парадигмы философствования", прошедшей в августе 1995 года, "русскоязычному уху", слово Curriculum стало хорошо знакомо не так уж давно по словосочетанию Curriculum Vitae — так называется некоторый аналог нашего ‘Листка по учету кад ров’, который приходится заполнять, если устраиваешься на работу за рубежом. Там надо указать все места, где проходило ваше обучение, полученные степени и все места и должности, на которых вы работали.

А в июне культурологический центр "Эйдос" Санкт-Петербургского союза уче ных посетил профессор Университета штата Луизиана (США) Уильям Долл и сделал доклад, из которого явствовало, что слово "curriculum" не только обладает рядом общепринятых значений, но может быть истолковано и в более широком философ ском смысле. В простейшем случае curriculum — это курс наук, программа обуче ния, содержание и структура которой определяется учебным заведением.

На ранних исторических этапах — в периоды позднего Средневековья и Возро ждения — ни о какой программе речь не шла, школяры и студиозусы могли многие годы постигать то или это, внимая профессорам и перемещаясь от одного из них к другому в соответствии с собственными интересами. В 1576 году Питер Рамус впер вые схематизировал образование, а начиная с 90-х годов прошлого века, "научный метод" "получения продукта из заготовки" занял прочное место не только в учебных заведениях, но и во многих других проявлениях культурной и общественной жизни.

Особенно это коснулось Америки, индустриальный взлет которой непосредственно связывают с восприятием идеи "метода во всем". В двадцатом веке Curriculum в образовательных чреждениях становится полностью обусловленным некоторой внешней целью, а его структура в каждом конкретном случае повторяет структуру той науки, которая изучается.

По-видимому, первым, кто осознал порочность такого подхода к формированию человека, его антигуманный характер, был Джон Дьюи. Не какая-то заранее задан ная внешняя цель обусловливает образование человека, но напротив, цели возника ют в процессе образования. Это динамический, самодостаточный, самоценный про цесс, реализуемый во взаимодействии ученика, предмета и учителя. Удачной 66 William DOLL, Jr.

естественно-научной аналогией для этого является так называемый "странный ат трактор" — объект, появляющийся в некоторых задачах нелинейной динамики, — замкнутая кривая линия, в окрестности которой частица движется хаотически, со вершенно недетерминированно, но тем не менее не покидая окрестности этой кри вой, как бы притягиваясь к ней. (Замечу от себя, что при этом "траектория" движе ния представляет собой объект, обладающий принципиально новым качеством — фрактальной, т.е. нецелой размерностью). Вспомним, что и само латинское слово curriculum происходит от глагола currere, который соответствовал гонкам на колес ницах по замкнутому кругу. Порядок, возникающий из беспорядка, отказ от внеш ней заданности бытия, от deus ex machina, вмешивающегося в дела людей, — таковы новые приоритеты в представлении о curriculum'е (который теперь следует понимать шире — как образ жизни в целом), предлагаемые автоом статьи.

Профессор У.Долл является автором ряда работ, в том числе монографии "A Post-Modern Perspective on Curriculum" (Teach College, Columbia University, New York and London, 1993), посвященных кратко очерченному здесь кругу вопросов.

Статья, предлагаемая вашему вниманию, была написана им специально для альмана ха "Silentium".

Сергей Сипаров Сергей СИПАРОВ ТЕЛЕОЛОГИЯ ЭВОЛЮЦИИ Есть ли цель у эволюции?

Изменение во времени живых и неживых объектов (оставим пока в стороне проблему различия между ними) происходит по-разному. Если косная материя по всей видимости подчиняется второму началу термодинамики, что ведет к разруше нию структур, разупорядочиванию, упрощению, то биологическая эволюция на нашей планете (Земле) происходит таким образом, что налицо усложнение и образо вание структур. Палеонтологи и биологи умеют датировать останки органической материи и могут, таким образом, подтвердить сделанное утверждение. Наиболее сложной известной структурой является мозг вида Homo Sapiens. Одним из призна ков этой сложности является реализация самоотражения системы, т. е. возникнове ние сознания. Удачной иллюстрацией является пример из книги М. Ичаса «О приро де живого: механизмы и смысл» (М., «Мир», 1994): если видеокамеру подключить к телевизору так, чтобы происходящее перед обьективом проецировалось на экран, а затем навести камеру на экран, то на нем появятся некоторые упорядоченные струк туры. Они, эти структуры, не свойственны ни самому экрану, ни камере, ни соедини тельному кабелю, а возникают как результат самонаблюдения. В этом смысле они аналогичны сознанию человека.

Появление человека разумного — существа, настолько радикально отличающе гося от остальной живой природы, что трудно поверить в его эволюционное проис хождение от предка, общего с обезьянами — нередко воспринимается как некоторое завершение: человек — венец творения. Вопрос, таким образом, может быть сфор мулирован так: является ли человек а) конечным результатом эволюции или б) ее промежуточным этапом? В обоих случаях возникают новые вопросы. Если верно первое, то был ли он сотворен или же стал результатом естественного отбора, и что же дальше?

Если он был сотворен, то, стало быть, конечным результатом он не может быть, а предназначен для чего-то, и, значит, реализована ситуация б). Для чего же он был предназначен? Что такое не может произойти без его участия? Или же человек — просто кукла Божественной игры? Последний случай возможен, но не интересен для самопознающего разума, ищущего, так сказать, «все корни уравнения».

Если эволюция носила характер приспособления и выживали все более совер шенные, в чем конечность совершенства человека? В том, что могущество данного вида выросло достаточно для мгновенной самоликвидации вида в целом? Тогда, если мы сумеем преодолеть этот мрачный искус, это будет означать, что мы еще больше усовершенствовались, а, значит, настоящий этап еще не предел, и есть воз можность двигаться дальше. Но куда? Получается, что мы вынуждены признать, что скорее всего существует некоторая цель — внешняя, если речь идет о Боге или ка ком-то космическом операторе;

внутренняя, если мы радикально изолированные разумные существа — средством достижения которой, одним из этапов на пути к которой является человек.

В зависимости от того, что тот или иной автор полагает целью происходящей эволюции, он употребляет термины прогресс или регресс. В настоящее время можно 68 Сергей СИПАРОВ различить две модели эволюции: инфинитную и финитную. Инфинитная модель в простейшем случае подразумевает поступательное движение к некоторой цели, причем приближение к ней является асимптотическим. Иногда говорят о восходя щей расширяющейся спирали, ассоциируя обороты с новым, более широким осмыс лением прежних идей и концепций. В этих случаях возможная цель эволюции нахо дится вне человечества, и оно стремится превзойти само себя в попытках продвинуться далее. Модель финитной эволюции (например, философия Curriculum’а У. Долла) состоит в описании развития как движения того типа, кото рый наблюдается в некоторых механических или гидродинамических системах и обладает одновременно признаками как хаотического, так и детерминированного движения. При этом система остается все время в окрестности некоторой замкнутой кривой, иногда называемой «странным аттрактором». Наличие «аттрактора» указы вет на существование цели, хотя и недостижимой, но такой, что в процессе движе ния к ней возникает новое качество — фрактальный характер самого движения.

Здесь цель эволюции хоть и неуловима, но не носит внешнего характера, и специ альных усилий прилагать не нужно — все равно попадем куда-нибудь. Новой, опо средованной целью является новое качество, (характеристикой которого является фрактальная размерность).

Однако, вне зависимости от того, имеется ли цель у эволюции и какова она, можно констатировать, что в процессе ее имеет место усложнение живых организ мов.

Для всякой ли жизни смерть является атрибутом?

Вернемся к вопросу о различии между жизнью и смертью. Как известно, осно вой жизни (на нашей планете) является белок — биохимическая конструкция, слож ная молекула, обладающая рядом специфических свойств и, в частности, способно стью к самокопированию, саморепликации. Именно это свойство позволяет говорить о смерти — исчезновении одного биологического объекта и приходе ему на смену другого такого же, обладающего теми же признаками. В то же время с химической точки зрения молекула при соответствующих (постоянных) условиях может существовать бесконечно долго, т. е. причин для ее исчезновения, распада нет. И действительно, существуют простейшие живые существа — бактерии и виру сы, которые настолько мало отличаются от косной «химической» материи, что прак тически вечны. Такие бактерии и вирусы могут в том числе и путешествовать в космическом пространстве при температуах, близких к абсолютному нулю, а, попав в благоприятные условия, стремительно размножиться и положить начало новой эволюционной цепочке. Известна гипотеза панспермии, согласно которой жизнь распространяется по Вселенной именно таким образом, наподобие того, как на Зем ле ветер разносит над океанами споры и семена растений. От бактерии до сложного организма — огромный путь, но Вселенной торопиться некуда. По мере усложнения живой системы одни поколения уступают место другим, признаки, закодированные последовательностями азотистых оснований в молекулах ДНК, передаются по на следству, статистически значимые мутации изменяют генофонд, происходит эволю ция.

Однако, выясняется следующее обстоятельство. Признаки живых организмов (можно различать актуально живое, т. е. претерпевающее смерть, и потенциально живое, т. е. биохимические молекулы, переносящие информацию от поколения к поколению) кодируются лишь двумя процентами всех звеньев, входящих в молекулу ДНК, а девяносто восемь оставшихся процентов тщательно копируются, передаются ТЕЛЕОЛОГИЯ ЭВОЛЮЦИИ _ по наследству, но никак не связаны ни с какими внешними признаками. По этой причине некоторые биологи считают эту часть молекул ДНК «мусорной» (trash).

Проследить возникновение и сохранение мутаций в «мусорной» части ДНК чрезвы чайно сложно, если вообще возможно, именно в силу отсутствия связи с внешними признаками. И если принимать теорию естественного отбора, т. е. изменения гено типа в результате мутаций, но под воздействием среды (а это действие связано толь ко с фенотипическими особенностями организма), то кажется весьма вероятным, что даже в случае возникновения мутаций, затрагивающих «мусорную» часть ДНК, они не удерживаются в генотипе в силу отсутствия закрепляющего фактора — среды, взаимодействующей с признаком.

Зачем же удерживается во времени большая из двух часть информации, соответ ствующая потенциально живой (т. е. вообще говоря, бессмертной) молекуле, при надлежащей актуально живому (т. е. претерпевающему смерть) организму? Почему потенциально живое, бессмертное, становится актуально живым, смертным? Какая цель преследуется и здесь, когда происходит этот переход?

Для того, чтобы попытаться ответить на этот вопрос, рассмотрим, что предпри нимает конструктор, когда встречается с необходимостью обеспечить безусловное выполнение некоторой функции устройства, его стопроцентную надежность. Пер вое, что приходит в голову, это повысить прочность и качество изготовления уст ройства. Ясно, однако, что стопроцентная надежность в этом случае не достигается, поскольку невозможно исключить случайность. Какой бы материал ни был исполь зован, как бы тщательно ни было изготовлено устройство, трещинка в заготовке или случайное изменение параметров среды, ведущее к поломке, могут испортить все дело. Поэтому в особенно ответственных случаях применяется периодическая при нудительная замена устройства аналогичным — операция, требующая участия чело века или специальной программы. Наряду с повышением надежности такая схема действий позволяет и вносить усовершенствования в конструкцию самого устройст ва при постоянной гарантии исполнения его функции.

Возможная цель эволюции Применяя эту аналогию к присходящему на Земле, можно предположить, что для того, чтобы обеспечить выполнение некоторой весьма важной функции, исполь зуется постоянно заменяемое и возобновляемое устройство, которое эту функцию и должно исполнить — надо думать, мы с вами. И, значит, превращение потенциально живого в актуально живое есть способ повышения надежности. Но надежности чего? Если условием выполнения функции является сохранность потенциально живой молекулы как таковой, то переходом к актуально живой материи эта сохран ность не достигается. Но достигается сохранность информации, связанной с потен циально живым образованием. Сама молекула может исчезнуть, но то, что записано в ее ДНК-кодах, причем именно на «мусорных» участках, пребудет. Зачем же нужны два процента изменяющейся структуры? А для того, чтобы приспосабливаться к изменяющейся среде, сохраняя тем самым «послание». И, пожалуй, это не все. Если то, о чем идет речь, действительно послание, то кому же оно предназначено? По видимому, автор его подписался в конце, так что надо установить только адресата. И наиболее вероятный ответ таков: адресат тот, кто сумеет прочесть. А чтобы про честь, расшифровать, надо обладать «мыслительными» способностями. При всей сложности потенциально живой молекулы до такого комплекса, как мозг, ей далеко.

И эволюция, идущая по пути усложнения, создает мозг-дешифратор. Адресат не сидит и ждет письмеца, он создается им. Правда, постепенно, не сразу. Что может 70 Сергей СИПАРОВ содержать в себе это письмо? Привет от того, кто послал, сообщение о существова нии других населенных миров, вероятно, с указанием их координат, инструкции по распространению письма-семечка. Таким образом, идея панспермии претерпевает усовершенствование: способ распространения жизни полагается применяемым це ленаправленно.

Вот что может быть целью эволюции на нашей планете — выполнение своей роли в экспансии разума. Если окажется, что возможно галактическое сотрудничест во, то мы можем принять в нем участие. Если оно не предполагается, то наша функ ция — закрепившись на планете Земля, передать эстафету дальше, осознавая, что мы не одиноки, после чего «переходить» к финитной или инфинитной модели и дейст вовать по собственному разумению. Но вот что не может, по-видимому, совершить ся без того, чтобы в результате эволюционного усложнения возникла разумная жизнь, — это развертывание указанной экспансии.

Вполне возможно, что все это выдумка, очередное выдавание желаемого за действительное. Однако, вопрос о других мирах возникает и возникает, несмотря на критические смешки, уже не первое столетие. Притягательная идея имеет шанс воплотиться усилием разума — стоит лишь прочесть письмо, найти в нем смысл, открыть его, создать его.

У человечества есть опыт: были прочтены египетские иероглифы, была найдена Троя, математические грезы воплощались в физических экспериментах. Как следует действовать в данном случае? Эволюционное усложнение могло пойти разными путями. Поэтому, если предположение о существовании письма-носителя информа ции верно, в «мусорных» последовательностях различных белковых молекул долж ны быть схожие участки. Их необходимо выделить и рассмотреть как текст. Воз можно, этому тексту удастся приписать смысл. Прочитавший (приписавший, создавший) его станет одновременно его соавтором и адресатом. Последние дости жения философской мысли — структурализм и постмодернизм в целом, настойчиво призывают именно к такому обращению с элементами культуры. Может быть, это закономерно.

Михаил МИКЕШИН "ПРОСТРАНСТВА БОЖЕСТВЕННОЙ КОМПЕТЕНЦИИ" ЕПИСКОПА БЕРКЛИ Недавно я имел удовольствие заниматься рассмотрением самого благородного, приятного и обширного из всех чувств.

Плодом указанного (назову ли я это трудом?) развлечения яв ляется то, что я теперь Вам предлагаю, в надежде доставить приятное занятие тем, кто среди дел и грубых наслаждений сохраняет вкус к более тонким удовольствиям мысли и реф лексии.

Дж.Беркли Наше сегодняшнее философское мышление сильно замусорено штампами и идеологическими схемами. Целый ряд мыслителей прошлого существует в нем с ярлыками, наклеенными почти столетие назад. Необходимо как можно скорее изме нить позицию конфронтации или безразличия на дружелюбное и заинтересованное соучастие в общем философствовании, которое с их стороны оказывается весьма нетривиальным, полным мысли, поэзии и — очень современным. Мне бы хотелось обратить данной работой внимание на один важный конкретный пример.

*** Английский епископ Джордж Беркли (1685-1753) был субъективным идеали стом.

Далее в "стандартной концепции" говорится, что его главной страстью было стремление считать внешний мир комбинацией ощущений, вызываемых в нас Богом.

Связь ощущений или идей есть связь знаков, которые подает нам Создатель. Раз вещи и идеи тождественны, то абстрактных идей быть не может. Нет смысла в поня тиях "материя" или "абсолютное пространство". Основные труды, где Беркли изла гает свои взгляды, это "Трактат об основах человеческого познания" (1710) и попу лярные "Три разговора между Гиласом и Филонусом" (1713). Правда, епископ не только откровенничал насчет тенденций своей философии, но старался прикрыть ее идеалистическую наготу, изобразить ее свободной от нелепостей и приемлемой для здравого смысла. Сам он называл свою концепцию "имматериализмом", а его после дователи — "естественным реализмом". Кажется, этот откровенный служитель церкви в основном понят и определен. Его сочинения могут представлять лишь исторический интерес (в 1985 году все прогрессивное человечество отметило лет со дня рождения Беркли) как переход от Локка к Юму и Канту.

В самом деле, исторический идеализм Беркли совсем не случаен. Интересна та религиозно-философская традиция, в которой работал епископ. Исследователи счи тают, что он был очень умен, глубок и хорошо информирован1. Достаточно сказать, что он один из немногих в то время не только прочитал и понял основной труд И.Ньютона "Principia", но и глубоко и активно критиковал его наравне с Лейбницем.

Итак, обратимся к духовной ситуации, в которой жил Беркли.

Перед мыслителем XVII-XVIII вв. лежало несколько хорошо разработанных философских возможностей. Во-первых, это ловушка последовательного скепти 72 Михаил МИКЕШИН цизма, во-вторых, опасность оккультизма и мистицизма, ставившего божественное откровение выше всякого разума, в-третьих, болезнь гипертрофированного разума, фактически пренебрегавшего откровением, ставившего себя на место Бога. Я думаю, что и сегодня эти три пропасти не перестают грозить нам. И немудрено, что англи канский епископ видел своим призванием защиту Бога, нахождение правильного "среднего" пути для человеческого разумения. Поэтому Беркли считал себя — и был — в первую очередь защитником и реформатором истинной религии, все его по строения и критические выпады были в фундаменте своем теологичны, его "экскур сы" в философию, науку, теорию восприятия и языка служили лишь вспомогатель ными средствами для большого теологического синтеза. Поэтому помещать Беркли между Локком и Юмом значит смещать акцент.

Следует, видимо, напомнить, что для мыслителей XVII-XVIII вв. рассуждение о Боге было одновременно постановкой глобальных философских вопросов о челове ке, мире и познании, способом прояснения сложной мыслительной ситуации. Поня тие Бога становилось философским, "квазирелигиозным", начинало жить и работать не по религиозным, а по метафизическим законам2.

Мистико-магическая, оккультная традиция, представленная, например, Пара цельсом, Я.Беме, позже Р.Фладдом и другими, призывает познавать подобное по добным. Она превращает аналогии между макро- и микромиром в идентичность.

Человек бесконечно самоотражается в зеркале мира. Мир принципиально антропо морфен. По Николаю Кузанскому и Роберту Фладду, существует универсальная "парадигма", ключ к познанию любого явления как сосуществующих противопо ложностей. Этот ключ — две взаимопронизывающих пирамиды света и тьмы, еди ного и инакого, микрокосма и макрокосма. Эта "парадигма" "отмыкает" и само по знание. Чтобы познать, человек должен быть полностью включен в мир.

Наблюдатель должен стать частью познаваемого, проникнуть в него.

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