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what he wants to say with the private language argument (Wittgenstein 1953: 243-315..). One of the intended conclusions of the private language argument is that the identity of sensations are partly constituted by the rules of language use. Wittgenstein so argues (surely his argument is wrong see Ayer 1985: 74-77, Robinson 1994: 91 118), that without a firmly established linguistic practice we wouldnt be able to identify our different bodily sensations. Wittgensteins picture of language thus suggests that when we try to define the different types of experience, we should give priority to folk psychological practice over phenomenology.

I dont have conclusive arguments against the Wittgenstein an approach.

But nor do I believe that such arguments are possible. I think that in this case as in most cases of priority issue we could argue only in a circular way. I say: the folk psychological classification of mental entities reflects phenomenological facts;

it classifies mental entities in the way it does, because the types of mental entities in question have just those inherent and distinctive phenomenological marks as they do. The Wittgenstein an says: it appears to you that the different types of mental entities have such and-such inherent and distinctive phenomenological marks, because they are classified by folk psychology in such a way as they are. Which is prior, phenomenology or folk psychology? For me it is trivially phenomenology, for the Wittgenstein an it is trivially folk psychology. I believe that the Wittgenstein an is in error, he believes that I am.

2. The prevailing metaphysical theories of mind in analytic philosophy Most of the prevailing metaphysical theories of mind in analytic philosophy do not care about phenomenological facts. They establish their views on the nature of the mind in such a way that they ignore the phenomenology of mind.

The slight of phenomenology is perhaps best illustrated by the dispute on mental causation over the last 40-45 years or so. The debate on mental causation is briefly the following. (1) It is our natural conviction that the mind is a causally efficacious entity: mental events can cause physical events. (2) According to the natural sciences the physical world is causally closed:

physical events have sufficient physical causes. (3) It is plausible to suppose that there is some difference between causally relevant and irrelevant properties of causes. (4) Therefore, mental properties are identical to neurophysiological (physical) properties. In broad outlines this is the argument for type-identity (Lewis 1966, Armstrong 1968). (5) However, due to multiple realizability, type identity is empirically implausible: it is implausible to think that pain in a human and in an octopus is realized by the same type of neurophysiological states (Putnam 1967/1991). (6) One possible solution: lets not identify mental properties with physical properties;

rather lets claim that mental properties supervene (globally or locally) on physical properties. (7) But if we do not identify mental properties with physical properties, then given the exclusion argument (Kim 1989/1993), which presupposes (3) we must either accept epiphenomenalism (which we dont want at all, because of (1)), or else must say that mental and physical properties jointly over determine their physical effect, some overt action, which is again implausible.

Similarly simply put, the following strategies have been devised to circumvent the above problems. Some (like Davidson 1970/1980, 1993) deny that we have to distinguish the causally relevant and irrelevant properties of a cause, and argue that it is the only way to evade the exclusion argument and also maintain (1). Others (like Lewis 1972/2004) claim that multiple realizability is not a conclusive objection to the type-identity theory, because we must identify mental and physical (neurophysiological) properties within species. Still others (like Jackson 1998: 1. chapter) argue that we dont need the type-identity theory in order to maintain the causal efficacy of mental properties: mental and physical properties are different, but the latter necessarily determine the former. Yet again others (like Shoemaker 2001, 2007) hold that not every kind of over determination is wrong;

they distinguish between redundant and non-redundant over determination, and argue that with the latter we can solve the problem of mental causation which does not have any of the above defects.

I wont carry on, for it should be clear that phenomenological considerations do not appear in the main premises of the contemporary debates about mental causation. (This debate has about as much to do with phenomenology as the debate about perdurantism-exdurantism-endurantism, or the especially sexy problem of the existence of arbitrarily detached parts.) The simple fact is that the participants of this debate consider exclusively the property of the mind (of mental events) that it is able to exert a causal influence in the world, and they make their standpoint on the question of such a great importance as the relation between mental and physical

on the basis of the analysis of this one property of the mind.

Of course one could say that our natural conviction that the mind has causal influence on the world really does have phenomenological roots, and to this extent the different theories of mental causation are all about the phenomenological mind. I have to admit that the question is a little bit more complicated than that. For it is really a phenomenological fact that the mind is able to cause things in the world, given the fact that our conscious actions do have a phenomenology (we experience our conscious acts.). However, the phenomenology of our conscious actions does not show what is presupposed by all the participants of the debate that in the course of the action a mental event causes a non-mental (physical) event. Rather it shows that the subject itself (or rather the body of the subject, the body as the subject experiences it) causes it. Thus the subject itself (or her experienced body) is the relatum of the causal relation, not some event in her mind. So metaphysically or ontologically the real cause is a different kind of thing.

Thus (although Im not totally sure of it), the phenomenology of conscious acts rather fits with a metaphysics of agent-causation (Taylor 1966: chapter 8-9, Chisholm 1976, O Connor 2000: chapter 3-4), but this type of metaphysics is almost universally rejected by contemporary philosophers.

Almost all contemporary philosophers think about these problems in terms of event-event relations without questioning it.

Of course, not only the metaphysical theories of mental causation have ignored phenomenology, and are about something other than the experiencing mind, but generally most of the philosophical theories of mind in analytic philosophy. As far as I can see, neither logical behaviourism, regarding mental entities as behavioural dispositions (Ryle 1949), nor functionalism, individuating the types of mental entities in a causal way (Putnam, 1967/1991, Fodor 1968, Harman 1973), nor eliminativism (Rorty, 1979;

chapter 2., Paul Churchland 1981/1991, Stich 1983, Patricia Churchland 1986) or fictionalism (Dennett 1971), or the causal (Fodor, 1987) and teleological (Millikan, 1984) theories of intentionality have anything to do with the phenomenology of mind, not to mention the theories of cognitive science, such as computationalism (Pylyshyn 1984) and connectionism (Clark, 1989). They have nothing to do with what it is for the subject to experience, and how things are given, how they appear for the subject from a subjective point of view. The object of the aforementioned theories is simply not the phenomenological or experiencing mind, but something else.

3. The metaphysics of the phenomenological mind What I mean by the metaphysics of the phenomenological mind is the metaphysics of facts revealed by the phenomenology of mind. Unlike the prevailing metaphysical views in analytic philosophy, the metaphysics of the phenomenological mind does not have to fit our common sense or scientific beliefs about the mind, which are alien or independent of the phenomenology of mind (such as the causal closure of the physical world), but has to conform to the phenomenological facts about the mind.

Make no mistake. I do not merely say that a metaphysics of phenomenological mind must take phenomenological facts seriously. More precisely: I do not merely say that beside other respects, phenomenological respects has to be considered too, just because it is not right that a metaphysical theory of mind is phenomenologically implausible. I am not just saying what, for instance, John Searle says: You cannot say anything that is phenomenologically false (2005: 335). Seeing it in this way, the phenomenology of mind would only have a restrictive role it would merely serve to rule out certain phenomenologically implausible theories. I make a much stronger claim: the phenomenology of mind delivers the phenomenological facts about the mind, and the metaphysics of the phenomenological mind is the metaphysics of these delivered phenomenological facts.

I do not contend that contemporary analytic philosophers are not doing phenomenology in a restrictive sense. For instance, the transparency argument (Harman 1990/1997, Tye 1995, 2000) against sense-datum theory (and non-intentional qualia theory), or the inverted spectrum argument (Block-Fodor 1972) or inverted earth argument (Block 1997) against functionalism are phenomenological types of arguments. Such arguments aim to show that the theories in question are unacceptable, because they cannot account for certain phenomenological features of our experience.

I want to say the following. Take functionalism. Its quite clear that functionalism is not a phenomenologically motivated theory, because it individuates mental events with their relational (causal-functional) properties.

In other words: it takes these relational properties to be the essential properties of mental events, and not their intrinsic (phenomenological) characteristics.

Since then opponents of functionalism have raised many objections to functionalism, some of which happen to be phenomenological. In this context phenomenological facts were not brought up with the aim to develop a comprehensive metaphysics which fits with these facts, but rather were just brought up like I said before as certain respects among many to argue against functionalism. It is this sort of thing that I have in mind when I say that phenomenology usually has a mere restrictive role in analytic philosophy.

Lets see now the metaphysics of phenomenological mind at work! In the next two sections I want to show how it may work through some examples.

4. First illustration: phenomenology and the metaphysical theories of mind Suppose that complete phenomenology establishes that every mental event is directed at something and every mental event has the characteristic of what it is like for the subject. (If you protest against complete phenomenology, then please also protest against complete physics!) Thus contrary to the orthodoxy of separatism, every mental event (including bodily sensations, moods and feelings) is intentional and every mental event (including thought processes) is phenomenally conscious.

Suppose also that complete phenomenology establishes that the relation between these two aspects of mental events is not contingent, but necessary.

That is, it is not the case that a mental event is directed at something due to a certain property and has the characteristic of what it is like for the subject due to a certain other property. Hence its false that the mind instantiates two different and independently existing properties, and that it is possible for the mind to instantiate only one of them, although as a matter of fact it instantiates both.

I think that based on this insight of complete phenomenology, we can refute the knowledge argument (Jackson 1982, 1986/1997) and the conceivability argument (Chalmers 1996) for qualia-based property dualism.

I begin with the knowledge argument. Suppose that from her birth Mary lives in a black-and-white room, and acquires knowledge of the external world from a black-and-white TV screen and black-and-white books. (For the sake of the thought-experiment we could also assume that there are no mirrors in Marys room, that her skin is white, her hair is black, that she does not cut herself and she does not menstruate.) Otherwise Mary is a super scientist: in her black-and-white room she learns every relevant physical facts (complete physics) about human vision. She learns the physics of light, the optics of the eye, the anatomy and neurophysiology of the whole visual system. In short: Mary knows every physical fact about human vision. Now suppose that one day Mary is released from her black-and-white room. She then sees a red tomato and exclaims: Hurray, now I know what it is like to see red!.

Thats the thought-experiment, now comes the argument. The supposition was that in her black-and-white room Mary knows every relevant physical fact about human vision. However when she left her room, she learned something new, something which she did not know before namely, what it is like to see red. Now, since (1) Mary knew every physical fact about human vision, and since (2) after she left her room she has learned something new about human vision, it follows that her prior physical knowledge was not complete. Therefore, physicalism is false, because not all facts are physical.

What sort of mind-body theory does the knowledge argument imply?

The answer is: Qualia-based property dualism. For the intended conclusion of the argument that there are non-physical facts should be understood as the claim that the mind instantiates non-physical properties. (This conforms to the standard definition of fact according to which a fact is a particulars property instantiation.) That is: the quale of redness, which Mary gets to know upon leaving her room is not a physical property.

How can we argue against the knowledge argument based on thesis of complete phenomenology seen above? This way: the knowledge argument implies property dualism which is a kind of epiphenomenalism. Since if (1) the causal closure of the physical world is true, that is, if every action has a sufficient physical cause (and the argument does not question this), and if (2) phenomenal properties are not physical properties which the argument intends to prove then phenomenal properties are causally inert.

This sort of epiphenomenalism is possible only if we separate the intentionality and phenomenal character of mental events. That is, only if we say that intentional properties are physical (which they must be, because they have causal efficacy), but phenomenal properties are causally inert (which they must be, because they are not physical). But since complete phenomenology has shown that there is a necessary connection between intentional and phenomenal properties, the knowledge argument which treats them separately is unacceptable from a phenomenological perspective.

The conceivability argument stands in even starker opposition to the thesis of complete phenomenology than the knowledge argument. Here is the conceivability argument: we can conceive zombies. These creatures are our perfect physical duplicates (they have the same physical properties we do), which have exactly the same intentional properties we do, but they live their mental life in complete darkness. When the traffic light switches to red, seeing it the zombie brakes like you or me. When the zombie sips from a tepid coffee he tuts like you or me. When the zombie is stung he shouts like you or me. Its just that for the zombie there is no such thing as seeing red, no such thing as tasting coffee, no such thing as feeling pain.

Now since (1) everything that is consistently conceivable is metaphysically possible, and since (2) zombies are consistently conceivable, it follows that zombies are metaphysically possible. But if zombies are metaphysically possible, then physicalism is false, because not all mental properties necessarily supervene on physical properties given the metaphysical possibility of creatures which have the same physical properties we do, yet do not have phenomenal properties we do.

The majority of contemporary analytic philosophers reject premise (1), saying:

from the consistent conceivability of zombies no way follows the metaphysical possibility of zombies. From the perspective of complete phenomenology premise (2) is to be rejected. According to complete phenomenology zombies cannot be consistently conceived, because it would require the separation of the intentional and phenomenal properties of mental events. That is something we cannot do, given the necessary connection between them.

5. Second illustration: phenomenology and the metaphysical theories of perception Suppose that complete phenomenology shows that our perceptual experience has two basic phenomenological characteristics. One is that in perceptual experience the things which we are aware of (that is: the objects we perceive) are transcendent, or exist independently of our actual perceptual experience. The other is that in perceptual experience the way in which (intentional) objects are given to us as opposed to other kinds of intentional events is robust, presentative, not just representative.

Conjoining these two phenomenological characteristics of perceptual experience, this is what we get: from a phenomenological perspective, in perceptual experience things that exist independently of our actual perceptual experiences (transcendent entities) are presented to us. To put it in another way, and perhaps more vividly: the qualitative feature of our perceptual experience is experienced in the world outside, on the perceived mind independent/transcendent object itself. When we perceive a red tomato, for instance, we experience the way it appears to us outside, on the mind independent/transcendent red tomato itself. To use a slogan: from a phenomenological perspective in the case of perceptual experiences qualia aint in the head (Byrne Tye 2006).

We could also put it this way: perceptual experience consists of mental events whose qualitative features are experienced on entities that exist independently of our actual perceptual experiences, outside in the world. This peculiar phenomenology is the distinctive mark of perceptual experience. These phenomenological characteristics are what distinguish perceptual experience from other types of mental events: thinking, feeling, moods, bodily sensation, after-images and their ilk. These two phenomenological characteristics belong exclusively to perceptual experience. These two characteristics define the inherent and distinctive mark of perceptual experience. It follows from all of this that if some mental event does not have both phenomenological characteristics, then it is not a perceptual experience, but something else:

thinking, mood, bodily sensation, or maybe even after-image.

How can the metaphysics of perception be connected to these phenomenological facts? By taking this phenomenology at face value and by raising the question in the following form: what kind of metaphysics must we accept in order for the subject to have the perceptual experience with this phenomenology which she has? It has to be downright Kantian, because it must reveal the transcendental conditions of possibility of the phenomenological characteristics of perceptual experience.

What must we claim? We must claim that the perceived mind-independent object and its properties shape the outline of the subjects conscious experience (Martin 2004: 64), where shaping is to be understood not in the causal sense, but in the sense that the perceptual experiences phenomenal character depends constitutively on the nature of the perceived object. Or as Campbell puts it: [the phenomenology] of your experience as you look around the room, is constituted by the actual layout of the room itself: which particular objects are there, their intrinsic properties, such as colour and shape, and how they are arranged in relation to one another and to you (Campbell 2002: 116).

Consequently, the metaphysical theory which takes at face value the phenomenological characteristics of perceptual experience is externalist;

it individuates perceptual experiences relationally. Still, it differs considerably from the standard Putnam/Burge type of externalism (Putnam 1975, 1988, Burge 1979, 1986). For contrary to their version, this externalism is rooted in the phenomenology of perceptual experience. This externalism is based not on the traditional Twin-Earth arguments, but on the phenomenological facts. Accordingly, we have to individuate broadly/relationally the content of our perceptual experience because phenomenology dictates us to do so.

From a phenomenological perspective, in our perceptual experience things existing independently of our experiences are presented to us;

we experience the qualitative features of our perceptual experiences in the world outside.

Lets not stop! Two more things clearly follow. If the phenomenologically plausible metaphysical theory of perception must be externalist, which has to state that the phenomenology of perceptual experience is constituted partly by the properties of the perceived object, then this metaphysical theory must reject the thesis of local supervenience, according to which the phenomenology of mental states is determined only by the subjects inner states. The phenomenologically plausible theory of perception is only compatible with the thesis of global supervenience.

Furthermore, because it is metaphysically possible that there are hallucinations which are from a subjective perspective indistinguishable from veridical perceptual experience, and because from a phenomenological perspective veridical perceptual experience are to be individuated broadly/relationally, therefore, the phenomenologically plausible theory of perception must say that veridical perceptual experiences are a different type of mental event than the hallucinations which are indistinguishable from them, given that by definition they are not relations to mind independent/transcendent objects. It must therefore commit itself to the disjunctive theory of perception (Tzsr 2005, 2009).

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J. Gebert PROS AND CONS FOR RESOURCES AND CAPABILITIES Introduction The concept of well-being is one of the most interpreted topics in economics and political theory. What society or policy decision makers think about the notion of well-being in general can influence policy decisions about distribution of material resources, common goods or creating institutions.

Consequently these beliefs about what matters as well-being can seriously affect policy decisions and the societys everyday-life.

In order to say something about the structure of society and about different social groups policy makers have to make interpersonal comparisons and say something about the well-being level of these groups. They have to compare people in different situations in society and on different scales of well-being.

Therefore policy makers have to decide on what level and in what dimensions are these people or social groups different. Policy making needs a scale to decide which people are worse off or better off. For instance: am I better off than my neighbor? Are pensioners worst off than unemployed young people? This scale, which is the base for interpersonal comparison, I call later in my paper the metric of social advantages or the metric of well-being. In my paper I compare two nowadays most influential ideas about these metrics in political theory, namely: resourcism (Dworkin 2000), and capabilities (Sen 1999).

I start my examination by our two very basic moral intuitions. The first insight is that in society everybody should be treated equally and every member in a society should be equally well-off in some respect. Therefore I will study these concepts of metrics in an egalitarian framework. I accept egalitarianism only for the sake of the argumentation and not because there egalitarian arguments are the most convincing1.

I start my examination in the first chapter by introducing the concept of resources by Dworkin (Dworkin 2000). Dworkin has the most comprehensive theory about resources;

however thinking in a resourcist framework has several explanations in social sciences, especially in economics. Then I in the second chapter I examine the capability approach and take into consideration Dworkins criticism against it. In the summary I compare the handicaps and advantages of the concepts and conclude that although capability approach contains more information about well-being, the concept misses such instruments like the insurance market by Dworkin There are other patterns in the literature also: prioritarianism (Parfit 1997) or sufficientarianism (Frankfurt 1987).

to equalize justice in society. But both concepts have important implication to applied sciences like economics, political economics or political science.

Resources The concept of resources by Dworkin Dworkins concept is the most well-known theory about social advantages as resources in the literature. Resourcist theorists state that the metric of interpersonal comparison is privately owned resources2. These resources are impersonal goods, such as natural assets or manufactured properties. If we are egalitarian, we can say that no one should be able to have more resources than any other individuals. We can even state this claim in market values: no individual should possess resources with higher market value than those available by other individuals.

The fact that resources are impersonal has an important role in Dworkins theory. He states that personal endowments or tastes are not a basis for interpersonal comparison. All that matters is the envy-test: the distribution is just if nobody prefers any other individuals resource bundle to her own3.

In Dworkins words: No division of resources is an equal division if, once the division is complete, any immigrant would prefer someone elses bundle of resources to his own bundle (Dworkin 2000, 67).

To satisfy the envy-test a simple equal distribution of impersonal resources is not enough. Dworkin has two arguments for this. First of all, this is because in practice the resources can not always be distributed equally. With a very simple example: there are fewer domestic animals around than people. The second argument reveals a shortcoming of the simple envy-test: even if nobody envies any other bundle of goods, some citizens may be unsatisfied with the distribution. If everybody has exactly the same package of goods for instance: the same amount of oranges and apples , obviously nobody can envy any other bundle because everybody has the same. But still there may be citizens who are unsatisfied because they hate oranges. They are not envying any other apple-orange bundle, but they would prefer a different distribution: a bundle of just apples4.

According to Dworkin commonly owned resources are a question of equal political power and not equality of resources (Dworkin 2000).

However we connect Dworkins name to the envy-test in contemporary literature, as far as I know the first framing of some kind of envy-test was done by an economist called Hal R.Varian (Varian 1974).

Obviously the person who hates oranges could trade his oranges into apples after the initial distribution. But in this trade he would be handicapped, because it can happen that nobody prefers oranges to apples so he is just not able to trade his oranges.

Dworkins suggestion to solve this shortcoming of the envy-test is a hypothetical auction. Lets assume a situation where shipwrecked people get on an island. There is very little chance of being rescued soon, so the wrecked society faces the task of distributing the resources of the island and start the economy. But instead of allocating the goods equally among the individuals (which is anyway almost impossible as we have seen before) they organize an auction. Everybody gets the same amount of clamshells and they can bid for goods offered in the auction.

In the auction every distinct item on the island is a subject for distribution.

But the items also can be split if someone informs the leader of the auction. For instance: the land itself is part of the auction but it can be divided into different parts if the citizens would want it. Then the auctioneer proposes a set of prices.

If there is only one purchaser for an item at these prices then the prices clear the market. This process is repeated until nobody is envying any others bundle, and everybody is satisfied. Now, as Dworkin writes: No one will envy anothers set of purchases because, by hypothesis, he could have purchased that bundle with his clamshells instead of his own bundle (Dworkin 2000, 68).

Obviously this auction is hypothetical and not a real one, like in the case of the original position by Rawls (Rawls 1971). Generally societies do not face a situation like shipwrecked people on the island and do not start the distribution of goods with an equal share of clamshells or any other metric of value. But according to Dworkin we can ask in every social situation if that distribution would be reached with a hypothetical auction and the allocation of goods is fair according to the requirement of the auction.

What is the difference between the auction described by Dworkin where everybody starts with the same amount of seashell, and a simple market mechanism, where everybody has the same amount of goods and they can freely exchange goods between each other? Although Dworkin does not answer exactly this question, in my opinion there is a well-defined important distinction here: the value of the seashell is equivalent (technically equally zero), but the value of goods differs from type to type and also according to the owners marginal rate of substitution. So probably the result would be different from an auction with seashells and from a free-trade market mechanism starting with equal resources.

But even if the envy-test is satisfied and the auction was successful, we still face a problem with fair distribution of goods. Because after the auction people are left alone with their resources and they start to produce and trade with more or less success. Inequalities occur and the envy-test would shortly fail because the less successful people would desire the more successful peoples bundle. I think this is the point, where the question of responsibility comes into the theory. From a moral point of view there is a difference between the following situations: if somebody is hardworking and gains more wealth than others, or just get lucky and wins the lottery. Also there is something different between people who are lazy and are wasting their money and between people who are hardworking but have bad luck with production.

And the difference is the responsibility for their success.

One solution in Dworkins theory about the differences in pattern is the second step of the envy-test. If somebody is hard-working (and lucky in some way) like Adrian in Dworkins example and after the equal distribution he can produce more wealth than others. The envy-test seems to fail, because the others would envy Adrians bigger amount of goods.

But at this point Dworkin introduces the second step of the test: the envy test is now valid both for the impersonal resources and for ambitions and life-style. Would other people envy Adrians resource and hard-working ambitions together? Well, I agree with Dworkin, generally the answer is no. And because Adrian is liable for the resulting differences in outcomes, then it are a result of option luck, therefore it is just. This feature of Dworkins theory is called ambition-sensitivity.

To solve the problem about responsibility, Dworkin makes a distinction between option luck and brute luck. Option luck is a calculated, perceived luck, like playing the lottery. In Dworkins words: Option luck is a matter of how deliberate and calculated gambles turn out (Dworkin 2000, 73).

But brute luck is the result of some unforeseen happening, is a matter of how risks fall out that are not in that sense deliberate gambles (Dworkin 2000, 73). In my opinion, the distinction is clear theoretically, although Dworkin himself admits that it is just a matter of degree.

Both option luck and brute luck can have an effect on the distribution of resources. I think the distinction is important from two perspectives. First, we have the moral intuition that society has to compensate for the misfortune from the brute luck, but it is not necessary to have to compensate for the miserable situation resulting from option luck. For instance: we do not compensate people who were gambling away their money on poker. Second and this is Dworkins argument: we are not allowed to take away the resources from the winners in option luck to compensate the losers because in that case nobody would choose a risk-taking life and for Dworkin this case is too paternalistic.

Dworkin claims that the solution to the problem how to compensate the result of brute luck is a fair insurance market. It is a hypothetical insurance market where citizens can buy insurance for brute luck. Therefore they can transform brute luck into option luck. For instance: if I buy insurance for car accidents, then I am secure against that brute luck, because I will be compensated in case of accident. Thus the brute luck becomes option luck. I can even have bad option luck although the notion sounds weird if I was buying the insurance against car accidents for nothing, but I did not have a car accident in my whole life.

The insurance market is setting the prices of the insurance so it is capable of reflecting the different risk-sensitivity of people. With Williams and Otsukas words:

(Dworkin) argues bad brute luck should be redressed to the extent required to mimic the operation of counterfactual insurance market in which equally wealthy individuals, aware only of the distribution of luck rather than their personal fortunes, purchase coverage against suffering relatively bad brute luck guided by their own values and attitudes to risk (Williams and Otsuka 2004, 134).

If everybody had the same opportunity to get insurance, then brute luck would not be a problem for society. However there are several problems about this insurance market: what about people born with handicaps and did not have the opportunity to insure against it? Dworkin suggests that this situation should be treated as a lack of resources, because those people are missing personal resources therefore according to the equality of resources principle they should be compensated5.

As a summary, Dworkin argues that the right metrics of the interpersonal comparison are resources which should be distributed equally among the members of society. To rule out the consequences of bad luck, Dworkin suggest a fair insurance market to transform brute luck to option luck. In my opinion Dworkins concept is especially responsibility-sensitive because he can make a difference between chosen, deliberate gambling and brute bad luck. Thus Dworkin starts from equality of resources, but allows inequalities from option luck.

Objection from the perception of disability However there are other objections against this theory of resources, which are harder to avoid. I call these arguments in brief coming from the In my opinion Dworkin is vague about this question. There are several problems around this solution. He makes a difference between ambition and features of body and mind and states that ambition like expensive tastes should not be compansated, but lack of normal features should. But what counts as normal? And where is exactly the difference between ambition and a simple feature? Dworkin himself admits that insurance market is not the solution which could solve every problem, but it is still the best possible option.

perception of disability, because all that matters in these objections is how people perceive their (dis)ability.

Dworkin makes a distinction between personal resources and impersonal resources. Impersonal resources are natural and manufactured goods in the outside world. But personal resources are personal powers and endowments.

With Dworkins word: Personal resources are qualities of mind and body that affect peoples success in achieving their plans and projects: physical and mental health, strength, and talent. Impersonal resources are parts of the environment that can be owned and transferred: land raw materials, houses, television sets and computers, and various legal rights and interests in these (Dworkin 1990, 34). Personal resources are not part of the envy-test at the first level, because obviously they can not be distributed. But Dworkin admits that people, who were born with disability with less personal recourse should be compensated somehow and should be given more impersonal resources.

But are we not back to the expensive tastes problem, where expensive tastes can be considered as a disability and should be compensated? Dworkins answer is no, because he makes another distinction between handicaps and preferences or tastes as I mentioned above. A mental feature can be considered as a handicap only if the person wishes not to have it. As Dworkin writes: (These people) regret that they have these tastes, and believe they would be better off without them, but nevertheless find it painful to ignore them. These tastes are handicaps;

though for other people they are rather an essential part of what gives value to their lives (Dworkin 2000, 82). As a consequence, a personal feature is considered as a disability, only if the person himself considers it as a handicap or a craving. This distinction also has a consequence that disability has to be compensated only if it is considered as a disability.

It is an important part of Dworkins theory because he can explain problems like the example about womens infertility. Being infertile can be a huge handicap for women who would like to bear a child. Thus according to Dworkin she deserves compensation. But the same feature is not to be compensated if she thinks that being infertile is an advantage, because she does not want to have a child. In this way she even can have fewer costs, because she does not have to spend money on different means to avoid pregnancy. And in this latter case, obviously she does not have a legitimate claim to compensation6. As Clayton and Williams writes, this is a huge advantage of Dworkins concept:

This distinction between handicap and advantage seems to be a great solution to solve the problem about the lack of certain personal resources from a theoretical point of view.

However it is really hard to imagine how would this work in a real society? How should [T]he test provides an account of interpersonal comparison which does not rest on the truth of contested claims about personal well-being. Instead individuals themselves decide what is to count as a valuable resource or opportunity, and what count as a limitation or handicap is. Because of the widespread disagreement about the nature of personal well-being characteristic of our pluralistic societies, many liberals will applaud this feature (Clayton and Williams 1999, 456).

However Dworkins concept is still missing an aspect of compensation.

This is the case, if somebody does not considers a feature a disability, but because of this characteristic he still in need of more resources. For instance the case of the cold giant.

Lets assume that there is a society where everybody has the same height, but one of the citizens is much higher, he is a giant. Now, in winter everybody needs the same amount of clothes to cover their body, except the giant, who needs more resource to cover his higher body. The giant does not consider his height as a disability, he even can considering it as an advantages. A resource egalitarian, like Dworkin would not give him the additional resources not to be cold in winter, because the giant does not envy the characteristics of others.

The giant could say: Im better a cold giant, than be a dwarf like you!. So he could prefer being a cold giant than being an average height, but I think that he would even more prefer being a warm giant than being a cold giant. Thus we have to admit, that he is still in cold without more resources and I think that we should give him the necessary resources not to be cold.

The case of the cold giant shows that the existence of envy is neither necessary nor sufficient for inequality. As Clayton and Williams state:

individuals can be more needy than others even if they do not prefer their resources, and they can be less needy yet still prefer others resources

(Clayton and Williams 1999, 457-458)7. But Clayton and Williams has a bit different example than the story about the cold giant.

They start from the statement that having a children is much more personally costly for woman then for man. But still, many women considers as a value the opportunity to bear a child and they considers as an advantage the policy maker decide, who deserves the compensation? The situation is close to what Cohen mentions: this distinction as a policy would result an intolerably intrusive state surveillance to administrate who feels disabled (Hi! Im from the Ministry of Personal Resources. Do you feel, by any chance, unusually handicapped today?) (Cohen 1989).

From the point of view of my argumentation needy means here some kind of lack of well-being and not welfare in the strict-technical sense. This state of needy can be covered by capability approach.

to be a women, thus obviously they are not envying the reproductive endowment of mens. But still, they can prefer to reduce the costs of child bearing than staying without some compensation. And many think that it is just, to compensate women because of those higher costs. As a matter of fact, this practice in many societies: there are maternity leaves and other benefits for women with children. So the case is that the woman does not envy the others feature, but still deserves compensation.

But the story does not ends here, Clayton and Williams (1999) turns around the example and considers a less familiar case: lets assume a man who envies the womens reproductive capability and regrets being unable to bear a child. But many think that his claim for compensation would be strange, his envy is not morally relevant, and he does not deserve any compensation. With Burleys words:

when it comes to reproductive capacities for example, the greater financial burdens imposed on women by virtue of their unique biological endowments probably will not be compensated on Dworkins view. A womens complaint is only deemed legitimate if there is penis envy, as it were. If she affirms her possession of female reproductive capacities, if, that is, she affirms the fact that she is a woman, we cannot say that there is any injustice along Dworkinian lines when actually there is. To demand that a woman want to be a men to support compensation is simply ridiculous (quotes: Cohen 2004, 25).


In summary about Dworkins theory: I think that equality of resources is a very promising concept of social advantages. It is responsibility sensitive, however the theory of insurance-market is incomplete and it has complications around how people perceive their disability.

Capabilities The capability approach The capability approach of Sen has triggered a major impact on both economics and other disciplines and it has practical relevance for policy design and assessment, most famously through the work of United Nations Human Development Report (Sen 1999, 1995, 1990). The capability approach contains what information we should look at, if we are to judge how well someones or a societys life is going or has gone. Consequently it is considered as a theory of social advantages and allows for interpersonal comparisons of well-being. Sen states that the theory of capabilities is especially a good tool to measure poverty in developing countries.

The concept of human nature has an important role in capability approach:

to understand human beings, either individually or collectively, we should understand how well their lives are going and who or what controls them.

A persons achievement can be judged in two different perspectives: (1) the actual achievement, and (2) the freedom to achieve.

Sen makes a distinction between functionings and capabilities: functioning means the state of a person in particular the various things he or she manages to do or be in a leading life, something what he has good reason to do, or pursue. It can be doing or being also. For instance: being healthy or have reading skills. But a persons well-being consists not only of his current states and activities, but also the persons freedom or real opportunities to function in ways alternative to his current functioning. For example: fasting as a functioning is not just starving: it is choosing to starve when one does have another option.

These activities and beings and the freedom to choose between them together constitute what makes a life valuable. Therefore Sen understand on the actual freedom they have, which means a real opportunity of something. Capability sets may include freedoms that are conditional, because they depend on the choices of other people. As brief summary of the aim of capability approach, let me cite Olsaretti: Sens main claim is that capability to achieve valuable functionings, that is, various valuable states of doing and being, is the relevant standard of individual advantage (Olsaretti 2003, 2).

A key analytical distinction in the capability approach is between the means and ends of well-being. Sen has objections against resourcist theories for instance: Rawlss use of primary goods for interpersonal comparisons, because primary goods are mere means, not intrinsically worthwhile ends.

Different people need different amounts and different kinds of goods to reach the same levels of well-being. For instance: the right amount of food to enable one person to labor effectively may be insufficient for a second person and too much for a third. The relation between a mean to achieve and the achievement of certain beings and doings is influenced by conversation factors such as mentioned previously: personal (physical condition, sex, intelligence), social (public policies, social norms), and environmental (physical or built environment, climate, pollution) factors. Sen argues that means and circumstances are both important, because it is not enough [] to know, that no one would prevent that person from pursuing that functioning if she attempted it: it also necessary that she have the means to pursue it, and that she not be faced by other internal obstacles that make the functioning ineligible for her, and/or its pursuit very costly for that person (Olsaretti 2003, 4).

To make use of capability approach the capabilities should be weighting, so we should decide which one is more and which one is less important.

And here lies the answer to the problem mentioned against Dworkin about perceiving a valuing disability. Dworkin states that I am handicapped, if I have a personal feature which I consider as disability (Dworkin 2000). But as we have seen, this is not enough for an evaluation, because there are cases like the cold giant and womens fertility where the person does not feel itself handicapped or disabled, but still he is in need of more resources. These cases can be answered with capabilities: the giant needs the additional resource, because he lacks the capability of being warm (being not cold). The woman who bears a child also deserves the additional resources, because to live with the capability of bearing a child, she needs more resources. Therefore the capability approach can avoid this problem.

Sen rejects formalized theories invented to measure well-being, for example real income indices. His thinking about welfare is heterogeneous, and describing it is not appropriate with one type of data. His theory is explicitly pluralist form of measurement, which involves the question of practical applicability.

Perfectionism and evaluating capabilities But the capability approach is also not without objections. The most problematic one is about perfectionism: the only way to say something about which capabilities should we support is some objective therefore perfectionist list of capabilities.

Nussbaum explicitly takes this objection and creates an objective list of capabilities (Nussbaum 2011). If we follow the path of Nussbaum, then we can not avoid the perfectionist critique about objective capabilities.

The problem with the objective capabilities is that the capability theory implicitly contains the judgment that which resources and features help the individuals to achieve their goals and which endowments count as disability.

For instance: being infertile can be a serious disability for some women who wants to bear a child, but being infertile can be an advantage for women who do not want to have a child.

However, I think Nussbaums list and the perfectionist path can be confronted easily so the perfectionist challenge should be better answered with Sens response about a deliberative process (Sen 1999). Choosing the important capabilities and weighting them is the task of some kind of democratic deliberative process8.

I accept that answer from Sen for now, because this kind of argumentation is not the subject of my paper. However I realize that Sens argument is still slippery, because we just pushed the problem of perfectionism into the field of democratic theory.

Obviously there are several difficulties about a deliberative democratic processes, for instance the problem of majority (Kymlicka 2002).

Another argument against the perfectionist objection is that on the evaluation we can focus on the opportunity for functioning. If we are taking into consideration functionings, we do not have to make substantive claims about comprehensive controversial theories. Sen himself states that the evaluative space can be the set of functionings or the set of capabilities also (Sen 1999).

If we reject to be a perfectionist capability theorist, then we have to choose the other path and accept that all what matters is the individuals own ranking, and valuation about different capabilities by themselves or by a deliberative democratic process. As Williams writes: Sen replies that the possibility of comparing capability sets depends only on ranking them as more or less valuable, rather than on any idea of normality, and that the impossibility of eliminating inequality does not entail the undesirability of minimizing, or reducing it (Williams 2002, 29).

Therefore I can answer the question stated by Clayton and Williams:

Where a disability is welcomed should we accept the individuals own apparent judgment that it does not constitute a disadvantage (Clayton and Williams 1999, 455)? And the answer is: yes, we should9. I agree with Clayton and Williams that this answer brings us closer to the welfarist view;

however it also brings us closer to Dworkins view about evaluating personal resources. And this anti-perfectionist path leads us to Dworkins critique about capabilities (Dworkin 2000).

Dworkin against Capability Dworkin argument begins by stating that if we want to follow a midfare

path between welfarism and resourcism, like capabilities then this solution will be ambiguous. Then he states that: [i]f the apparent ambiguity is resolved in one of two possible ways, his equality of capabilities also collapses into equality of welfare. If it is resolved in the other way, then equality of capabilities is identical with equality of resources (Dworkin 2000, 286).

The latter part of this statement is supported by Dworkin in the following way: if we focus on elementary functions, such as being adequately nourished, being healthy, have minimal shelter, and then we are back at the idea of resources, because these elementary functions are the same as some basic personal and impersonal resources. In this case, Dworkin and Sen We could think, that with emphasizing own evaluation we are back at the intolerably intrusive state surveillance mentioned by Cohen (Hi! Im from the Ministry of Capabilities, Im wondering what kind of capabilities do you value today?) (Cohen 1989).

But by Sen the evaluation is not the task of the individual himself, but the task of the deliberative democratic process, whatever this process is.


are just using a different terminology for the same social advantages. The only difference is that Dworkin compensates through insurance market, but Sen does not define exact tool for it.

The first part of Dworkins criticism of capability approach and the previously cited quotation can be explained in a different way. If Sen wants to broaden his set of functionings, then he should care about more complex functionings, like self-respect or participation in communal, political life. Dworkin admits that this broader set of functionings can be a very attractive idea. But he also admits that these complex functionings are those doings and beings which can be not grabbed by a resourcist theory, because they depend on factors which are outside of personal or impersonal resources. But in this case the complex functionings are merely another form of equality of welfare and all the objections against welfarism can be applied against capability approach.

Dworkin has this conclusion because of the flexible, open-ended framework of the capability approach. Sen himself does not specify the list of capabilities, thus his theory is open to any doings or being which can be reasonably valued, just like in the cases of welfarism, where preferences matter10.

According to Dworkin, we have now two ways to follow: we either follow the resourcist view by expanding the class of relevant goods to include natural, as well as social primary goods (Williams 2002, 26), because peoples powers are technically resources, because they are used together with material resources to achieve well-being. The other way is to follow the welfarist view about the subjective preferences.

In defense of Sen As far as I see, there are two ways of defending Sen from Dworkins criticism. First to show that resources either personal or impersonal can not grab the essence of capabilities, to wit, capabilities can not be reduced to resources. The second way of the defense is to show that preferences in the welfarist theory are not like functionings in Sens theory.

I start with the first way and claim that capabilities can not be reduced to resources. As Williams states: Sens remarks imply that it is possible for inequalities in capability to be morally relevant even though they do not derive from inequalities in either personal or impersonal resources (Williams In my opinion, there is an exact difference between preferences and valued functionings. Preferences are desires for the state of affairs, where the individual expects utility from the satisfying. But functionings are just reasonably valued doings and beings, but the individual does not expect utility from it.

2002, 30). If we take a look at the conversation factors between means and ends, we can realize that between them there are personal resources like gender, metabolic rate or body size, which can be interpreted in the framework of resourcism. But between the conversational factors there are social, environmental factors, like climate, social norms, social security, education which can be not reduced to personal or impersonal resources because can not be owned like resources defined by Dworkin.

To defend Sen from Dworkins objection in the second way, there is Williams example about Ann and Bob (Williams 2002). Ann and Bob are twin-siblings and are very much alike in their personal and impersonal resources. They both are well-educated, healthy and talented and they both have the aim to have a nice family-life with a member of the opposite sex and pursue successful careers. But there is only one difference between them: Ann is a women and Bob is a men. Williams argues in the following way: an individuals capability to combine parenthood and occupational success depends not only upon his or her resources and ambitions but also the ambitions of others. It is possible that although the twins have common ambitions, this similarity is atypical of men and women. Consequently, the capabilities of Ann and Bob to achieve their parental and occupational ambitions may still be quite unequal (Williams 2002, 31).

Williams support this argument with a very similar and contemporary example about preferences in accordance with family-life. We can assume a society, where every man is an ideal worker, meaning that they prefer to work in their profession than working at home around the house. If in the same society all the women are homemakers and prefer house-work to a profession, than there is no problem for family-life. But if in this society Ann is an ideal worker, or a co-parent, who like to divide the house-work equally will be in trouble to find a husband, because with an ideal-worker she can not share the house-work. So to satisfying Anns preference for a nice family-life, depends very much on others preferences. But this situation can not be described in welfare-terms, only in terms of capability.

Concluding remarks Sens most plausible objection against the resourcist theories in general namely that resources are just means and not ends in themselves (Sen 1999) can not stand against the Dworkinian concept. Dworkin has the insurance market mechanism, which can compensate bad brute luck, and he also suggests paying off the handicapped, because they miss personal resources.

In my opinion Dworkins argument against Sen that capabilities are falling whether into basic needs approach or welfarism can be rejected, because capabilities and functionings are more than just preferences. However the capability approach also has a handicap against resources because the capability approach can not take into consideration the reason why capabilities are narrowing. Sen himself admits this disadvantage of his concept. He states that a persons set of capabilities can be narrower as a result of two reason:

(1) first, if the persons freedom was hurt, or (2) if the individual has personal disadvantage (Sen 1999). I describe the difference with an example: being unwillingly unemployed is practically missing the capability to work in the Senian terms. But being unwillingly unemployed can have different reasons:

for instance: I do not get a job, because I am discriminated as a woman. In this case we are talking about the first reason: the persons freedom was hurt. But another reason for being unwillingly unemployed can be for instance that I am not educated. Then we are talking about personal disadvantage.

Sen states that from the point of view of a well-being theory it is indifferent, which reason caused the narrowing of opportunities. But from a moral point of view the case is different: being unemployed because discrimination is unjust, but being unemployed because of undereducation from own fault is indifferent from a moral perspective (Sen 1995).

References 1. Arneson R. Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare// Philosophical Studies. 1989. 56. P.77-93.

2. Clayton M., Williams A. Egalitarian Justice and interpersonal comparison/ / European Journal of Political Research. 1999. 35. P. 445-464.

3. Cohen G. A. On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice// Ethics. 1989.

99. . 906-944.

4. Cohen G. A. Expensive Taste Rides Again. In Dworkin and His Critics:

With Replies by Dworkin, edited by J. Burley. Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2004.

5. Dworkin R. M. Foundations of Liberal Equality. In Tanner Lectures on Human Values, edited by G. B. Peterson. Salt Lake City, Utah: University of Utah Press, 1990.

6. Dworkin R. M. Sovereign virtue: the theory and practice of equality.

Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2000.

7. Frankfurt H. Equality as a Moral Ideal// Ethics. 1987. 98. . 21-42.

8. Hausman D., McPherson . Economic Analysis and Moral Philosophy.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

9. Kymlicka W. Contemporary Political Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.

10. Nagel T. Equality and Partiality. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991.

11. Nozick R. Anarchy, State and Utopia. Oxford: Blackwell, 1974.

12. Nussbaum M. Creating capabilities: the human development approach.

Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011.

11. Olsaretti S. Endorsement and freedom in Amartya Sens capability approach. In 3rd Conference on the Capability Approach. Pavia, 12. Parfit D. Equality and Priority// Ratio. 1997. 10. . 202-221.

13 Rawls J. A Theory of Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971.

14. Rawls J. Social Unity and Primary Goods. In Utilitarianism and Beyond, edited by A. K. S.-B. Williams. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.

15. Sen A. K. Equality of What? In The Tanner lectures on human values.

Stanford University, 1979.

16. Sen A. K. Jusitce: Means versus Freedoms// Philosophy and Public Affairs. 1990. 19(2). .111-121.

17. Sen A. K. Inequality Reexamined. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.

18. Sen A. K. Development as Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.

19. Temkin L. Inequality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993.

20. Varian H. R.Equity, Envy, and Efficiency. Journal of Economic Theory/ / 1974. 9. .63-91.

21. Williams A. Dworkin on Capability// Ethics. 2002. 113 (1). . 23-39.

22. Williams A., Otsuka . Equality Ambition, and Insurance. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume// 2004. 78 (1). . 131-150.

23. Williams B., Sen . . Introduction. In Utilitarianism and Beyond, edited by B. Williams and A. K. Sen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.

G. Bcs COUNTERPART THEORY AND MODAL REALISM ARE COMPATIBLE Jim Stone (2009 and 2011) has recently argued for the startling claim that counterpart theory and Lewisian modal realism are incompatible. He so argues that counterpart theory and the multiverse hypothesis are incompatible. Given that modal realism implies that there is a multiverse it follows that counterpart theory and modal realism are incompatible. Worse yet, the same argument also proves that modal realism is itself incoherent. Stone concludes that the counterpart theorist should become an ersatzer. I will argue however that Stones argument fails because it rests on a false assumption.

Suppose that reality consists of parallel universes that are causally and spatiotemporally isolated from one another. For simplicitys sake also suppose that in the multiverse my only counterpart is Smith and Smiths only counterpart is me.

One day I find a wallet with a lot of cash and the owners address.

Assuming that I have the liberty of indifference, its up to me what I do with it. I can freely return it or can freely keep it. Smith who lives in a parallel universe also finds a wallet with a lot of cash and the owners address. He too has the liberty of indifference, he can freely return or can freely keep the wallet.

Can we both freely return the wallet? Or can my returning the wallet causally prevent Smith from doing the same? Hardly, since we are causally isolated from one another. What I do can have no causal effect on what Smith does, and vice versa. Hence, it is possible that we both (and everyone else in the multiverse) freely return the wallet. Call this conclusion C. So the multiverse hypothesis and ipso facto modal realism (MR) are compatible with C.

But counterpart theory (CT) is not. Suppose we both freely return the wallet. It would still be true of each of us that we could have freely kept it. Hence according to CT each of us has a counterpart who freely keeps it. But the supposition was that neither of us has kept it, so neither of us has such a counterpart. So we each have and dont have such a counterpart.

Thus, if CT is true, it is not possible that we both freely return the wallet.

Therefore, MR and CT are incompatible.

Worse yet, MR is at the same time not compatible with C. Since it is not the case that we both freely return the wallet (Ive kept it), C entails that the multiverse could have been different. But the modal realist denies that the multiverse could have been different. It is a basic tenet of MR that what is possible is necessarily so, that is, that the space of possibilities could not have been any other way than it is.

MR is then the conjunction of two claims: there is a multiverse and the multiverse cannot be different than it is. The first is compatible with C, the second is not. We can assert as a necessity that a universe exists for every way a universe could possibly be, and we can have real, undetermined world parts, but we cant have both (Stone 2011: 100). Hence, MR is either incoherent or else (if the second conjunct is struck out) incompatible with CT. Either way the counterpart theorist should become an ersatzer.

But Stones argument is flawed, I will now argue. The argument assumes that it is contingent what goes on in a universe. It assumes that I can freely keep the wallet and can freely return it in my own universe, and Smith can keep it or return it in his own universe. Given that I cannot causally affect what Smith does in his universe, and he cannot affect what I do in my universe, it follows that we can both freely return the wallet and hence that the multiverse could have been different.

Whence this assumption? Based on some of his remarks, Stone seems to take real people who have the liberty of indifference to be undetermined world parts whose undeterminedness consists, I surmise, in exactly the fact that it is contingent what goes on in the universes they are part of. And this I take to indicate that Stone equates liberty of indifference with undeterminedness.

But the modal realist denies that there are undetermined world-parts in the sense that it is contingent what goes on in a universe. It is a basic feature of MR that it is never contingent what goes on in a universe. And the modal realist would also deny that liberty of indifference is undeterminedness. She would say that my liberty of indifference consists of the fact that I do different things in different universes which is perfectly consistent with the fact that what I do in each of those universe isnt contingent.

Once the assumption is dropped the problem instantly dissolves. Smiths and my liberty of indifference is not something which the other has to interfere with in order to prevent one from doing the same. Our liberty of indifference consists in the fact that I freely keep the wallet and Smith (my counterpart) freely returns it. From which it immediately follows that it is not possible that we both freely return the wallet, and a fortiori that the multiverse could not have been different.

I conclude that Stone has not succeeded in proving that MR is incoherent or incompatible with CT. The counterpart theorist need not become an ersatzer.

References 1. Stone J. Why Counterpart Theory and Modal Realism are Incompatible/ / Analysis. 2009. 69. P.650-653.

2. Stone J. (2011). Counterpart Theory vs the Multiverse: Reply to Watson// Analysis. 2011. 71. P.96-100.

IV.

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3. , . , ., , 90- ., , .

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Portes A., Zhou M. Gaining the upper hand: Economic mobility among immigrant and domestic minorities // Ethnic and Racial Studies 1992. Vol.15. P. 491-522;

Portes A., Zhon M. The new second generation: Segmented assimilation and its variants. Annals AAPSS. 1993. 530, 74-82;

Waters M. C. Ethnic and racial identities of second-generation black immigrants in New York City // International Migration Review. 1992. Vol.28. P. 795-820.

, .. , . , 4.

. 5. , , . , , , , . . . , 6. , , , , , . . . , , . , - 7.

Alba R., Nee V. Rethinking assimilation theory for a new era of immigration // International Migration Review. 1997. Vol.31. P. 826-874;

Gans H. Symbolic ethnicity:

The future of ethnic groups and cultures in America. Ethnic and Racial Studies. 1979.

Vol. 1. P. 1-20;

Nagel C. R. Geopolitics by another name: Immigration and the politics of assimilation. Political Geography. 2002. Vol. 21. P. 971-987.

.. ? . ., 2000. . 142.

Portes A., Zhon M. Op. cit.



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