«САНКТ-ПЕТРБУРГСКИЙ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННЫЙ УНИВЕРСИТЕТ Факультет Политологии В. А. Гуторов Политика:,, ...»
Предвидение и прогнозы в политике весьма слабо связаны с любым вариантом теории прогресса, поскольку, как уже отмечалось выше, чув ство прогресса является, по большей части, актом веры, хотя для его обоснования и могут быть привлечены аргументы из области филосо фии и науки. В политической теории V в. прогрессистская ориентация выступала на передний план потому, что для рационального предвиде ния в этой сфере материала было еще недостаточно. Теория Платона и Аристотеля, напротив, была направлена на поиск вечных принципов политики, на установление закономерностей, определяющих постоян ное изменение конституционных форм. Этот поиск начинается с разра ботанной Платоном в VIII книге «Государства» теории деградации поли тических режимов и завершается в античности классической концепци ей круговорота конституций в «Истории» Полибия. Важнейшим промежуточным звеном эволюции этой теории является аристотелев ская «Политика». Далеко не случайным является то обстоятельство, что во всех трех, указанных выше, произведениях прогрессистские мотивы оттеснены на периферию концепцией постепенной деградации полити ческих форм. Тем не менее их существование предопределяется самой установкой на активную роль законодателя, либо приостанавливающего неизбежную в принципе деградацию, либо видоизменяющего схему по литической эволюции в результате целенаправленных творческих уси лий. Платоновское идеальное государство является воспроизведением в сфере мысли принципов, которые существовали и будут существовать вечно в неизменном мире трансцендентных форм. Возможность появ ления такого государства на земле остается крайне проблематичной, а если бы оно и возникло «по какому-то божественному вдохновению»
(Resp., VI, 499 C), то в силу изменчивости всех земных вещей оно неми нуемо обречено на постепенное вырождение (Resp., VII, 546 A sqq.). Вме сте с тем Платон выражает уверенность в том, что в результате целена правленных воспитательных усилий деградацию идеального государства можно приостановить и даже заставить его пребывать неизменным, двигаясь вперед наподобие колеса (Resp., IV, 424–427). В «Законах» эта уверенность подкреплена целым рядом теоретических доводов, объеди ненных вокруг принципиальной возможности разработать «второй по совершенству» государственный проект, направив усилия законодателей на постепенную эволюцию такого государства в направлении первого идеального проекта (см.: Aristot. Pol., II, 1265a 1 sqq.).
В аристотелевской «Политике» элементы теории прогресса выраже ны гораздо более рельефно. Согласно Аристотелю, в основе большинст ва изобретений лежит извечное природное стремление людей к благоус тройству собственной жизни, распространяющееся после удовлетворе ния первичных потребностей и на государственные институты (Pol., VII, 1329b sqq.). Задача законодателей заключается в том, чтобы выбрать наиболее ценные из государственных установлений, возникших в пери од между последней и грядущей мировыми катастрофами, и использо вать их для разработки собственных проектов. К числу таких установле ний относятся, например, разделение государства на отдельные слои, отделение военного сословия от земледельческого, введение совместных трапез (сисситий), «изобретенных» в глубокой древности в Италии, а за тем на Крите (Pol., VII, 1329b 5). Все остальные детали идеальных кон ституций законодатели должны стремиться изыскать и восполнить сами (Pol., VII, 1329b 30 sqq.). Государство как высший тип человеческого со общества устремляется к высшему из всех благ, именуемому самодоста точностью (автаркией). Это состояние по-разному выражается в раз личных конституционных устройствах. Однако своего подлинного ста туса государство может достичь только тогда, когда оно существует «ради достижения возможно лучшей жизни», на осуществление которой «могут с полным правом притязать... лишь воспитание и добродетель»
(Pol., VII, 1328b 10 sqq.).
Такая убежденность, конечно, резко контрастировала с концепцией закономерной деградации государственных устройств, развиваемой в III книге «Политики» (Pol., III, 1286b 1 sqq. sqq.). Однако даже в рамках этой, очень близкой к платоновской, схемы проступают вполне оптими стический прогрессистский мотив. Подчеркивая, что для современных государств демократический строй является чуть ли не единственно возможным вследствие увеличения численности населения, Аристотель довольно ясно дает понять, что переход от тирании к демократии озна чает поворотный пункт в поступательном развитии и может рассматри ваться как начало «нового подъема» (Pol., III, 1286 10 sqq.).
Концепция прогресса, развиваемая в произведениях Платона и Аристотеля на первый взгляд выглядит крайне ограниченной. В сущ ности, она и не могла быть иной, поскольку оба философа принадле жали к консервативному направлению политической мысли. Основная тенденция их политической программы состояла не в бесконечном со вершенствовании политических принципов, а в сохранении основ по лисного строя, который всегда представлялся им оптимальным. Тем не менее, при всем несходстве их прогрессивизма с идеями XVIII–XX вв., невозможно отрицать того очевидного факта, что консервативные вер сии прогресса никогда не выглядели чужеродными и в политических теориях нового и новейшего времени. К тому же сам факт использова ния античными консерваторами прогрессивистских формул, разрабо танных радикальными политическими мыслителями V в. (Протагором, Гиппием, Гипподамом), является достаточным доказательством рас пространенности идеи прогресса в древнегреческой общественной мысли.
Концепция прогресса в форме, гораздо более близкой к современ ной, становится органической частью стоической философии не в пред ставлениях ее основателей — Зенона, Клеанфа и Хрисиппа, но в учениях создателей так называемой Средней Стои — Панетия и Посидония (II в.
до н. э.), которые развивали идею культивирования наук и искусств в качестве важнейшей гуманизирующей силы. Посидоний определенно рассматривал развитие цивилизации как основную задачу человека и ут верждал, что под руководством философии, т.е. разума, могут быть от крыты всевозможные виды знаний и искусств, равно как законов и по литических институтов (Sen. Epist., 90, 6–7). Само понятие развития представляется Посидонию как постепенное восхождение цивилизации и воспитание человеческого рода.
Не сохранилось ни одного фрагмента философии Средней Стои, в котором выражено мнение о развитии цивилизующих принципов в бу дущем. Но в стоических текстах начала и особенно середины I в. н. э.
идея бесконечного прогресса выглядит общим местом. Рассматривая идею движения планет, Плиний Старший походя отмечает: «Если в этих вопросах мы разделяем мнения, отличающиеся от взглядов более ран них мыслителей, мы, тем не менее, признаем, что и они также имеют за слуги, впервые указав путь дальнейшего исследования. Не надо только терять надежды в том, что в последующие века знания всегда будут идти вперед» (Naturalia Historia II, 15, 62).
Сенека также принимает как данность сам факт, что несовершенное состояние знаний будет исправлено в последующие века. «Придет вре мя, — писал он, — когда проницательность ума и продолжительные изыскания прольют свет на то, что до сих пор скрыто... когда наши по следователи будут удивляться тому, как мы могли быть невежественны в вещах столь очевидных» (Naturales Questiones VII, 25, 4–5).
Особенно парадоксальным моментом является то обстоятельство, что возникшая в позднеантичный период концепция прогресса, очень близкая к современному его пониманию, была принципиально несо вместима с формировавшейся в течение многих веков греческой и рим ской политической традицией. Идея личного самоусовершенствования рассматривается у Сенеки как высшая цель индивида и всего человече ства. Человек принадлежит к двум городам, или государствам: одно включает в себя богов и людей, а в другом ему случилось родиться.
Культивируя добродетели посредством преумножения теоретических знаний, человек служит великому и истинно универсальному государст ву, помогая потомкам, передавая закон и порядок будущим поколениям (De otio 4, 1–2;
6, 4). Поэтому истинно мудрый человек «свободен от за кона, который держит человечество в рабстве;
все века воздают ему по чет, как если бы он был богом» (De brevitate vitae, 15, 4–5). Политические события, войны и битвы, марширующие под знаменами армии кажутся мудрецу такими же незначительными, как пересекающие равнину мура вьи (Naturales Questiones I, 9, 11–12).
Комментируя данную завершающую стадию деполитизации лично сти, Л. Эдельштейн связывает эту тенденцию с уже упоминавшейся вы ше традицией профессионализации знания, возникшей уже в IV в. до н. э. «То, что такая позиция, такое осознание управляемости вещей не ограничивались индивидами — будь то политические реформаторы или просвещенные тираны — вполне оправдывается всеобщей рационали зацией окружающей среды... Эксперты начинают находить свое место в повседневной жизни. Само по себе это было бы невозможно, если бы постоянно не увеличивалось количество людей, желающих презреть по литическую ответственность и славу и стать специалистами. Политика больше не удерживала людей в рабстве. Уход от государственной жизни, крайне редкий в пятом веке даже среди философов, теперь становится вполне обычным. Платон предполагал, что любой человек, узревший сферу Идей, будет служить государству, только если его к этому прину дят. Независимо от того, должен или нет философ заниматься полити кой, растущий индивидуализм способствовал изысканиям в области гу манитарных знаний и наук не меньше, чем в сфере философии. Освобо жденные от своих традиционных привязанностей и не будучи отныне исключительно гражданами, люди устремились к приватным занятиям и стали заботиться главным образом о собственных, избранных ими са мими интересах»20. Для эпохи империи такого рода мироощущение ста ло доминирующим.
Очевидно, именно поэтому новое понятие и концепция прогресса, возникшие в философии Средней Стои и последовательно развиваемые Цицероном и римскими стоиками, оказались столь созвучными совре менной концепции политики и политического.
Аналогию кантовским принципам, вполне соотносимым с той тео рией прогресса, которая была разработана Кондорсе, можно найти в философии римской Стои. Для Сенеки идеал прогресса является вы ражением высших чаяний человека и человечества. Обосновывая этот идеал, он выдвигает аргументы, очень близкие к тем, которые приво дились мыслителями XVIII в. В знаменитом манифесте Кондорсе про гресс знаний рассматривается как «ключевой момент в развитии чело веческого рода», а «история цивилизации является историей просве щения»21. У Сенеки мы встречаем совершенно аналогичные мысли. О римском философе-моралисте, как и о Кондорсе, можно сказать, что «он настаивает на неразрывном союзе между интеллектуальным про грессом и прогрессом свободы, добродетели и уважении к естествен ным правам, а также на влиянии науки в деле разрушения предрассуд ков... Все ошибки в политике и этике произошли от... ложных идей, ко торые тесно связаны с заблуждениями в физике и с незнанием природных прав»22. Сенека также недалек от того, чтобы принять во внимание «равенство среди всех людей на земле, единую цивилизацию во всем мире и забвение различий между развитыми и отсталыми на родами»23.
Деполитизация прогрессистских идей в позднеантичную эпоху не выглядит парадоксальной. Она вполне отвечала условиям и духу своего времени. Тем не менее трудно отрицать и тот факт, что современная концепция политического прогресса была, до известной степени, ре зультатом спонтанного, но, вместе с тем, органического синтеза всей ан тичной традиции, осуществленного в произведениях Макиавелли и Гоб бса, Локка и Монтескье. Отрицание существования античных версий концепции прогресса в современной литературе, является продуктом многообразных философских и идеологических аберраций, свойствен ных новому времени и до сих пор оказывающих воздействие на совре менную политологию и историческую науку.
Примечания 1. Lovejoy A. O., Boas G. Primitivism and Related Ideas in Antiquity. Bal timore, 1935. P. I, 6.
2. См.: Comte A. Cours de philosophie positive. 3 ed. Paris, 1869. T. IV.
P. 229 sqq., 233 sqq.
3. Ibid. P. 234 sqq.
4. Ibid. P. 231 sqq.
5. Кант И. О поговорке «Может быть, это и верно в теории, но не го дится для практики» // Кант И. Сочинения на немецком и русском язы ках. Т. I Трактаты и статьи (1784–1796). М., 1994. С. 283.
6. Там же, С. 291.
7. Там же. С. 329.
8. Кант И. Идея истории во всемирно-гражданском плане // Кант И.
Сочинения на немецком и русском языках. Т. I. Трактаты и статьи (1784–1796). С. 95.
9. Кант И. О поговорке… С. 297, 303.
10. Dahl R. A. After the Revolution? Authority in a Good Society. Revised edition. New Haven;
London, 1990. P. 36.
11. Bury J. B. The Idea of Progress. London, 1920. Р. 7. 64.
12. Ibid. P. 7 sqq.
13. Dodds E. R. The Ancient Concepts of Progress and Other Essays on Greek Literature and Belief. Oxford, 1973. Р. 1.
14. Ibid. Р. 24–25.
15. См.: Dodds E. R. The Greeks and the Irrational. Berkeley, 1951. pas sim.
16. Edelstein L. The Idea of Progress in Classical Antiquity. Baltimore, 1967.
17. См. подробнее: Ibid., P. 128 sqq.;
см. также: Snell B. Die Entdeckung des Geistes. Hamburg, 1946. passim.
18. Ibid. P. 29.
19. См. об этом подробнее: Гуторов В. А. Античная социальная уто пия: Вопросы истории и теории. Изд. Ленинградского университета, 1989. С. 129 сл.
20. Edelstein L. The Idea of Progress… Р. 82–83.
21. Bury J. B. The Idea of Progress. Р. 209–210.
22. Ibid. P. 213.
On the problem of unity of Plato’s political philosophy* The problem defined in the title is the only one of innumerable attempts to present an explanation (within the author`s power, of course) of so called paradox of Plato. Its main feature consists in principal impossibility of reduc ing the variety of Plato`s political texts to any common denominator. This particularity gives rise in its turn to a great number of interpretations having the equal rights to exist. It is quite to the point to recall in this relation the half-ironical observation of E. Dodds: «Too often we unconsciously identify a past thinker with ourselves, and distort his thoughts to make him the mouth piece of our own preconceptions;
or else, unconsciously identifying him with our opponents, we belabour him with gusto, serene in the assured knowledge that he cannot hit back. I think such distortion of the past in the interest of the present to be a kind of trahison des clercs — though it is a treachery which we can never be quite certain of avoiding, since we commit it for the most part without our own knowledge. Plato has at all periods been one of its prin cipal victim… Arm yourself with a stout pair of blinkers and a sufficient but not too excessive amount of scholarship, and by making a suitable selection of texts you can prove Plato to be almost anything that you want him to be»1.
However the problem still persists whether this variety of interpretations is a result of individual aspirations of Plato`s suppoters and opponents or it is conditioned by subjective peculiarities of Plato`s thought excluding any uni tary approach. Of course, both variables give the absolute freedom of inter pretations and it is very hard to find a golden mean. It is impossible to deny that the very origin of such controversy descends from the difference between Plato and platonism which arose probably in the period when the philosopher was still alive. For Speusippus, Xenocrates, Aristotle and the other students of the Academy whose primary ideas have been formed in the atmosphere of free discussion to understand properly the essence of Platonic philosophy meant to read in his dialogues their own ideas by representing them as be longing to Plato himself.
The problem of relation of objective and subjective causes of such trans formation is very complicated one. It goes out of limits of the ancient phi losophic tradition. Appearing first in the history of the european thought as a result of interpretation of Pythagoras` legacy by his followers, it was repeated again and again in the case of Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, Marx etc. It is evident that a definite regularity exists — the classical doctrines begin to change be cause of quite sincere intentions of the supporters to catch their «hidden core».
* Статья впервые опубликована в сборнике: Plato's Political Philosophy and Con temporary Democratic Theory. Eighth International Conference on Greek Philosophy 4– 12 July, 1996.Athens, 1996.
In the XX century to the philosophic and scientific tradition of interpreta tion of platonic texts was added an ideological one. Since 1930s it began to threaten seriously to swallow up the others. The spectrum of ideological and related interpretations is very broad. Plato plays the roles now of the ideolo gist of the primitive archaic mentality, now the theorist of ancient bureauc racy or aristocracy, now the totalitarian politician — a forerunner of ideology and practice of communism and fascism etc.2.
In the works of many scholars (both the defenders and opponents of Plato) the ideological connotations became an integral part so that they may be subjected already to a systematizing investigation. The last of such attempts (which is known to me) to classify the varied ideological tendencies under taken by D. Dawson3, gave some interesting results which have the immediate connection with the topic of this report. As Dawson remarks, a view to the Republic as reactionary political program became a watershed dividing the leftist critics, on the one hand, and the partisans of the traditional moderate approach to platonic political projects, on the other hand. The «neoconserva tive» or «straussian» wing which appeared recently takes the attitude of mod erate criticism4.
I support completely an opinion that the arguments of the leftist or neo conservative scholars on the character of Plato`s political philosophy seem sometimes as narrow and contradictory ones. But one may agree with D.
Dawson only in part when she writes as follows: «Perhaps it will be sufficient to cite the two earliest commentators we possess. They are Plato and Aristotle.
To ask what Plato himself thought is to raise a notorious problem, because Plato himself never says anything to us, unless some of the Epistles are genu ine. Since all his other works are in dramatic form and the author never in trudes into the drama, how can we gain access to his thought, and how far can we read these dialogues as though they were treatises? But in the case of the Republic this problem does not seem insoluble»5. Does this mean that the problem is insoluble in the case of the Laws or the Critias? It seems to me that in these dialogues one can read many Plato`s authentic thoughts too.
But before proceeding to the analysis of this problem it is important to dwell on another that of the approach to relation of the Republic and the Laws in the modern literature. As D. Dawson notes, the great majority of scholars who are inclined to regard the utopian proposals of the Republic mainly «in an ideal or symbolic context», refuse «to see any necessary connection be tween the Republic and the Laws», while the radical critics think that «the Laws may be considered a practical application of the principles of the Repub lic or a mitigated version which Plato fell back when he realized the plan of Republic to be unworkable»6.
It is necessary to remark at once that the later approach is based on a very reliable tradition stemming from the Aristotle`s criticism of Plato`s projects in the second book of the Politics. But it is impossible also to deny that in the works of the scholars who do not like to overaccentuate the differencies be tween the Republic and the Laws, one can find also the image of two Platos — the younger and the older the views of which are hardly reconciliable with each other. For instance, in the beginning of XX century V. Lilla affirmed that while the Republic «is modelled on a base of absolute ideal which is transcen dental to necessities of real life… having a pure artistic character», in the twelve books of the Laws it is impossible more to see «Plato — a great artist of genius but only a learned lawgiver of antiquity» recognizing soberly the tradi tional principles of Greek society7.
Such an approach had always its opponents. In the 1930s A. Festugire in his work devoted to the problem of the «contemplative life» in platonic dia logues emphasized especially the erroneous view of Plato as a «tired oldman»
who gave in finally to the pessimistic mood8. In the early 1970s M.Pirart in the book on the Laws expressed directly doubts that the platonic thought has undergone a radical transformation in this dialogue as compared with the pe riod when the Republic was created9. F.Lisi in the mid-1980s has pointed out justly that an elaboration of the theory of perfect state can be regarded as a trait which is characteristic of all stages of development of Platos`s political philosophy unified by one transparent theme — the quest of the universal connection between justice and human nature10.
Nevertheless the image of two Platos has been recurring regularly for dec ades even in works which are absolutely distant from any ideological criticism of the great philosopher. It penetrates unconsciously even in argumentation which is incompatible with the intention to negate the philosophic and politi cal unity of Plato`s thought. For example, what made E. Barker to write the following lines: «Certainly neither Plato nor Aristotle protests against any and every form of slavery. If Plato objects in the Republic to the enslavement of Greeks, in the Laws he recognizes slavery and legislates for slaves, whom he couples with children as having imperfectly developed minds»11. All the above mentioned scholars can be suspected in any ideological bias not more than Aristotle who, as H. Cherniss ones noted, knew Plato better than we do when reading his dialogues12.
There are many remarks in the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics which testify to the fact that Aristotle has always intended to regard the Republic and the Laws in a unity definitely expressed. But among these remarks one Aris totle`s observation in the Book II of the Politics concerning the character of the Laws occupies an exclusive place: «Plato (sc. in the Laws ) says little about the constitution, and because he speaks of desiring to make this more suitable for existing states he brings it round by degrees back to the other form, that of the Republic» (Aristot. Pol., II 6,4, 1265 a 3–4).
In the abstracts for this conference I made a mistake by citing without special analysis the Loeb`s edition of the Politics. H. Rackham who translated the Politics for it, uses a concessive construction in translating «boulomenos koinoteran poiein» as «though wishing to make this (sc. the constitution of the Laws) more suitable» etc.13. Thus boulomenos is opposed to kata mikron periagei, the sense of which however reveals Plato`s intention (as it seemed to Aristotle) to form a transitional period for the gradual passage from his sec ond-best state to the best one, i.e. the constitution of the Republic.
As far as I know this observation had never evoked any doubts by the translators of the Politics. J. Aubonnet, E. Barker and J. Barthlemy Saint Hilair understand also kata mikron periagei in the sense that Plato in the Laws returns by degrees to his first project without any definite primary intention as though obeying to an irresistible wish in spite of his initial plan to make his second political project more suitable for existing states14. W. Newman in his commentary pays no special attention to this Aristotle`s observation15.
Meanwhile such interpretation contradicts to what we find in the Laws.
By grounding the principles of the mixed constitution, Plato at the first sight does not demonstrate any distinctive intention to draw near the project of the Republic. Only in the end of Book XII he begins abruptly to disclose his plan of the creation of so called Nocturnal Counci l (nukterinos sullogos — Legg., 960–969)16. Plato calls in conclusion the Nocturnal Council «the di vine» and insists that the state should be handed over to it. Thus he shows the wish to represent this council as the bearer of absolute philosophic prin ciple on the analogy of the collegium of the Guardians-philosophers in the Republic (Legg., 969b).
It becomes clear that we have, at least by appearance, a sudden rather than gradual transition to the project of the Republic. This impression let probably Michelet, Bruns, Zeller and Krieg to believe that such a sudden transition is caused by later editorial work with the text of the Laws after the Plato`s death17.
What do the words kata mikron periagei mean in Aristotle? The idea to join immediately boulomenos koinoteran poiein with kata mikron periagei be longs to Prof. A.I. Zaitsev18, who proceeding from the observations of W.
Oncken and Fr. Susemihl on dynamic character of theoretical construction in the Laws19, interpreted the Aristotle`s accentuation of principle of gradual transition in the sense of existence of Plato`s primary aim to draw together af ter all both of his political projects.
T. A. Sinclair who commented the last book of the Laws, draws to a quite opposite conclusion, coming back to the image of two Platos: «The end of the Laws shows furthermore that Plato was divided in his own mind on a matter even more fundamental than education for rulership and citi zenship. He was in doubt whether his proper task was to build a city in this world or in the next, here again harking back to the Republic, where the crowning effort belonged to the World of Ideas. Even in the Laws the non material has been given precedence over the material, the soul over the body, but the city of the Laws is very much of this world. It is only at the very end that his old longing for the other world reasserts itself and the feel ing… comes to him that the starry heavens will provide a quicker path to that world than the theory of knowledge. For unity amid diversity, for per manence in a world of flux he had sought all his life. He had tried to con struct a State which should conform to these principles and had early given up all thought of seeing it actually in existence. Now, at the end of his life, he has to abandon the project even in theory»20.
It seems to me however that both the aristotelian observation and many considerations by Plato himself in the Republic and in the Laws have a con trary meaning. Plato was the utopian thinker by his turn of mind. That is why he became not only the greatest representative of this trend of thought, but also the founder of the specific kind of literary utopia. Naturally, he was well acquainted with preceding utopian tradition — from Homer and Hesiod and the other varied versions of the golden age myth intensely elaborated by the Attic comedy 21, to the works of Hippodamus of Miletus and Phaleas of Chal cedon. It is not the proper moment now to go into details of the endless dis putes on the nature of utopianism. According to a traditional interpretation, the utopianism as a definite type of individual and social mood and con sciousness repudiating or mystifying the reality for the sake of illusion or ab stract ideal, forms always a basis of utopia — a model of perfect social life and state organization which is opposite to really existing states. From this point of view, the literary utopia is regarded as a specific manifestation of more gen eral trend of thought. It cannot be opposed to its psychological substratum.
The scholars trying to prove that the utopia cannot exist out of its literary ex pression, deny as rule the notion itself of utopian consciousness22.
The weak point of such position consists in the lack of proof. We already know in ancient history the authors using the utopian subjects and reasons exclusively as an artistic way of the more attractive and obvious demonstra tion of favourite ideas. The good example of this tendency is the Sacred In scription of Euhemerus. One may be therefore the utopian without creating utopias and vice versa.
The attempts to oppose absolutely utopia and politics with each other seem not to be more convincing. For example, F. Polak by distinguishing the «true elements of Utopia — a social criticism and systematic reconstruction», postulates the impassible abyss between «Utopian idea and politics». That is why Plato is characterized by Polak as the true Utopian only in the Timaeus and the Critias but not in the Republic and the Laws23.
The refutation of such a view makes me to look on the other side of the problem of unity of Plato`s political dialogues. They became utopian ones not only because of a conscious orientation to a definite literary genre or of an understanding of unrealizable character of his own projects, but also due to the consecutive and logical development by the philosopher in theory and practice of a definite political and educational program.
Of course, Plato made an extensive use both in the early and later dia logues of mythical and literary stereotypes which had the utopian hue. For ex ample, in the Book VIII of the Republic, by describing the Athenian democ racy he creates the image of an unreal topsyturvy world where all social rela tions are turned upside down: in democratic state the rulers become the subjects, the father gets used to being like his son and vice versa, the teachers are afraid of their pupils, the young people lay claim to equality of rights with the adults and the women — with the men. The slaves, settlers and strangers are equalized with the citizens possessing full rights. The disobedience is grafted even to the animals (Resp., VIII, 562d–563b). The similar descriptions were widespread everywhere in different Mediterranian cultures from es chatological prophecies of the ancient Egypt and the jewish messianic litera ture to the Attic comedy — the immediate prototype of Plato`s image of de mocracy.
The unrealizable character of the project created in the Republic was pre destined by absolute incompatibility of hierarchic structures of the ideal aris tocracy with democratic organization and customs described by Plato in so sarcastic manner. It is evident that nowhere in existing states would the citi zens agree to be exiled to rural areas (eis tous agrous) and leave their children to be brought up in accordance with new laws given by philosophers (Resp., VII, 541a;
cf.: Legg., V., 735e–736c). One needs another means to get it.
Plato himself even when he expressed repeatedly a conviction that the new principles of philosophic rule would be suitable because of their attrac tiveness for the majority of people which is deprived of wisdom (Resp, 500e, 501e, 502b), did not believe in the vigour of his own arguments and relied more on enchanting influence of the myths (Resp., III, 414–415d). The image of the perfect state can serve for the philosopher as a «model laid up in heaven» (Resp., IX, 592a-b)24. But to make half-educated people aspire to ap proach it was an unlikely prospect for Plato (Resp., V, 450c-d etc.). Only the creation of strong and efficient army integrated politically into the ruling class and separated from the mass of citizens both socially and spatially, can be re garded as a sole safe guarantee (Resp., III, 415d-e)25. Thus the realistic ten dency of Plato`s political thought depends on its utopian context. On the whole, this tendency to make himself and his contemporaries believe in real izable character of his utopian projects could not but intensify the rigidness of Plato`s constructions.
It seems to me that the roots of this Plato`s ‘utopian realism’ show them selves in a most clear way in one reasoning in the Book IV of the Laws. This reasoning seems to be especially valuable because it was written during the period when Plato summing up his political career and not desiring more to take part in state affairs (Legg., IV, 712a), could express without reserve his credo of life. By considering what constitution is fit most in its subsequent transformation to the best state, the Athenian Stranger says as follows: «Give me the state under a tyrannical rule;
and let the tyrant be young and possessed by nature of good memory, quick intelligence, courage and nobility of man ner» (Legg., IV., 709e–710a). If the tyrant is of moderate temper, «the state will acquire in the quickest and best way possible the constitution it needs for the happiest kind of life» (Ibid., 710b).
The further discussion confirms also the practical orientation of Plato`s thought. Giving a reply to Clinias who was extremely astonished by intention itself of using tyrannical power for realization of good constitution, the Athe nian continues: «The easiest step is from a tyranny, the next easiest from a constitutional monarchy, the third from some form of democracy. An oligar chy, which comes fourth in order, would admit of the growth of the best State only with the greatest difficulty, since it has the largest number of rulers… The fact that a tyrant, when he decides to change the moral habits of a State, needs no great efforts nor a vast length of time, but what he does need is to lead the way himself first along the desired path, whether it be to urge the citi zens towards virtue`s practice or the contrary» (Ibid., 710d–711c).
The long controversy whether this conclusion is a pessimistic sum caused by the ultimate disappointment in human nature or the problem is one about primary principles elaborated in the earlier period will probably never finish.
But it seems to me still there are far more of facts testifying that the theme of ideal tyrant was essential for all stages of evolution of Plato`s political phi losophy. This reasoning in the Laws should be compared in particular with the remarks in the Book VI of the Republic on the possibility to meet among the king`s descendants the peculiar philosophic natures who would establish true laws for their subjects(Resp., VI, 502a-b). The real candidate for this role is, of course, a tyrant who transforms himself in a king under the influence of the wise councillor. In the Book VIII of the Republic in his scheme of degrada tion of constitutions from the ideal state to the tyranny Plato says nothing about the intention to «lock a circle» and draw tyranny near to a monarchical rule founded on law (Resp., VIII, 544a sqq.;
cf.: IV, 445d-e;
IX, 580b, 587b-e;
Legg., III, 681c-d). In the VIII letter the old philosopher calls the recommendation to change the tyranny on the king`s rule and avoid both the name itself of tyrant and tyrannical actions «his old advice» (palaian emen xymboulen — Epist., VIII, 354a-b).
What period in his life does Plato exactly mean? Naturally, he was in volved in such discussions being a member of the Socratic circle. Exemplum Socratis has undoubtedly produced a great influence on the image of philoso pher-king in the Republic 26. Plato has always shared the Socratic idea the greatest or king skill of governing the state to be accessible only to a few men — the wise shepherds possessing true knowledge (Xen., Mem., IV 2, 11;
I 2, 32;
III 7, 5–6;
III 5, 21;
I 2, 9;
cf.: Plato. Crito., 48a). Socratic interpre tation of the image of «shepherd and flock» became not accidentally, of course, a starting point for development of the subjects both of the Republic and the Cyropaedia of Xenophon (Plato. Resp., I, 342c–344c;
Xen., Cyr., I 1,2). A sharp criticism of tyrannical rgimes in the Republic and the Laws (Plato. Resp., IX, 577c;
Legg., II, 661e–662a;
IX, 859a) naturally makes to suppose the reflection of Plato`s experiments with Sicilian tyrants. This experience be ing united with an initial image of the noble monarchical rule transformed the opposition «philosopher-king–reckless tyrant» in the most fundamental im age of Plato`s political philosophy.
Of course, the problem itself of monarchy had acquired a quite independ ent status by Plato only in the 60–50s years of IV century beginning from The Statesman. The working out of this theme had often a polemic hue. We can find now only the faint echoes of the literary disputes (intensified by a later tradition) on the question what model of ideal ruler is the best. The contro versy has been probably initiated by the Busiris of Isocrates (between 388 and 385). The image of Egyptian constitution described in Isocrates` speech has definite similarities with the project of the Republic (Isocr., XI, 15–23, 24–28, 38–40;
cf.: Plato. Resp., II, 372c–III, 392c).
In the period of creation of the Laws Isocrates` Cyprean speeches were al ready written as like as Xenophon`s Agesilaus, Hiero, and Cyropaedia. There was a tradition that the Cyropaedia was written as a polemic reply to Plato`s theory of education of the Guardians. It evoked in its turn a reaction of Plato who in the Laws wrote in negative tone of Cyrus the Elder`s education and abilities (Aul. Gell. N.A. XIV, 3;
Plato., Legg., III, 694b-c)27..
There are many coincidencies showing Plato to share the ideas formu lated in the restorative programs of his contemporaries who combined (often in the limits of the same work) a conception of ideal monarch with idealiza tion of ancestral constitution (Athens and Sparta, in particular), on the one hand, and panhellenic ideas, on the other hand (Isocr., III, 14–15, 16–26;
VII, 21 sqq., 58 etc). The principle of the «geometrical equality» forms the base of both Plato`s political projects and the Cyropaedia (Plato. Resp., VIII, 558c;
Legg., VI, 757c;
Xen. Cyr., VII 5, 36).
Nevertheless, the advancement of the person of a tyrant in foreground in the Book IV of the Laws shows that in the given case the problem is not about the conception of ideal monarch which seems to be a traditional one in greek political literature of IV century. The utopian element of absolute domination gets the full prevalence by Plato because of the internal psychological motives and the circumstances of his life. The methods themselves of the creation of ideal polis by the philosophers-kings make to recognize the conclusion of M.
Miller that the Plato`s monarch has an appearance of a traditional despot claiming to absolute power, as the just one (Plato. Resp., VII, 540d;
VI, 488c-d, 489b-c, 500e, 501b;
VII, 537–539d, 541a;
Legg., V, 735c–736c;
Xen. Mem., I, 31–38)28.
The evident differencies in interpretation of the theory of ideal rule by Plato, on the one hand, and by Xenophon and Isocrates, on the other hand (Xen. Cyr., VIII, 5, 22–27;
Isocr. V., 154), depend on a specific nature of uto pian consciousness and creativity. In many works of utopian genre the posi tion of the creator unites often with the position of the ruler (or lawgiver)29.
The position of the creator is characterized by the axiomatic perception of space, the tendency to the objects strictly outlined and the symmetry of con structions, for instance, — the town surrounded by walls with the proportions clearly expressed, having some building in the center (temple, palace etc.).
The next tendency is the systematization. It manifests itself in quantitative di visions within the collective body of citizens, in proportional correlations of social strata.
The position of the ruler and lawgiver is visible mainly in the regulation and centralization of social life, the hierarchical principles of organization of politi cal power, the rigorous fixation of the age-groups and the character of their oc cupations, the gerontocracy and gynaecophobia, the asceticism, standartization, and militarization, the magnificent state and religious cults etc.
The utopias of Plato and his modern follower T. Campanella are charac terized by a contamination of the positions both of the ruler and the creator.
It is evident that all these utopian elements are present in Plato`s dialogues.
But it is far more important that these elements are attracted to a constancy.
They form not only the spatial and the historical backgrounds of his political constructions thus supporting the unity of argumentation, but have a broad impact on the aims and tasks of Plato`s political program described in the seventh letter (Plato. Epist., VII, 324b-c, 325e–326b, 332e–333a;
cf.: Resp., V, 473d;
Ael. V.H. II, 42;
DL., III, 23). Here are some examples. Along side with transparent themes and a great number of small details which testify the permanence and sequence of argumentation in the dialogues written dur ing different periods — the cyclic theory of periodic catastrophes in the Ti maeus, the Statesman, and the Laws, the 50-years age of the Guardians philosophers and the Guardians of the laws in the Republic and the Laws, the evident similarity between the custom of the Atlantis` kings to decide all the affairs and administer justice «at night extinguishing all the lights in the tem ple» (Plato. Crit. 120b) and the every day activities of the Nocturnal Council in the Laws which has the same number of the main officials as the number of the kings in Atlantis (Legg., XII, 961a;
Crit., 114a) etc, we have also the models of the higher or synthetic unity.
The ancient Athens described in the Critias is an image which joins the il lustrating of principles of the Republic with a literary tradition of the age of Cronus and the image of ancestral constitution (Crit., 112b-d;
cf.: Tim., 23e– 24d). The Atlantis is the most synthetic image too. The oriental mirages de scending from the Herodotus` History merge in it with ideas of the Republic.
For example, the picture of the gradual degradation of generations of the Po seidon`s noble descendants is a mythical version of the scheme of degradation of constitutions in the VIII book of the Republic (Crit., 110–121)30. The gen eral planning and some concrete details of Plato`s Magnesia coincide often with the descriptions of the Atlantis (Legg., VI, 761a-b;
Crit., 111d, 117c, 118d etc.). The Plato`s Cretan city which seemed to Aristotle as too great, is smaller in size than the ancient Athens (Crit., 112d) and can be regarded as the Atlan tis in its miniature.
In comparing the Republic and the Laws the modern scholars usually pay attention to a softening of Plato`s attitude towards the problem of influ ence of the transcendental model of state on political practice, his interest to the problem of mixed constitution etc. I think there exists a tendency to un derestimate how strong is the orientation on the powerful person embody ing the monarchical principle of rule, and how it influences Plato` s argu mentation. Though paradoxical as it may seem, the strengthening of this element of a personal will is initially layed in the compromise between ideal and reality on which the project of the Laws is founded. The serious change in the description of the age of Cronus in the Laws in comparison with the version of this myth in the Statesman has a great symbolic sense. In place of the picture of harmonious unity of Gods and men abandoning themselves to a philosophic contemplation, the idea of a salvational mission of the di vine rule comes to the foreground (Legg., IV, 713c-d). The imitation of such a rule is declared a supreme law and regarded by the lawgivers making the new regulations for the citizens, as «supreme service to the Gods» (Legg., IV, 713e–714a, 715b-d).
That is why the tyrannical principle comes forward in the Laws in the ab solutely uncovered form. One should not overlook in this connection one very interesting historical detail. It is not easy to answer the question why in the Critias the story about an ideal state which is coloured with enthusiastic hues of a patriotic legend is trusted to the man who was at the head of the most odious government of the «thirty tyrants». It was condemned by Plato in the seventh letter (Epist., 324d). However it was not by accident that he gave the title of Critias to his dialogue. It happened because of some considerable coincidencies in their political programs.
Unfortunately we haves at our disposal only few fragments of Critias` works. It is probable that Plato`s negative attitude to the Athenian oligarchic rgime was not transferred to its leader who was both the initiator and theo rist of a new program of political reforms aspiring to avert the Athens from unjust life and restore the ancestral constitution. This intention of Critias was emphasized by Plato himself in the same seventh letter (Epist., 324d;
Xen. Hell., 3,2 ). The rejection of the maritime trade and expansion, the de struction of the fleet on the pretext that «the dominance at sea gives birth to democracy» (Plut. Them., XIX), the strict limitation of the number of citizens and the prohibition to leave the country, the claim to purge the city from per verse people and give the full rights only to a narrow select body of citizens (Lys. XII, 5;
Xen. Hell., II, 3, 19) — all these intentions coincide with Plato`s analogous proposals in the Republic and particularly in the Laws (Plato. Resp., VII, 541a;
Legg., IV, 705a;
cf.: Gorg., 518e–519a)31.
The above mentioned examples and reasons do not show, of course, the intention of Plato to imitate immediately the slogans and practice of contem porary tyrannical rgimes, though some of his concrete recommendations could undoubtedly incur such suspicions. The understanding of a complete incompatibility of any of existing states with the principle of Justice and the Idea of Good brought him to the firm conviction that only the unlimited will of the lawgiver can help of embodying these ideas into practice in spite of all human vices and illusions.
This conviction itself gave to his political dialogues both the deep internal unity and programmatic orientation. It is probable that Aristotle (who himself worked out the conception of the perfect aristocracy which was very close to the project of the Laws) meant all these properties of Plato`s thought in the above mentioned remark in the Politics.
Notes 1. E. R. Dodds. The Ancient Concept of Progress and Other Essays on Greek Literature and Belief (Oxford 1973). P. 107.
2. M. Eliade. Cosmos and History. The Myth of Eternal Return (New York 1959). P. 34–35;
cf.: Fr. J. Cunningham. “Plato: Archaic or Modern Man?”, Thought Vol. 50. No. 199 (1975). P. 411 sqq;
L. Mumford. The City in History (Hammondsworth, 1966). P. 647;
K. R. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies. Vol.1. The Spell of Plato (London, 1952). P. 169;
R. B. Levinson. In Defence of Plato (New York, 1970);
E. N. Tigerstedt, In terpreting Plato (Stockholm, 1977). P. 3;
E. M. Wood, N. Wood. Class Ideol ogy and Ancient Political Theory. Socrates, Plato and Aristotle in Social Con text (Oxford, 1978), P. 137;
see also: J. Annas, An Introduction to Plato`s Re public (Oxford, 1982), P. 1;
W. Fite. Platonic Legend (New York;
F. A. Havelock, Preface to Plato (Cambridge, 1963);
F. Novotny. The Posthumous Life of Plato. (Prague, 1977);
C. E. de Vogel. Rethinking Plato and Platonism (Leiden, 1986).
3. D. Dawson, Cities of the Gods. Communist Utopias in Greek Thought (New York;
Oxford 1992). P. 62 sqq.
4. D. Dawson, Cities of the Gods. P. 63–64.
5. D. Dawson, Cities of the Gods. P. 69.
6. D. Dawson, Cities of the Gods. P. 64–65.
7. V. Lilla, “L`Utopia della Peppublica di Platone e L`ideale della Vita:
Memoria Letta all` Accademia“, Atti della Accademia Pontaniana. Vol. XXXI II. Mem. N 5. Ser. 2 (Napoli, 1903). P. 3, 7;
cf.: G. Kafka. Sokrates, Platon und der sokratische Kreis (Mnchen, 1921);
P. Fridlnder. Platon. Bd. 3, 3 durch.
und erganz. Aufl. (Berlin, New York, 1975). P. 128.
8. J. Festugire, Contemplation et vie contemplative selon Platon: (Paris, 1936). P. 400, 401.
9. M. Pirart. Platon et la Cit grecque: Thorie et realit dans la Consti tution de “Lois” (Bruxelles, 1974). P. VII;
cf.: W. Oncken, Die Staatslehre des Aristoteles in historisch-politischen Umrissen. Bd. I (Leipzig, 1870). 202 ff.;
Ritter. Platon. Sein Leben, seine Schriften, seine Lehre. Bd. 1 (Mnchen, 1910). P. 279;
F. Ollier, Le mirage spartiate. T. 1 (Paris, 1933). P. 252;
Edelstein. The Idea of Progress in Classical Antiquity. (Baltimore 1967).
P. 110, 112–114.
10. F. L. Lisi. Einheit und Vielheit des platonischen Nomosbegriffes: Diss.
(Knigstein/Ts. 1985). P. 26, 33;
cf.: G. Entz. Pessimismus und Weltflucht bei Platon (Tbingen, 1911). P. 177 ff.
11. The Politics of Aristotle. Trans. With an Introduction, Notes and Ap pendixes by Ernest Barker (Oxford, 1961). P. LII.
12. H. Cherniss. Aristotle`s Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy (Balti more, 1935), P. IX sqq.
13. Aristotle. Politics with an English Translation by H. Rackham (London, 1977) ad loc.
14. Aristote. Politique. Livres I et II. Texte tablie et tradui par J. Aubonnet (Paris, 1960);
Politique d`Aristote. Trad. Par J. Barthlemy Saint-Hilaire. 2d.
15. W. Newman (ed.), The Politics of Aristotle. Vol. 2 (Oxford, 1887). P. sqq.
16. Plato mentions the Nocturnal Council already in the X book. See: T. A.
Sinclair. A History of Greek Political Thought (London, 1951). P. 204 sqq.
17. See: “Berliner Jahrbcher fr wissenschaftliche Kritik” (1839, II). S. ff.;
E. Zeller, Philosophie der Griechen. Bd. I (Tbingen, 1859). S. 316 ff.;
Bruns. Platos Gesetze vor und nach ihrer Herausgabe durch Philippos von Opus (Weimar, 1880);
M. Krieg. Die berarbeitung der platonischen Gesetze duch Philipp von Opus (Freiburg, 1896).
18. A. I. Zaitsev. “Aristotel ob otnoshenii “Zakonov” Platona k jego “Gosu darstvu” (Pol., II 1265a, 3–4)” Antichnoje obzsestwo (Moskwa, 1967).
19. See: W. Oncken. Die Staatslehre des Aristoteles… 201;
Fr. Susemihl, Die genetische Entwicklung der platonischen Philosophie. T. II. H. 2 (Leipzig, 1860).
cf.: Fr. Susemihl, R. D. Hicks. The Politics of Aristotle (London, 1894).
20. T. A. Sinclair. A History of Greek Political Thought. P. 206–207.
21. On utopian trends by Euripides, see: F. Solmsen. Intellectual Experi ments of the Greek Enlightment. Princeton;
New Jersey, 1975). P. 66–82.
22. See: R. Trousson. Voyages aux pays de nulle part: Histoire littraire de la pense utopique. (Bruxelles, 1975). P. 9.
23. F. Polak. The Image of Future. Vol. 1 (Leiden;
New York, 1961).
P. 386–389, 425.
24. D. Dawson. Cities of the Gods. 66 sqq., P. 72.
25. See: J. Luccioni. La pense politique de Platon (Paris, 1958). 164 sqq.;
D. Dawson, Cities of the Gods. P. 79–84.
26. K. von Fritz. Platon in Sizilien und das Problem der Philosophenherr shaft. (Berlin, 1968). S. 14;
cf.: J. Brun. Platon et l`Academie. (Paris, 1960).
27. See: C. Ritter. Platon. Bd. I. S. 205;
cf.: Platonis. Opera Graece. Rec. et Adnot. Critica Instruxit C.E.Chr. Schneider. Praefatio. Vol. 1 (Lipsiae, 1830).
R. Weil. L`”Archeologie” de Platon (Paris, 1959). P. 123 sqq.
28. M. H. Miller. The Philosopher in Plato`s Statesman (The Hague e. a., 1980). P. 48.
29. R. Trousson. Voyage aux pays de nulle part. P. 21–22.
30. See: A. Heidel. A Suggestion Concerning Plato`s Atlantis (Boston 1933);
Chr. Gill, “The Genre of the Atlantis Story” Classical Philology. 1977. P.72, 287– 304;
Ph. J. Forsyth. Atlantis. The Making of Myth (Montreal;
J. Ferguson. Utopias of the Classical World. (London, 1975).
31. See: D. V. Panchenko. Platon i Atlantida (Leningrad, 1990).
On the relation of aesthetic and moral principles in Plato’s Cretan state* One of the most interesting points of difference between ‘The Republic’ and ‘The Laws’ consists in exceptional attention of Plato to aesthetic aspects of grounding of the theory of ideal polis and education. This peculiarity seems to be especially noteworthy because the discussion about the perfect constitution in both dialogues keeps succession from philosophic, political and ethical points of view. In both dialogues Plato repeatedly puts forward the following argument — the aesthetic order has to correspond not only to definite ethical principles but the art itself should become in general an embodiment of the moral and be therefore responsible for the formation of ideal image of states manship.
Nevertheless the function of the fine arts in the educational program elaborated by Plato for the citizens of Eunomopolis demands further elucida tions. In general the analogies grounded, for example, on comparison of statesmanship with artistic creative work are as frequent an element of Plato’s argumentation as a comparison of statesman’s craft with the art of an experi enced physician. Sometimes both images — the physician and the artist — merge. For example, the philosophers in order to provide health for the state have to possess as much freedom in reforming social institutes as the artist drawing on the tablets or the sculptor modeling waxwork figures (Resp. VI, 500 e). It is possible that P. Fridlnder came closest to the truth in supposing that ‘The Republic’ was “at the same time a creation of Muses, a philosophic work and a political action”1.
To confirm the idea of aesthetic orientation of Plato’s political thought one can refer to the passage from Book IV of ‘The Republic’ which seems to be very important for understanding of evolution of the Platonic argumentation.
In this passage the substantial principles of ideal state showing its unity are outlined virtually with an artistic power. The unity of the state is examined in its individual aspect: the state can be regarded as united (and autarchic too) only when each of its citizens “is a unity by himself, not a multitude”, i.e. if he is engaged only in a single trade that he is good at (Resp., IV, 423 d). The strictest specialization of every class guaranteeing the unity expresses at the same time the principle of justice at both state and individual levels. But the absolute guarantee of the unity can only be provided by proper training and education of the Guardians. By means of education securing hierarchic sub ordination of the main elements in every individual’s soul as well as in the * Сокращенный вариант статьи впервые опубликован в сборнике: The First In ternational Conference on «Ethics and Politics». 24–28 May 2006. St. Mark’s Basilica Mu nicipality of Heraklion. Book of Abstracts, Crete, Greece, 2006. В полном виде статья публикуется впервые.
state as a whole real stability is provided. As a result of such initial educational impulse the state would stay invariable in future “moving ahead independ ently, gaining momentum like a wheel” (Resp. IV., 424 a). If education is re garded as a cornerstone guaranteeing stability in the state, it has to be spread to the maximum number of its citizens. But this is the problem Plato is ex tremely vague about.
In the passage mentioned above the main emphasis is made by Plato on art of music by prescribing “that the State must be protected from innovations disturbing order” because “there can be no changes anywhere in the art of music without changes in the most important political institutions” (Resp., 424 b-c). At the same time proposing to bring order into children’ s games by means of appropriate songs and confirm thereby the feeling of being accus tomed to the law from a very early age, Plato evidently bears in mind children of all estates without any exception (Resp., 424 d-e).
Proceeding from the above mentioned passages and some others, O.
Gigon put forward a hypothesis that Plato strove to introduce the third estate, i.e. the bulk of population to the musical education of the Guardians2. R. von Phlman went even further attempting to prove that Plato intended to spread the communist way of life among all the citizens of Kalliopolis3.
All of the above mentioned hypotheses originate in the critical thought expressed by Aristotle in passing in the ‘Politics’ according to which the state offering privileges only to a slim group of citizens could hardly be called ideal (Aristot. Pol., II, 11–16). However the whole context of Plato’s reasoning about the art of music in the Books II, III and IV of the ‘Republic’ leads us to admit these hypotheses as untenable. Implicitly assuming the ideal state to be a highest work of art (in this particular case — the art of political leadership) the philosopher was far from disrupting both in his own eyes and the eyes of his contemporaries such a harmonious image born in the sphere of pure thought by referring to the necessity of introducing vulgar people to the edu cational program developed by him. In this respect Plato is adamant of this point: “...The main educational value of musical art lies in the fact that it penetrates into the very depth of man’s soul touching its innermost strings in the most effective manner;
rhythm and harmony bring in beauty thus making men harmonious and beautiful provided that they have been properly edu cated. Otherwise the situation is reversed” (Resp., III, 401 d).
This proposition of Plato is somewhere in between two passages which deal with Apollo as a creator of the noblest musical style on the one hand, and Apollo as a source of the most beautiful laws, on the other hand (Resp., III, 339 d-e;
IV, 427 b).
It is clear that the ability of the third estate to own, to acquire riches, to buy golden and silver ornaments, to build luxurious houses, in short, everything about which Adymantes speaks with surprise when he discovered during the discussion that philosophers and warriors essentially play the role of guarding troops protecting the ever increasing reaches, excludes rather than implies the possibility for the rich to be introduced to the highest principles of art and edu cation. The riches themselves protected by rulers only for the sake of getting the rations of food (Resp., IV, 419 a sq.) result from the specialization which is in separable from that noble prevention aimed at guarding the simple minded who have not been previously educated from the lures of the fine arts. By sin gling out three kinds of pleasure which correspond to the three estates and three principles of soul, Plato looks upon greed for money and pleasures bought with money as occupations unworthy of really free man, bestial and servile in their nature (Resp., IX 500 d;
584 e–587 a). So if we compare three main prin ciples of Plato’s first ideal state with its four virtues, it becomes evident that the third estate having formally “its own share in the general prosperity” (Resp., IV 421 e) is devoid of virtue in the true sense of the word since wisdom and cour age correlate only with two upper classes while the lower class is only left with a system of general precepts demanding from it implicit compliance, more pre cisely abidance in the state of servitude towards the ‘best people’ possessing a divine ruling capacity (Resp., IX, 590 d).
At first sight, the picture described by Plato resembles in part the social organization of Sparta where Helots were constantly excluded as a class from the general educational system of the Spartans. Probably, F. Ollier was right in thinking that Plato’s criticism of Sparta’s timocracy stemmed primarily from the fear of evoking in the reader’s mind unnecessary associations with the Spartan constitution4.. Anyway, Plato’s arguments concerning the role of the art in the first ideal project had a paradigmatic social purpose establishing a quite definite standart for men to follow. In this sense the aesthetic approach did not contradict the Platonic ethical formula for an ideal commonwealth — to have the right people in the ruling class, the right education and right way of life for the citizens.
On the other hand, just as the views on character and social functions of art in ‘The Republic’ give an impression of full succession to the early Platonic tradition we find in ‘The Laws’ a quite different picture.
In a certain sense, one of the reasons for this is the change in the methods and style themselves in Plato’s later dialogues, first of all, in ‘The Critias’ and ‘The Statesman’ related to the attention which the philosopher begins to give to numerous historical myths. But the main reason appears to come from a gradually increasing disappointment of Plato at the possibility of realizing in practice his ideal plans.
Both of the above mentioned trends are in constant interaction affecting those new aspects of analysis of the social role of art which is found in the ‘The Laws’. From the artistic point of view the Platonic account of the conflict between the ancient Athens and Atlantis comes close to the historical novel, mainly from viewpoint of describing the landscapes of the gigantic island and the architectural ensembles. The role of art in this account, however, can also be perceived in the spirit of traditional paradigm: the hypertrophy of artificial means used by the Atlanteans in all spheres of life — artificial irrigation, arti ficial correction of natural borders (the plain — a regular polygon, the town — a circle), artificial system of water supply, gold-and-bronze plated walls, unusual natural affluence (see: Crit., 110 e–115 c etc.), a halo of artificial mystery cloaking power (night, oath, sacrifice indispensable to the kings of Atlantis to consolidate justice) — all this according to Plato’s concept had to give not only special emphasis to the degradation of ‘natural monarchy’ set up on the island by the gods but also to the lack of reasonable naturalness sym bolized by the heroic selflessness of the guardians of ancient Attica living a communist life. Plato deliberatively resorts to artistic technique of doubling of antithesis striving to evoke in the reader’s mind associations between Atlantis and Herodotes’ descriptions of oriental despoties (see: Her., I, 98 etc.).
The radical difference of ‘The Critias’ from ‘The Republic’ consists not only in the fact that instead of the intellectual experiment characteristic of the former, a fantastic artistic vision of the conflict between two states ap parently being antipodes comes to the foreground. At present few people would deny the fact Plato was to a certain extent enchanted with the picture of Atlantis he himself had drawn. This peculiarity is supported, in particu lar, by the coincidence of numerous essential details in the organizations of the Atlantean state and the ‘second-best state’ depicted in the ‘The Laws’.
For example, the kings of Atlantis had a custom of getting together at night for settling matters and administering justice. The rulers of Eunomopolis practiced a similar custom where the ‘Nocturnal Council’ played a major role. In particular, architectural and spatial schemes of Atlantis and Magne sia are also isomorphic. There is a plain in the center of the island in the middle of which rises a hill which Poseidon surrounded alternatively by wa ter and land rings (Crit., 113 c-d, 115 c–116 c). Subsequently the kings of Atlantis built up the land rings with stone walls, sanctuaries, gymnasia. The city in ‘The Laws’ circular in shape is also surrounded with wall rising gradually to Acropolis (Legg., V, 746 a). It is there that Plato places his Noc turnal Council at the end of ‘The Laws’ (Legg., XII, 969 c). Plato evidently tries to achieve in both compositions the effect of a ‘single building’ symbol izing an ideal state of its own kind (Legg., V, 746 a;
VI, 779 b).
However the political system, social structure and educational system of the Plato’s Cretan city based on the compromise between ideal and reality contrast in a particular way with this elated, almost idyllic picture. In his later years Plato became convinced that no ruler possesses resources capable of changing human nature. The character of human material is such that phi losophers even having become rulers would never enjoy as much freedom of rearranging human matters as the artist painting a picture or the sculptor working with clay or bronze. The functional role of education in general and the fine arts in particular reflect the fundamental turn in the Platonic political theory signifying a transition from the formation of an ideal ruler to the pro gram of creating an image of the ordinary law-abiding citizen altogether sup porting the state’s goals which have been set by the ruler.
The social structure of Eunomopolis stands in sharp contrast to the ideal project of ‘The Republic’ being limited to a group of landowners divided into four propertied classes which are prescribed to spend part of their time in their households along with their military duty (Legg., VI, 758 b;
cf.: VI, 776 a, VII, 808 a-b). Such deviation from the Spartan model, let alone complete dis harmony with the first project, fully confirms the correctness of conclusions of those scholars who view the main features of the way of life of Eunomopo lis’ citizens as a result of mingling the Lycurgian cosmos with the Athenian constitution idealized in the spirit of patrios politeia 5..
The contraposition of the civil body of landowners not only to foreigners and slaves but also to artisans totally excluded from citizenry can serve as a proof of the fact that Plato is the original author of the Aristotle’s classic for mula on which the later based: “...Just as with all other natural organisms those things that are indispensable for the existence of the whole are not parts of the whole organization, it is also clear that not all the things that are neces sary for states to possess are to be counted as parts of a state” (Aristot. Pol., VII 1,1). Naturally, the disappearance of the third estate problem opened up completely new prospects to the development of a uniform educational pro gram the main symbol of which is the idea of moral harmony and of service to the state on the basis of imitating perfect models which had existed in the re mote past.
The problem of sources of educational theory set forth in ‘The Laws’ has not yet unambiguously resolved. In our view, there is every reason to believe that one of its main sources is the theory of education worked out by Pythago ras and his disciples. In the pythagorean theory of the balance of cosmic and human laws the unity of ethics and politics so characteristic of ancient Greeks’ mentality is expressed in an extraordinarily sharp manner assuming the form of demand to follow in everything the God’s will which is the only source of both the good and the human justice (Jambl. V.P. 137). In complete compli ance with this demand Pythagoras considered the God’s power to be “the most useful in establishing justice” (Ibid., 174). The idea of the God’s power in Pythagoras (and later on in Plato) should certainly not be understood in the sense in which it had been understood by Hebrew prophets. The Pythago rean theocracy is an allegoric expression of the philosophical idea of universal order testifying also to the intention of the founder of the Crotonian union to use traditional mythological ideas with a view to spreading his own political principles (see: Ibid., 46).
In ‘The Laws’ Plato modifies the pythagorean ideas in the spirit of his own political philosophy by introducing the mythological element which was not present in his predecessors’ theories and which becomes the starting point for the development of aesthetic and moral principles in frame of a new educa tional program. This element consists in philosophical adaptation of He siodus’ myth about ‘Cronus’ life’. The new version of this legend suggested in ‘The Laws’ has a purely biased character and is different even from its closest version outlined in ‘The Statesman’. Instead of the picture of harmonious unity of gods and men engaged in philosophical contemplation of nature the idea of salutary mission of divine rule comes to the foreground. It turns out that the blissful life in those remote times became possible thanks to Cronus’ wise prudence foreseeing that “no human nature... is capable of ruling human matters unlimitedly without becoming arrogant and unjust” and placing daemons — beings of a higher and more divine nature — not men as kings and rulers of our states (Legg., IV, 719 c-d). Deprived of divine protection men “can not possibly avoid evils and labours”. Salvation will only come if men imitate the divine rule and adopting the very principle as “a definition of reason” will call it law (Legg., IV, 713 e–714 a). In turn the lawgiver making laws for the sake of social well-being embodies “the supreme service to the gods” (Legg., IV, 715 b-d).
As to how efficient this mission was according to Plato can be seen from the constantly recurring myth of men as God’s marionettes. No one knows why the gods created men, most probably just to have fun. Governing such creatures unworthy any special care is simply a severe necessity. It is aimed at attracting everyone to the path of virtue stretching the golden threads “which leads us astray to the path of sin”.
The ideological grounding of an educational program of this kind marked by extreme pessimism forms a basis for an utterly utilitarian approach to the role of art in life. However this by no means prevents Plato in ‘The Laws’ from developing initial principles of his aesthetics formulated in his earlier works.
The art belongs (like reason and law) to the first cosmic principles and there fore stands above natural things and even the nature itself (Legg., X, 888 e — 891 b). The cosmos itself with all the Gods governing it is at the same time na ture, chance and art. Both cosmic harmony and the processes generated by it are at the same time an object of contemplation and example for imitation.
Justice can be considered to be one of such objects being the supreme beauty to Plato incomparable to any works of art (Legg., V, 732 e — 734 e).
An ideal constitution can also become an object for artistic contempla tion. According to Plato this constitution represents a reproduction of the best and most beautiful life “being no other thing” than the most genuine tragedy (Legg., VII, 817 b).
Naturally the cosmic principles of true art are beyond most people’s un derstanding. And now we have to state again the fundamental contradiction of the Platonic educational program. Spreading the principles of musical edu cation to all citizens without exception Plato continues as of by inertia to re gard the overwhelming majority of them as crowd persisting to prohibit their participation in forming aesthetic judgments and evaluations which he con siders to be the property of true experts (Legg., II, 659 a-b;
VII, b). The lot of majority is only to imitate behavior models that can be easily as similated by an ordinary mind. Moral harmony in the Platonic second-best state is attained therefore by inculcation of new principles of education among which the fine arts purified of all ‘harmful admixtures’ play the most important role.
No wonder that we find in the ‘The Laws’ a new version of the theory of imitation in comparison with Plato’s earlier works including the ‘The Repub lic’. One can henceforward suppose mimesis to have become in a certain sense the central notion of the Platonic political argumentation combining aesthetic and ethical principles in a united system.
In Book III of ‘The Republic’ both the notion and general theory of imita tion are investigated by Plato through division of arts into imitative and non imitative art forms (Resp., III, 338 c;
392 d–394 d). This quite technical dis junction of the fine arts (H. Koller) acquired a purely ethical character for Plato who perceived art mainly from educational point of view. Criticizing the ‘inadmissible imitative methods’ of Homer and other poets who sang of the doubtful behavior of the Olympic gods, Plato looks upon this sphere of poetry as a domain of subjective inventions which have nothing in common with the real nature of the divine. In so far as imitation can never approach reality be ing incapable of perceiving truth, the Guardians must imitate nothing except for deeds of reasonable and courageous men (Resp., III, 395 e). The slaves also should not give themselves to imitation because the only thing which is de manded of them is to do what is necessary.
Although Plato is convinced that imitation is capable of disclosing god’s secrets to men thorough the artist’s inspiration, it is however absolutely unac ceptable from the educational point of view. Thus Plato’s attitude to imitation in ‘The Republic’ seems to be very contradictory, often very negative. In his later works, on the contrary, imitation is regarded as a quite positive charac teristic on the condition, of course, that its subject is both positive and accept able for the State. For example, the best ideal state is perceived as an imitation of the ‘Cronus’age’ (Legg., IV, 713 b). Musical tones are imitation of divine harmony. A wise king must imitate a true political expert. In turn, those who imitate the king in accordance with the law form aristocracy, without the law oligarchy (Plato. Pol., 301 a).
On the whole, imitation in ‘The Laws’ is regarded almost as a main artistic principle defining the structure of aesthetic perception and moral behavior.
Art was given to men by gods pitying them, aiming to regulate their natural propensity to body movements and sounds by bringing order and harmony into them (Legg., II, 653 d-e). Harmony and rhythm being the basis of the fine arts give pleasure to men.
Nevertheless, those who affirm that “the degree of pleasure received by the soul serves as a proof of correctness of the art of music are wrong in their reasoning” (Legg., II, 653 d). Only the true and right pleasure based on the imitation of virtuous capacities of human nature deserves praise. It should be come firmly established in poetry, songs and dances (Legg., II, 655 c–656 c).
The lawgiver should therefore subject poetical works to the most severe cen sorship compelling poets to create those rhythms and harmony that develop justice in men (Legg., II, 660 e – 661 d).
Thus beauty has meaning only when it is combined with justice. For its sake one can admit a lie by affirming that justice is always good (Legg., III, d-e). Plato closely relates all these quite utilitarian principles to the above mentioned myth of human marionettes. Citizens are not supposed to discuss the nature of aesthetic categories. They should sing and dance incessantly, the aim of the dances and songs being exclusively the extolment of the wisdom of the laws and their creators (Legg., II, 665 c). In order to make them able to sing and dance any method available should be used including wine (Legg., II, 665c–666 b). Wine-drinking makes the human marionettes’ feelings more in tense sharpening their senses and memory (Legg., II, 645–646 d). Moreover making people drink for their education is inexpensive, save and fast and the influence of wine is often more effective than any moralizing (Legg., II, 646 e– 650 b).
That is why the Platonic educational theory often grows into a puppet comedy imbued with tragic colours at the end of ‘The Laws’ when the phi losopher starts working out his system of punitive laws. In the final analysis the aim of all the Platonic innovations whether it be the classification of round dances or the prohibition of ludicrous body movements and song sub jects is to strictly follow the letter of the law which constitutes the supreme form of beauty. Consequently, obedience to the law should become automatic for all emotions to be predictable. It is for this purpose that the citizens be sides military training and husbandry should spend most of the time in round dances. Thus the standing reiteration of the myth about men as the God’s marionettes is reinforced by the following Platonic demand to the citizens of Magnesia — “one must live by playing” (Legg., VII, 803 e).
Perhaps Aristotle was not quite right when accusing Plato in the Book II of ‘The Politics’ of underestimating human nature. Judging sceptically the ca pacities of ordinary man, Plato pinned all his hopes on utilitarian aesthetics, the mobilizing force of the fine arts and general education based on the imita tion of the ideal norms set in advance. As a result the contradictory attitude towards art could only increase because it had become for old Plato the main remedy for both supporting and subduing ‘weak souls’ along with punitive laws. The art is supposed therefore to play in ‘The Laws’ the role which was once intended for the official myths in ‘The Rebublic’.
Notes 1. Fridlnder P. Platon. Band III. Die Die platonishen Schriften. Zweite und dritte Periode. 3 durchg. und ergnz. Aufl. B.;
N.Y., 1975. S. 128.
2. Gigon O. Gegenwrtigkeit und Utopie. Eine Interpretation von Platon’s Staat. Bd. I. Buch 1–4. Zrich;
Mnchen, 1976. S. 349 ff.
3. Phlman R. von. Geschichte der sozialen Frage und des Sozialismus in der antiken Welt. 3 Aufl. Mnchen, 1925. Bd. II. S.135–143.
4. Ollier F. Le mirage spartiate. Etude sur l’idealisation de Sparte dans l’antiquit grecque de l’origine jusque’ aux cynique. P., 1933. P. 235 sq.
5. Tigerstedt E. The Legend of Sparta in Classical Antiquity. Stockholm, 1965. Vol. I. P. 262, 269;
cf.: Morrow G. R. Plato’s Cretan City. Princeton, 1960. P. 152, 396.
Универсальная царская власть и «альтернативная модель конституций» в «Политике» Аристотеля* Во всех учебниках политической науки и популярных работах по ис тории политической мысли можно встретить традиционную схему из шести государственных устройств, разделенных на правильные (царскую власть, аристократию и демократию) и «отклоняющиеся» (соответст венно тирания, олигархия и охлократия) со ссылкой на аристотелевскую «Политику». В общем виде это верно. У самого Стагирита, правда, про тивопоставляются непосредственно не демократия и охлократия, но смешанное государственное устройство — полития и демократия, под которой подразумевается один из ее наиболее крайних вариантов. Но основной принцип классификации остается неизменным: «правильные»