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The share remained on this high level up to 2002 with some minor changes.

Towards the early 21th century the investment attraction of Indochina states increased notably against a background of growing risks in the other SEA states. To a great extent that was bound up with the fact that the governments of such countries of the subregion as Vietnam, : Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar appreciated distinctly that the true and dynamic socio-economic development was not possible without large-scale FDI participation. The success of FDI attrac tion to all of Indochina states was determined not by regulatory measures of any kind but by more favourable investment climate.

But to the same or even greater extent the ruling circles of Indochina states were obliged to brisk up efforts in order to lay down more favourable investment climate under the pressure of China, their mighty competitor in SEA, which was very successful in attracting FDI during the period under review. China not only pulled aside the new FDI coming to SEA, but rather gained over some foreign investors from Indochina states. In 2002, the first year after China's admittance in WTO, the flow of FDI to the subregion declined by 2,1 times, and its share in to tal flow of FDI to SEA shrunk from 42,2 to 18,1%.

From 1995 to 2001 as a whole the major investors in the subregion were the countries of East Asia (51,7%) with an obvious leadership of Japan and Singapore which supplied nearly 1/3 of the total FDI received by Indochina states. Hong Kong and Taiwan took the lower level as well as the newcomers Malaysia and Indonesia which made their first investment in Indo china states just in the 90-ties. The second rank was occupied by the EC countries (14,9%) with the leadership of Great Britain and France and the third one by the United States.

In the period under review the raising activity of Japanese and Singaporean investors in Indochina could be observed, especially after 2000. Their combined share in total FDI flow to the subregion increased from 26 to 60%. Beginning from 1999 a considerable slowdown in European investment to Indochina is taking place.

N. Rogojina Institute of World Economy and Internationa Relations Russian Academy of Sciences Dr. Senior Research Fellow Environmental Aspect of Development of the Mekong River Basin While the economic development of the countries of Indochina accelerates, their interest in the Mekong river increases. The growth of demand for water resources, especially when they are transboundary, creates the potential for emerging intergovernmental conflicts on water. This possibility was taken into account on the initial stage of economic modernization in the region when the Committee was formed to foster joint development projects of the Mekong River Ba sin.

But unfavorable for cooperation the political situation in the region for many years chal lenged the committee in accomplishing its duties. When the situation changed and at the same time rivalry between countries for the control over the waters of the Mekong river especially for hydro-power building became more intense, their interest in the Committee as the regulator of the vexed problems has been rekindled. But economic contradictions between states compli cated the functioning of the Committee.

Nevertheless that very economic considerations determined the future of the Commit tee, which was transformed into the Commission in accordance with the Agreement on Coop eration for Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin signed by Thailand, Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia in 1995.

The creation of the Commission is a political move, surpassing objective necessity of the countries of the region in resource-sharing and joint management of the Mekong River Ba Indochina: Trends in development sin existing today. The national interests in developing the Mekong river prevails over the re gional ones. And as before such policy creates the possibility for emerging inter-state disputes and reciprocal claims.

The ability of the Mekong Commission as the regional structure to prevent the creation of social and environmental conflicts subjected to the development of the Mekong river and therefore guarantee the sustainable development in the region is open to question. The situation is aggravated by the fact that environmental and social requirements of development, although being formally recognized by all states as their priorities, have remained the object of their dec larations but not of practical realization.

But the Mekong Commission designed mainly to implement regional programs is poorly adjusted to solving social and environmental conflicts that emerge on the national level, though having regional consequences.

However the Mekong Commission still lacks clear position on the projects, being torn by contradictory interests of those who supports large scale dam building on the one hand and those who backs the implementation of environmentally sound models of development on the other hand. Trying to prevent internal split and conciliate different views the Commission in clines to exaggerate the negative consequences of the past deeds and undermine the contempo rary ones.

Nevertheless, the functioning of the Mekong Commission favors the increase of atten tion of the world public, the population of the region and governmental agencies towards envi ronmental issues, the solution of which have become an urgent need.

Concern upon the future of the Mekong river is justified, taking into account the fact that by now the ecosystem of the river has been irretrievably damaged and signs of its degrada tion have become more evident tropical forests are diminishing, the biodiversity is rapidly los ing, the rate of erosion is accelerating. In short the unique river system that is not succumbed to restoration is being heavily destroyed.

S. Ioanesian Institute of Oriental Studies Russian Academy of Sciences Senior Research Fellow, IVAN The Trends of Eastern Indo-China Countries Cooperation with the Peoples Republic of China South-East Asia countries economic relations with the Peoples Republic of China (P.R.C.) are becoming more urgent at the boundary of the XXXI centuries. For the last years of the late century, the P.R.C. became one of the leading economic partners of the South East Asia countries, e.g. two-way trade volume for that period increased from $13 to 40 billion.

China is also a large investor of these countries economies.

Such ties with the eastern Indo-China countries, in particular Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, began strengthening in the mid of 1970s with restoration of peace and cementing national independence of the mentioned three states. By to-day, they have very diverse bilateral and transnational contacts with China in trade, financial and investment spheres where the P.R.C.

(together with its new territory of Hong-Kong and also with Taiwan) occupies one of the leading positions among other world partners.

These relations are based upon both interstate and contractual and legal foundations.

: The paper contains a brief description of the development process and characteristic of different steps of Indo-China economic relations with the P.R.C. since the second half of the XX century. The author believes that many events of both world and regional importance had the influence on the relations progress. So, after the socialist system collapse, these relations began not only changing, but also renewing and consolidating in spite of reiterated complications and interruptions provoked by political contradictions and military conflicts which sometime hap pened on this ground.

Many negative trends of the three countries economic relations with the P.R.C. are be ing gradually changed for more positive and rational. International statistics and bank reports show that the four states economical intensification which took place for the studied period cor responds to the processes of globalization gaining in strength in the world with all its specific consequences typical for economically highly developed and poor countries.

At the same time, not a single conclusion can be draw: the time showed that the men tioned states policy especially well seen on the P.R.C. example proceeds not only from eco nomical, but considerably from strategic interests (these are the ambitions, the historical opposi tion of Vietnam to China, their struggle for political influence zones in the region, genetic Thai land striving to have stronger positions in Laos, competition with quickly reviving China, West and Japan for Indo-Chinese markets that nevertheless sometimes acts in favor of their smaller

economic partners). It proves the great attention the P.R.C. leadership focuses on eastern Indo China economic ties with Hong Kong (which has maintained its right for membership in some international organizations) and Taiwan as well as with developed capitalist countries.

The intensification of the Indo-China economic cooperation with the Peoples Republic of China is a part of the process of approaching the ASEAN organization. This process had been predicted 20 years ago and it was promoted by global political climate warming up, on the one hand, and by authority growth of the eastern Indo-China countries, on the other hand, as reliable and prospective business partners of the developed and developing economic systems of the world economy. Pledge of this success is that their markets are becoming more and more overt (though this process is moving in a complicated manner and not so quickly) and the Indo-China states reformatory policy which is going on despite of lots of objective troubles. This conclu sion, or rather forecast, has been proved by studies results obtained by national and foreign spe cialists. The reality of a new situation is that the eastern Indo-China sub-region must be consid ered at present not only as a South-East Asia strategic importance zone, but also as one of the growing centers of world communitys economic interests.

L. Morev Institute of Oriental Studies Russian Academy of Sciences Professor. Senior Research Fellow Language Situation and Language Policy in Countries of Indochina The Indochinese Peninsula is one of the most particoloured regions of the world from the ethnolinguistic point of view.

It can boast of approximately 300different languages spoken there, e.g. Thailand 62, Vietnam 54, Laos 48, Myanmar 135, and Cambodia 19. At the colonial period the languages of ruling powers French and English played a dominant role in the field of communication in the Indochinese countries, except Thailand (Siam) which retained formal independence. In the post-colonial period the languages of prevalent ethnic group assumed this Indochina: Trends in development part instead. At the same time language building for national minorities made start some coun tries of Indochina, as Burma (Myanmar), Vietnam, Laos. However shortly after this process was curtailed owing to the conceit of the major ethnic group, on the one hand, and nationalistic trends among some minorities, on the other. Upon the plea of national integrity the ruling elites launched the policy of assimilation of minorities and turned a deaf ear to their languages. The languages of prevailing authorities monopolized all spheres of mass communication, whereas minority languages were deprived of any social rights and were driven back to the very margin of communicational field. Such state of things lasted until recently.

For the last decade sociolinguistic situation in Indochina has changed for better slightly.

Local administration showed signs of tolerance to disadvantaged minorities and their languages.

There appeared some possibilities, though delayed, for the revitalization and even development of minority languages. The most favorable situation in this respect is now in Myanmar. In some national districts of this country minority languages gained certain social status: object of learn ing, language of instruction, means of some mass media, etc. On the whole, these measures of local authorities are rather hesitating and evidently belated. Young generation for the consider able part dont know mother tongue, they look to a national language as a language of higher social status and slight the language of their parents. Linguistic continuity and traditions are cut off. Most of the minority languages in Indochina can hardly survive, they are doomed.

The specific feature of the sociolinguistic situation in Indochina is that many languages spoken there are the so-called transnational languages, i.e. languages spread in two or more ad jacent countries, including neighboring areas of Southwest China. Ethnic borders and state bor ders cut each other. Aspirations for the ethnic unity may be at variance with the interests of state integrity and vise versa. Such state of things is rot with internal and external conflicts.

Finally, the latest feature of sociolinguistic situation in Indochina is the rush for the English language. A lot of young people treat their indigenous languages as lowgraded, out dated, and prefer to study English than their mother tongue.

V. Dolnikova Moscow State University. The Institute of Asian and African Studies Professor Thailand. Rural Provinces and Peasantry Socio Political Role (1980 beginning of 1990) For the period of last decades, Thailand has passed a complicated and rather contradic tory road of its socio-economic and political development and has achieved serious results in economy and in social sphere.

In spite of an intensive process of industrial sector and municipal economy capitalistic modernization, 70% of its population has been living in rural areas, and more than 40% of the gainfully employed population is engaged in the agricultural sector.

The capitalistic modernization is seizing more and more rural provinces of the country.

So, for the period of 1975 2000, a share of the population employed in industry, trade and ser vices in the structure of the gainfully employed population lived in the rural regions increased from 20 up to 47%. By the beginning of 2000, 60% of all businessmen (owners, manufacturers) lived outside the cities, and 62% of economically active citizens living there were hired workers.

A large number of hired laborers in the rural regions included about 2 million farm workers and more than 6,6 million industrial, trade and service employees. 1,6 million (22%) : hired workers were engaged in state-owned enterprises and about 7 million (78%) were em ployed in the individual sector.

Numerous groups of the rural business participants occupy pretty strong economical po sitions, they secure large profits. Also they are financed by national and provincial banks and gradually are being involved in the capitalist economy.

At the same time, different forms of illegal business are going on to be kept. Profits from border trade, drugs smuggling, gambling business that widely spread in Thailand, illegal immigration, prostitution and other kinds of sexual services were equal to amounts equivalent, by the beginning of 2000, to 20% of the GDP cost. All this illegal business has been concen trated in the hands of local provincial bosses cropped up from Chinese immigrants so called chao pho.

The rural business activity obtains gradually more organized up-to-date corporative con figurations. Provincial towns and large regional centers create local associations of business men, Boards of Trade, banks and finance companies which use modern methods of commerce activity and various ways of business-like cooperation.

The capitalistic modernization begins changing the social structure of the population liv ing outside the towns. However, despite the steady increase of this population engaged beyond the agricultural branch, more than half (53% of manpower taken into account outside the towns) are the people strictly linked with agricultural production and are the members of different farms. All they represent a specific social community peasantry, in the broad sense. They incorporate due to -the labor activity character, rural way of life and some historically formed specific features of the national mentality, social behavior, and religious-ethical reception of the world. The advanced politological researches combine them by the common term chao thi that in English means lord of the place and are considered as the nation basis that played a decisive role in forming national territory, cultivation of new lands and Thai statehood formation.

The majority of peasants are the owners working the land. Unlike peasantry of the South-East Asia countries, they suffered insignificantly from pressure of landlords, bureaucrats, and local merchants capital. The Thai peasantry developed as the most socially stable part of the society, isolated to some extent and provided with land.

Just in the village, such traditional features of the Thai society as status hierarchy, reali zation of different forms of collectivism and mutual aid, honoring of elders, personal behavior toleration, devotion to orthodox Buddhism, and recognition of the Kings power and bureau cratic arrangements existing in the country have been kept. The peasants themselves elect per sons to perform some leading roles and to maintain relations with local officials delegated by the metropolis. Village headmen elected at general meetings are considered as the highest local authorities for the inhabitants. This practice took place even in the periods of dictatorship and for a period of some years it remained a single form of public representation in the country. Rec lamation of new lands and manpower shifting stipulated a kind of dynamism in the peasants social behavior which is seen in rural population migration mobility, in highly different perma nent and seasonal forms of migration. These are a rural population inflow to the towns, particu larly to the region of the Bangkok agglomeration, and simultaneous reverse flow from towns to the villages. In the conditions of rapid growth of capitalism and market relations and their dis semination not only in towns, but also in outlining districts, the traditional peasantry social iso lation inevitably gets broken. Peasants by birth have been widely represented in the students, intellectuals, municipal hired workers, bureaucratic and business circles. They take an active part in political processes that occur in the country. The overwhelming majority of them is going on to maintain the most important vital interests with their village relatives and fellow-villagers.

The traditional peasant ideology and transformed national Thai mentality still strongly kept in the Indochina: Trends in development village are widely spreading both in the countryside and urban regions and determine seriously numerous groups of urban inhabitants social behavior and political predilections irrespective of duration of their living period in the towns or places they occupy in the modern Thai society.

Combination of up-to-date and traditional factors in political life and conservation of the traditional peasant ideology influence on numerous urban population groups is a definite factor smoothing acuteness of social contradictions and political conflicts inevitably appearing in the conditions of capitalist modernization of the economy and society.

There are some forces in Thailand which catch keenly social and cultural impulses originated from the traditional peasant world and which seek to use them in the interests of the national unity, cultural prosperity and economical and political stability of the society.

These forces are represented first of all by the monarchy still possessing immense po litical authority, Buddhist sangha leadership and non-government agencies of different kinds.

Political parties functioning in the country and the government of Taxing Chinnovat exercising the power take into consideration the social role of the peasants and traditional social and cul tural and ideological values maintained by them.

The traditional Thai mentality with its tolerance, aspiration to avoid conflicts and to achieve peaceful settlement disputes as well as the rural society social stability are the determin ing social factors which guarantee Thailand a successive way out of rather critical situations without great sacrifices, maintaining the political stability and achievement of considerable positive changes in the national economy development.

N. Bektimirova Moscow State University. The Institute of Asian and African Studies Professor Cambodia: issues of political evolution (1993 2003) 2003 marked a watershed in the political development of Cambodia. Cambodians cele brated the 50th anniversary of obtaining independence and the 10th anniversary of the termina tion of peacemaking operation and the formation of a new state the Kingdom of Cambodia.

In the 90s Cambodia underwent three major large-scale social transformations, which required urgent consideration, namely the transition from war to peace, from planned to market economy and from authoritarianism to liberal democracy.

The democratic transit in Cambodia had a number of distinctive features. Firstly, it took place in special international context when democratic ideas became the spirit of the time.

Secondly, it was initiated and financed by the international community. Thirdly, the democratic transition started without the necessary socio-economic and cultural-political prerequisites.

Fourthly, despite the wide variety of differently oriented political forces former royalists, communists, Khmer Rouge, and simply immigrants which switched into the political process there were no frictions between them neither of politico-ideological nature nor in the questions of political and economic strategies of development. Thus the interests of the major political actors in Cambodia were quite similar they struggled for domination over resources, control over certain elements of the economic system, as well as for influence on state structures and institutions engaged in the distribution of these resources. In addition, the transformation was characterized by the fact that the old nomenclature of Cambodian Peoples Party (CPP) re mained at power.

: The political process in Cambodia in the 90-s was determined by three parties Cam bodian Peoples Party, Funcinpec, and Sam Rainsy Party (SRP). In early 90-s CPP managed to consolidate its power in the country. Liberal economic reforms, which started in the late 80-s led to a boost in economic activity and to the creation of close linkages between state officials and businessmen. Central authorities, namely the CPP, took the role of the protector of the economic interests of the local bureaucrats and the party apparatus. The ruling circles of the party won the loyalty of civil and military servants and managed to consolidate these strata around the leaders of the party. Thus the traditional patron-client relations between central and local authorities were given new vitality. In weak states political power is always economic in its essence. The state dominates through its capacity to monopolize, distribute, and exploit natural resources.

This factor becomes even more powerful in periods of transformation. Control over them al lowed the authorities to withdraw those resources from the population, a fact which had signifi cant political implications. The local administration, as well as the central authorities thus ob tained an excellent tool of economic pressure on the rural population for the purposes of politi cal mobilization.

However, during the elections of 1993 in the presence of a large body of international observers from the UN the CPP failed as yet to make full use of the mobilizing potential of the local authorities. Funcinpec won the first elections with a narrow margin, the CPP coming a close second. The government formed after the elections could most adequately be described as a polarized coalition, since neither of the sides was prepared for fruitful cooperation. Each of the parties regarded it as a necessary measure, a temporary pause before political and electoral struggle. The factual presense in the government of two prime- ministers led to the division of civil and military structures between two patrons.

The creation of the coalition based upon parity principles triggered the marginalisation of Funcinpec conditioned by objective as well as subjective factors. Firstly, it had a very limited access to natural resources which deprived the party of the opportunity to form a solid financial foundation in the specific Cambodian context. Moreover, it substancially reduces the mecha nisms of exerting economic pressure on the population for the purposes of its political mobilisa tion in the interests of the party. Secondly, Funcinpec had no virtually no branches on the level below provinces and thus the rural electorate remained largely uncovered by its influence. This led to the orgarnisational weakness of the party and limited opportunities to expand its social base. Thirdly, prince Ranariddh failed to fulfill the role of the traditional patron, to express gratitude to those members of the political elite who had supported him.

As far as the development of democracy in the country is concerned, the emergence of the opposition Sam Rainsy Party can be regarded as one of the most significant moves in this direction. However, the specifics of political views of the party leader made itself felt from the very first steps of his political activity. It conditioned a distinctive opposition strategy. Accord ing to Sam Rainsy, the international community must be the major lever of democratisation processes in Cambodia. He linked the containment of the authoritarianism of Hun Sens power with the pressure on the government from the part of the international community rather than with the development of democratic institutions within the country.

From the late 90s, Cambodia has increasingly been moving in the direction of retradi tionalisation of its political space, which has two major trends- one coming from below and one from above. Retraditionalisation from below is the result of objective circumstances. The elec tion system throws out into the political arena people from poor backgrounds, mainly peasan tary, whose political conciousness is entirely dominated by traditional, largely, paternalistic stereotypes. They carry a whole host of traditional meanings, symbols and norms of behaviour.

Indochina: Trends in development Retraditionalisation is also implemented by political elite. As a rule, political leaders de liberately use the methods and forms of traditional political culture. When politicians address the public, especially those living in rural areas, they necessarily have to use the language of the national political tradition. One of the simpliest ways to do this is to appeal to monarchical slo gans and the personality of the King. The most vivid example in this relation is the activity of Funcinpec. Throughout the process of democratic transformation the party has been associated with the King and this has been used as the major election slogan.

Anti-Vietnamese slogans of Funcinpec and the Sam Rainsy Party appealing to national consolidation are no less traditional. The CPP is also increasingly using traditional methods. It aspires to foster patrono- cliental relations with the population, while combining them with modern bureacratic forms of control and pressure.

In the last decade the King has been acting as an intermediary in the settlement of po litical crises which generally emerge after elections. The traditional method of conflict resolu tion with the help of the institute of the monarchy prevented the political actors from spoiling their reputation, since through making them obey his will, the King bestowed his charisma upon them. Thus, Norodom Sihanouks political wisdom and experience turned the conservative po litical institute of monarchy into a certain guarantee of the expansion of democratic transforma tion of the country.

The modern political process in Cambodia is characterized by a strong personification of power which manifests itself primarily in stressing the enourmous personal contribution of Hun Sen to the preservation of political stability and those tangible results of economic devel opment, which are felt by citizens on the local level.

One of the most significant indications of the retraditionalisation of Cambodian political space is the aspiration of political leaders to legitimize their power using the norms and con cepts of traditional political culture. In Cambodia Buddhism has traditionally been given the legitimizing priority. Buddhism helps to secure and maximize the legitimacy. It can still con struct emotive arguments in support of political actors.

In the last years the prime-minister Hun Sen is increasingly turning to Buddhism. This manifests itself mainly in his donations to the Sangha. During the last year he has presided over the inauguration of several pagodas every month, most of them are built on his personal dona tions. He also takes an active part in organizing religious festivals to raise money for the needs of the Sangha. It is true to say that he used to be involved in charity before but those activities were mostly secular. The religious activity of Hun Sen is widely publicized. He represents his life as an example of a karma of an ordinary man a son of a poor peasant- who achieved his present top position thanks to his deeds in this life rather then in previous ones. The representa tion of his life within the conceptual framework of khmer traditional political culture moderates the inherent karmic fatalism of this religion, gives people the hope to achieve tangible results in this life, privides a powerful impetus to act here and now. In his address to the public Hun Sen often calls to abide by the moral and ethical principals of Buddhism declaring that the for eign policy of the country rests upon the principles of non-violence and Buddhist peace culture.

His relations with the Sangha are very much like those during the Sihanouk period in the 60-s.

No doubt, he seeks traditional legitimacy willing to act as a traditional leader. There is at least one more reason of Hun Sens appeal to Buddhism. In the last few years the country un derwent a superficial but very fast westerniezation. By putting the new reality into traditional cultural context Hun Sen might be trying to alleviate the possible negative consequences of this process.

The results of the 2003 elections did not substancially alter the configuration of political forces in the country. The CPP won the majority of seats. The opposition Funcinpec and the : SRP preserved their electorate having lost 4% of the votes compared to the 1998 elections.

However, there have been major changes within the opposition itself. The Sam Rainsy Party has now become the primary political actor winning 60% more seats than in the previous elections.

Critically evaluating the political evolutrion of Cambodia in the last decade, it should be said that its development is characterized by multidimensionalism and variation. For this reason, it is impossible to give a straightforward interpretation of the political process in the country.

The existing regime is a mixture of democracy, authoritarianism, paternalism, clientalism, etc.

The eclectic nature of Cambodian political space, the coexistence of contradictory trends creates the potential to move in different directions. Pressure from the part of the international commu nity, on the economic aid of which the country will remain dependant, at least in the forseeable future, guarantees that the country will follow the path of democratic development. However, one question arises: what this democracy will be like?

A. Parmenov Moscow State University. The Institute of Asian and African Studies Research Post-graduate student The role of foreign capital in the socio-economic development of Vietnam Capital constitutes the primary condition for economic growth in every nation. Vietnam is not an exemption and it needs a very big volume of capital to attain the target of high and sus tainable growth in the coming years. Therefore, in the context of being less developed economy and possessing poor capacity of savings, the intensification of foreign capital mobilization to supplement the domestic sources is of great significance.

During the last decade sources of foreign capital in Vietnam consisted mainly of foreign direct investment (FDI) and official development assistance (ODA), commercial credits and loans were very limited due to strict state policy in this sector. Of these two above-mentioned main forms, FDI plays the most important role, because its not only a source of investment capital, but also includes transfer of technologies, management and marketing experience, ac cess to global distribution network, etc. Moreover, while ODA, except for non-refundable aids, inflicts debt burden (though in case of Vietnam countrys debt is manageable), FDI generally doesnt affect adversely on countrys balance of payments. Due to these advantages Vietnam considers FDI inflows as a factor of great significance for economic development and restruc turing in the coming years. As for ODA both Vietnamese leaders and donors community con sider it as a very important source for development of infrastructure and social sphere (e.g. those sectors which foreign investors dont have any significant interest and at the same time the State doesnt have enough funds to invest in).

In 2001 2002 foreign capital amounted to more than 1/3 of countrys total investment capital (with FDI almost 19% and ODA 15%). Though this level has decreased in comparison with mid-90s (when only FDI amounted to 1/3 of total investment capital and overall foreign funds reached almost one half of it), international financing is still considered as one of the most effective resources for Vietnam development investments.

The legal system for foreign direct investments in Vietnam has taken shape in 1988 when National Assembly of SRV adopted the Law on foreign direct investments in Vietnam. Then the Law has been revised and amended several times in 1990, 1992, 1996 and 2000. First foreign in vestors came to Vietnam in last 80s early 90s, but the main flows began in mid-90s.

Indochina: Trends in development By 2003 FDI in Vietnam reached about 40 billion USD in more than 4000 registered projects from 74 countries and territories, while disbursed capital amounted to 22 billion USD.

During the last decade annual volumes of FDI inflows to Vietnam were fluctuating considera bly. Reaching its maximum in mid-90s (almost 7 and 9 bln. in 1995 and 1996), then decreasing sharply in following 3 4 years in recent years foreign capital inflows to Vietnam stopped at the level of 2 2,5 bln. USD per year. Meanwhile the volumes of disbursed capital were increasing steadily and reached 2 2,3 bln. USD per year.

Regional countries are the main investors in Vietnams economy with Singapore, Taiwan and Japan always on leading positions. FDI projects were registered in almost all 50 Vietnamese provinces, but more than 70% of its volume are concentrated in the South key economic region (includes Hochiminh city, Dong Nai, Binh Duong and Baria-Vungtau provinces) and Hanoi. At the present moment more than 2/3 of FDI capital is channeled to industry and construction. In some key industries (oil&gas, automobile, metallurgy, etc.) foreign investments are playing the leading role. All the economic indicators of FDI enterprises were growing rapidly during the last decade. In 2002 enterprises with FDI capital produced 13% of countrys GDP, 35% of total indus trial production, 27% of exports (if including crude oil this figure increases up to 47%), they pro vided 20% of state budget revenues and almost 0,5 million jobs for local stuff.

All these facts prove the increasing role of FDI sector in Vietnamese economy, which has all the potential for growth in the years to come. The main problem now is how to attract more foreign investments. Both Vietnamese and international experts admit that the only way to fulfill this target is to upgrade radically the business environment in the country.

Development of ODA programs in Vietnam began after 1975, but prior to 1993 it was mainly nominal with small amounts of aid disbursed by several UN agencies. In the 90s with the normalization of relations between major countries, international organizations and Vietnam ODA was rising fast. Through 11 annual donors conferences since 1993, ODA funds in Vietnam were growing rapidly from year to year and by the end of 2002 donors pledges reached 20 bil lion USD with credit agreements signed for 16,4 bln., of which disbursed capital amounted to 10 bln. USD. Apart from FDI capital ODA inflows to Vietnam were growing steadily during the past decade and reached almost 1,5 bln. USD of disbursed capital in 2002. Now ODA consti tutes almost 15% of countrys total investment capital and 40% of foreign capital inflows to Vietnam. The proportion of non-refundable aid now is less than 20% of total committed capital, the rest are loans at preferential interests. Classified by the volume of ODA commitments for several years in a row there are three major donors of Vietnam (of total 20 bilateral donors, international organizations and 400 non-governmental organizations): Japan, World Bank and Asian Development Bank. These 3 donors provide more than 80% of total aid to Vietnam.

Nowadays more than a half of total ODA funds are channeled to infrastructure devel opment, which mainly includes energy and transport. The second half is divided in approxi mately equal shares between social sphere, institutional support and rural development. ODA programs are implemented on both central and local level. Now Vietnamese government as well as donor agencies are focused on decentralization of aid disbursement in order to make it more adequate for local needs. At the moment the most important task is to improve the process of aid disbursement, to facilitate all the related procedures and harmonize the coordination work be tween donors and recipient Vietnamese agencies.

So, foreign capital constitutes an integral part of Vietnamese economy and now plays a significant role in the countrys development. In the coming years Vietnam seems to follow the trend of becoming less dependent from foreign financing, but still the role of FDI and ODA cant be underestimated in the countrys future.


: Le Hong Thai Moscow State University. The Institute of Asian and African Studies Research Post-graduate student Vietnam-Russian partnership in the new global configuration The author analyses new tendencies of relations between Vietnam and Russia during the period after disintegration of Soviet Union and all socialist system. This article represents a part of the generalized research of Vietnamese foreign policy from the late 1980s to the beginning of XXI century, aimed to reveal ways, forms and features of Vietnam's entry to the international rela tions in the post Soviet period. The author aspired to find out, how that policy corresponds to geo political and economic tendencies of the present time. It helps to understand the new concept of national security of Vietnam, as the major component of the development strategy of this country.

As a whole changes in relations of S.R. of Vietnam with Russia are still insufficiently investigated and even less publicly discussed in our countries. Present article aims to fill in the vacuum especially evident in comparison with former fundamental works of the Soviet re searchers on the subject of Vietnam's foreign policy and mutual cooperation. The overview of the Russian partner of the character of mutual relations, its position to develop bilateral relations in new international context has received only primary generalization in scientific periodical press of the Russian Federation.

For better understanding a modern situation the author first of all estimates the basic re sults of cooperation with the USSR. Alongside with the decisive contribution of the Soviet Union to formation of an economic complex in the country he outlines serious mistakes in elaborating general strategy of economic development. This strategy did not correspond to real conditions and needs of Vietnam and has caused the most serious system economic crisis in late 1980s-early 1990s. As other reason of crisis is named cancellation of so cold ideological component of co operation. Without this core component the relations between two countries has been collapsed, and then it required considerable efforts to restrain them from total reduction.

Certain revival of relations after several years of practically full stagnation the author dates by the second half of 90s when joint economic projects and top-level visits came into ac tions. Specifying objective reasons of this process the article notes first the formation during past fifty years of a strong economic bases of bilateral interaction. The factories constructed by Soviet Union in many respects formed the base for development of key industries and agricul ture in Vietnam, have allowed to achieve main tasks of social and economic development. Sec ondly, Russia use to be in a great contrast with largest powers conducting struggle for strength ening of the positions in region and Vietnam itself. Vietnamese people have no syndromes or the biases concerned to Russia and connected to historical past or approach to the decision of inter national and internal political questions. Thirdly, dependence of Vietnam on deliveries of the Russian equipment, and also rendering of services in military technical sphere is kept.

All these factors, to the authors view, are quite favorable both for continuation of con fidential political dialogue, and for constructive work in traditional and new fields of coopera tion. At the same time, he recognizes, that a present situation in bilateral relationship, basically much more, than former corresponds to realities, needs and opportunities of the two parties.

Then the article characterizes the process and features of reestablishing and develop ment of bilateral relations. Their stages, concrete participants and quantitative parameters are shown too. As the international politics in more and more wide scales serves economic interests of its subjects the states, big attention is given to economic aspects of cooperation.

Indochina: Trends in development The author supposes that renewal of Hanoi foreign policy was accelerated both by car dinally changed geopolitical situation in the world and the internal demands. From the late 80's the process of all-round reforms so cold doi moi was began in the country, especially radi cal it was in economy and foreign policy.

The article shows some new contents of relations in view of changed external priorities of both countries and establishing by them of market mechanisms. The reasons of why the Rus sian Federation has actually dropped out of the list of the core partners of Vietnam are re vealed;

some opportunities of overcoming of the arisen difficulties are determined. The author exposes concept of strategic partnership as new definition of mutual cooperation. Along with characteristics of different spheres of this partnership the basic attention is given to trade and economic relations, including export-import operations, settlement of a debt problem, realiza tion of investment, scientific and technical projects.

The analysis made by the author allows to draw a basic conclusion that since the second half of 1990's the Vietnam-Russian relations gradually went out from impasse and critical situa tion. In his opinion, this trend confirms that the parties maintain interest to continue their multi ple cooperation. The Vietnam-Russian relations unlike other traditional connections with the former socialist countries of the Central and East Europe all the same were kept from full scale and all-round curtailing.

It is shown, that bilateral relations retain, basically, complex character, in many impor tant spheres is still kept confidence. According to this view the author makes important conclu sion about real long-term prospects of mutual partnership. Thus he takes into account the con formity of Vietnam and Russian approaches on the key international problems, and the presence in Vietnamese society of the wide strata sympathizing Russia and actively supporting further cooperation.

For Vietnam maintaining and widening of all-round contacts with old and reliable part ner is one of necessary vectors of its foreign policy. Such need is dictated for Hanoi both by its goal for political, especially military-political balance of power in Asia-Pacific region and protection of the trade and economic interests. The parties, on the author's view, have not yet explored potential of cooperation created in the soviet period in trade, economic, scientific and technical spheres.

At the same time, the author makes forecast of possible evaluation of bilateral relations in view of change of a situation in the region and the world. He recognizes, that in present situa tion, when presence of the third countries in Vietnam becomes more and obvious, Russia hardly might return the lost positions. Feature will depend much on how the Russian Federation will be active and effective to operate here either in political and economic or in cultural and education fields. Outlining the best way doing the article recommends for a correct choice of directions and objects of technical and investment cooperation, terms of export-import deliveries, strengthening of a support of joint projects at the state level.

V. Mazyrin Moscow State University. The Institute of Asian and African Studies Associate professor Vietnamese migrants in Russia: ways of living, problems and perspectives This article represents one of the first attempts to draw the general picture and charac teristic features of Vietnamese migration to Russia, which turned out significant since 1980s.


: The author analyzes specific patterns of the formation of Vietnamese community becoming an important, but isolated part of Russian society. He gives his own provisional calculation of Viet namese population here, an estimation of dynamics and the reasons of inflow of Vietnamese migrants (Vietkieu) to the Russian Federation, structure, interests, difficulties of life and pros pects of their further stay in the country.

Statistics and conclusions given in the article arise mainly from the sociological survey (poll), made by the author himself in 2002 through interviewing 261 Vietnamese migrants in main localities of their habitation in Russia (Moscow, Saint-Petersburg, Vladivostok). Above mentioned survey concerned all illegal immigrants penetrated to Russia;

it was organized and sponsored by Moscow representative office of the International migration organization.

Firstly, the article introduces the politics of Hanoi leadership in the field of manpower export. It stresses that Vietnamese community abroad is very wide Vietkieu live in more, than 100 countries, totally estimated by 2,5 2,7 million. Government of SRV encourages departure and work of labor force abroad in view of difficult demographic situation and a low standard of living of the population.

The author analyzes the attitude to Vietnamese migration in Russia too. He emphasizes that public attention to the problems born by this inflow constantly grows. However authorities have not yet developed a consecutive position concerning Vietkieu, process of immigration is not studied broadly.

The governments of two countries undertake feeble attempts to find together adequate forms for decision of migrants problems. In particular, the two parties are now occupied with launching of an agreement on cooperation in education and professional training of the person nel, which might create a legal basis of Vietnamese stay in Russia.

Dynamics, channels, motives and legal status of Vietnamese migration are considered carefully. Number of Vietkieu in the Russian Federation is estimated by 100 120 thousand, half of them live in Moscow. Last decade the number of visitors from Vietnam quickly grew.

However as a whole Vietnamese community is far enough from occupying a leading position.

The share of Vietnamese migrants among all foreign residents across Russia does not exceed 0,5 1%, and among the population of the Russian Federation only 0,069%. While comparing the number of Vietnamese emigrants worldwide anyone could see that less than 5% of them live in Russia.

Besides a small part of Vietnamese citizens, who is legally taking place in Russia (em ployees of the state, private enterprises and firms, students, etc.), this community by most part consists of immigrants, including those who refused to return home after termination of their study or work in Russia. Many of them actively accommodate here members of family and relatives.

The status of the majority of Vietkieu in Russia is contradictory. They have made en trance legally, having a service passport, the unitary or repeated visa. But they live and work here frequently on illegal or semi legal position. Meanwhile they keep Vietnamese citizenship.

Vietkieu could be named forced migrants, but not political refugee. Their arrival is caused mainly by economic reasons, positive aspirations. Vietnamese migration to the Russian Federation, thus, has mainly labor character.

Consequences of such illegal status are extremely negative. Vietkieu do not feel stability of their stay in Russia, they do not see long prospects. The extremely insignificant part of mi grants plans long life and citizenship here, ready for investment of capital in improvement of own life and expansion of the business.

The author characterizes the abilities, life stile and social structure of Vietkieu. There are no any places of communal habitation of Vietnamese immigrants in Russia like China towns. The majority lives in hotels, hostels, apartment of the firms, they occupy very rare Indochina: Trends in development buildings and apartments, which were rented or bought from local residents. Vietkieu are dis persed by small enclaves on the territory of cities, especially large towns.

The article stresses high competitiveness of Vietnamese people compared to other pre tenders for workplaces as the reasons of their successful inflow and making business in Russia.

An establishment of various connections with local population (including marriage) and authori ties is outlined too among the factors of success.

The author supposes the structure of Vietkieu community to be modified not in the best direction last time. Migrants of a new wave know Russian and local laws worse, have lower professional level, they are occupied mainly in trade, instead of manufacture in the past.

The social structure of Vietnamese community is similar to a pyramid. Rich business men (1% of total), among which a lot live in Russia for 10 20 years, form its top. Up to 5% of total belongs to the second, less elite group, which is serving to the first as managers, employ ers. There are enough students and scientific stuff among them. The third part, extensive enough (about 30%), includes workers loaders, carriers and other subsidiary personnel. The basis of a pyramid (2/3 of total amount) consists of small businessmen occupied mainly in trade activities.

Two last groups have no any economic prospects in the Russian market and will be steadily ejected by legal and administrative measures.

Describing business-making practice of Vietkieu the author stresses big changes to be occurring. The assortment of the goods is essentially updated;

the retail trade in the markets is conducted mainly not by Vietnamese, but by Russians or natives of CIS countries, employed by them;

trade activities become more and more civilized. At the end of 90s Vietnamese big pri vate businessmen in Russia were already engaged in industrial manufacturing and rather large export operations.

Having accumulated the initial capital, the most successful Vietkieu have started other kinds of business: services, real estate, investment and construction. The author states an impor tant qualitative change in Vietnamese private business in the Russian Federation the beginning of a transition from import of manpower from Vietnam to the import of capital and technologies.

Negative moments of Vietnamese conduct are lightened too. The life being and com mercial activities of migrants often take place in shadow economy. Therefore it is accompa nied by negative phenomena: infringements of a passport and visa regimes and a social order, unsanitary conditions of habitations, sale of low quality goods, payoff for officials and other swindles.

Illegal character of Vietkieus stay and business in Russia creates nutritious ground for activities of native criminal elements. The author cites documentary evidence, according which criminal gangs operate in the main places of community habitation.

Even those Vietnamese, who are not connected directly with a criminal case at all, show vigilance towards Russian authorities because of vulnerable position of Vietkieu. Such attitude is caused by numerous threats to their existence in this country, such as requisitions of their property by militia, constant testing visits of different inspections, tax bodies and local officials, trusteeship of gangster roofs.

Making conclusions the author notes that Vietnamese community, nevertheless, became an integral part of economic and public life of Russia. Therefore he recommends faster solving ques tions of Vietkieus stay and work here, removing bureaucratic barriers that restrain this change.

Objective research of all conditions and prospects of Vietnamese business in Russia helps to understand, that it should be recognized but put in strict legal frameworks. Thus we could encourage Vietnamese investments into Russian economy, strengthen an atmosphere of goodwill and mutual understanding.

Numerous tables illustrate the article.

: P. Shustrov Moscow State University. The Institute of Asian and African Studies Research Post-graduate student From the history of the economic development of Thailand In the middle of the 19th century Siamese rulers whenever they wanted it or not were pressed to open the country to the European countries. Siamese-Britain Bowring treaty of made the countrys foreign trade de-jure available for foreigners thus de-facto involving Siam into closer ties with European superpowers like Great Britain and France. Once opened for the entire world the Kingdom of Siam has had to choose its place and role in the world and region economy. Being surrounded by Britain and French colonies like Burma, Malaya, Laos and Cambodia the country has nothing left but to do her best both economically and politically. Ob viously there was no way to win in her struggle for independency with Britain and France but anyway some chances not to be torn to pieces between these giants were still sufficiently high.

So political and economic modernization could be the only reaction to the challenges of the fast-changing world and Siamese monarchs namely Mongkut (Rama IV) and his son Chu lalongkorn (Rama V) have decided to enter this long but promising path hardly realizing what was waiting for them at the end. In any case Siam would have never lost more than when she has started the reforms. The country didnt have enough space for maneuver so she could rely only upon her own resources and strong wish to survive.

The clear understanding of what to do was mixed with the lack of practical knowledge and reliable executors. Thats why generally right approach to the reformation process has led the country to some wrong results. Monarch refusal from foreign trade monopoly has raised the vitally important question of sources for the reform financing. The ruling elite understood the modernization as westernization so all know-how and technologies should be brought from Europe and only silver or pound sterling could be used as a mean of payment. So export of any products could bring such needed hard currency into the country and provide necessary financ ing of the reforms. Due to the coincidence of various circumstances just after 20 years of the foreign trade monopoly abolition the rice has become the main export commodity and for the next 75 years its share never has fallen below 40% of overall export volume.

At the early beginning of the reforms rice export revenues have been used as the main source of modernization financing. These revenues have helped Siamese government to under take such important reforms like administrative, financial, and military. The abolition of slavery itself was one of the main engines of the reforms and in turn it has made a significant contribu tion to the export potential of the country, which has led the economic development for many decades. But the situation has dramatically changed as rice production has turned into nightmare and the main obstacle of radical economic reforms.

Siamese society has quickly used to rest on the laurels and spent out the fruits of rice export. The country has got into the trap of a monoculture economy: she couldnt break with her dependency on rice export revenues which was vitally necessary for the reforms and weak at tempts of transformation to capitalism and the more reforms have been undertaken the tougher the dependency has become. The vicious circle has got its start in 1870-s and lasted as long as 80 years till the very end of the World War II. The country has truly become a raw material ad junct of the industrially developed countries. Any motion was evident only in rice growing, processing and export and even government infrastructure projects were fully designed to sat Indochina: Trends in development isfy the needs of the increasing rice production and to facilitate immediate delivery to the world markets.

Along with the rice export three other commodities teak, rubber and tin accounts for as much as 80% of the total export volume. After the removal of kings foreign trade monopoly the ancestral aristocracy has begun to loose its positions in foreign trade to the active Chinese immigrants, which started to build their so-called mat and pillow capitalism at the end of the 19th century. As soon as before the World War II they have managed to concentrate in their purses the amounts comparable with the countrys budget and only small sums have worked for their new homeland well-being. The matter was that main financial flows were directed outside the country going to mainland China, Hong Kong and Singapore. At the same time the domestic market was so weak and consumption was so low due to the self-sufficiency of the most Sia mese households. Thats why no modern industries could be established as a sufficient amount of the consumers of their products werent likely to be found.

These two main reasons have got a crucial impact on Siamese economy, which couldnt even afford herself any hope for the best future. Monoculture economy was an unbearable bur den for the country and rice export-driven development exhausted Siams people and nature capital. Such a development has limited average annual GDP growth during 1850 1950 to less than 2% while per capita hardly reached 0.1 0.2%. That means that most of the countries population has seen no changes from the country opening in 1850-s. Stagnation is the right word for the process taking place in the country with much more potential for the fast economic growth than any other country in the region and which has done practically nothing to change the advantages into the gains.

However even such a stagnation-like development has brought some use and Siamese capitalism has been born evolutionary and slowly. The forces, which later have leaded the capi talism break-through of 1950 1960-s, have latently collected their mightiness some 20 years before that time. Siamese Chinese and later Thai Chinese bourgeoisie has matured gradually from the beginning of the 20th century. It took them 50 years to be matured enough to fight against the old development paradigm and to overcome the momentum of half-feudal self sufficient economy. Thailand has missed the opportunity of the rapid capitalism transition twice in the mid 1850-s and at the beginning of the 20-th century. She cant afford herself missing the third, probably the last chance. Strong political will and accumulated economic re sources have helped the country to avoid being an outsider any more and to change the policy of reactions to the policy of challenges.

. .. : 03821 25.01.2001 .

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